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ABSTRACT
This dissertation presents research conducted during the hurricane seasons of 2017 and
2018 in New Orleans, Louisiana. The research’s purpose was to assess citizen perceptions of
evacuation support services offered during mandatory evacuation events. A prospective
quantitative survey and qualitative, open-ended, semi-structured interview assessed perceptions.
Both research methods were designed and assessed using the constructs of the Health Belief
Model, a public health model created to assess perceived barriers, benefits, risks, severity, selfefficacy, and cues to action regarding health programming. Quantitative research yielded 211
surveys, representing opinions of New Orleans residents within 1-km Euclidian distance of an
evacuation pick-up marker. Qualitative research yielded 20 interviews detailing perceptions of
evacuation support in New Orleans across Evacuspot zones. Quantitative findings found that:
social support systems influence decisions to evacuate and influence varies by race; gendered
preference for evacuating in New Orleans is higher for males; pet ownership lowers evacuation
preference; the elderly have a lower preference for evacuation; disability status does not impact
evacuation preference; there is no association found in awareness of evacuation assistance
programming by education level, but there is an association by race; there is no association found
between homeowners and non-homeowners in self-reported evacuation compliance; and, trust in
the City of New Orleans varies significantly by race and education level. Qualitative findings
included perceived barriers of pet ownership, finances, age, anxiety, property ownership, traffic,
lack of preparedness messaging, low levels of trust in city services, and misunderstanding of
programming; perceived benefits of personal comfort; risk perceptions that were influenced by
perceptions of city competency; low perceived self-efficacy to use evacuation programming; few
local cues to action to utilize programming; and perceptions of severity influenced by
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misunderstandings of the Saffir-Simpson scale. Results led to conclusions regarding the current
prospective efficacy of City-Assisted Evacuation in New Orleans, and enabled recommendations
for improving programming strategies. This research seeks to move evacuation behavior
research from vulnerability-factor based research to multi-variable, intersectional, community
informed assessment strategies, and contributes to literature on proactive emergency
management strategies and expressed preference approach research.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
City-Assisted Evacuation
In August of 2005, 37 hours before Hurricane Katrina made landfall, then-Mayor C. Ray
Nagin made a last-minute decision to issue a mandatory evacuation of New Orleans. Residents
were left scrambling to evacuate. This was far less time than the minimum 48 hours FEMA
recommends as the standard notice of a mandatory evacuation (Emergency Management
Chatham, 2012). Only 80 percent of the city had evacuated by the time Hurricane Katrina made
landfall (Boyd, 2011:vi). Of the approximately 100,000 residents left behind to weather the
storm, more than 55 percent of those left in the city lacked access to transportation (Boyd,
2011:vi). Louisiana officials estimate that 1,464 New Orleanians died as a direct result of being
stranded during flooding from Hurricane Katrina, and the number of additional deaths caused by
circumstances directly related to the disaster were estimated to be at least 1,575, according to the
Louisiana Katrina Victim database (Boyd, 2011:vi). Three weeks after the storm, a Kaiser
Permanente survey identified “not having a car” as the number-one reason residents had failed to
evacuate (Roy, 2016).
The City of New Orleans responded to the tragedies of Hurricane Katrina by creating a
City-Assisted Evacuation program (CAE) to provide full assistance to vulnerable population
groups who were unable to evacuate independently (Roy, 2016). The CAE program is
considered by planners to be a low-barrier program, with open access to any and all users. No
advance registration is required—those who need assistance simply arrive at one of 17
designated pickup points located throughout the City of New Orleans, where they will receive a
safe ride out of town to an area shelter during a mandatory evacuation event. The program is
also designed to return citizens to their original pickup destinations when it is safe to reenter the
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city. Of the 17 designated pickup points, five are designated as “Senior Evacuspots,” and offer
extra help for senior citizens. In addition, anyone with medical or other mobility needs who
needs assistance reaching a designated pickup spot can advance register for pickup by calling 31-1 in New Orleans and adding themselves to the Special Needs Registry.
City officials tested the New Orleans CAE program once during the mandatory
evacuation issued for Hurricane Gustav in 2008. While authorities estimate that between 15,000
and 20,000 New Orleans residents and tourists utilized the CAE program (Kiefer et. al, 2009;
Fogarty, 2011), that number is far below projections of the number of New Orleanians who lack
personal transportation and need evacuation assistance, which the city currently anticipates to be
closer to 35,000 individuals. The anticipated CAE utilization number reflects projections made
by New Orleans Regional Transit Authority (RTA) using 2015 statistics, of approximately 1/3 of
regular transit users who presumably would not be able to find a single seat in any car leaving
the city, and thus, would require CAE assistance (Roy, 2016).
Evacuteer
When the CAE program was tested by Hurricane Gustav in 2008, Robert X. Fogarty was
serving as a volunteer coordinator for the New Orleans Mayor’s office. Fogarty helped
coordinate over 200 volunteers, many of whom were AmeriCorps members, who provided
emergency assistance to the CAE program. These volunteers stepped in where needed during
the emergency event, registering riders, tagging luggage, and maintaining a sense of order.
Realizing that the CAE program would not have gone as smoothly without the valuable
assistance from volunteers, Fogarty saw a need to formalize an agreement that would provide
surge-capacity assistance from volunteers upon activation of the CAE program. The non-profit
organization Evacuteer (a portmanteau of “evacuation” and “volunteer”) formed in August 2009.
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Today, Evacuteer aims to improve CAE usage and function by training volunteers to
assist with CAE protocols and improve and expedite the evacuation process. Evacuteer partners
with the City of New Orleans to deploy volunteers to assist civilians throughout the city at 17
evacuation pickup points, each designated by an official Evacuteer “Evacuspot” marker in the
form of a tall metal figure hailing a taxi. During an evacuation activation, Evacuteers help
citizens navigate through each step of the CAE process. They assist evacuees when waiting for
pickup, when boarding buses with luggage and family and pets, when arriving at a central transit
location in downtown New Orleans, and when transferring to charter buses to travel to safe
shelter outside the city. When Evacuteer is not directly assisting with an evacuation event, the
organization is working to recruit and train approximately 500 volunteers each year. Beyond
being on-call to aid the city during hurricane season in the event of a mandatory evacuation
order, volunteers also assist Evacuteer with distributing information about the CAE program to
citizens at public outreach events. Although volunteer engagement peaks during the active
hurricane season of each calendar year, Evacuteer engages with its volunteer base year-round,
and each year a large number of Evacuteer registrants are repeat-volunteers who re-pledge and
commit to another year of service.
An Unusual Arrangement
As it functions today, the New Orleans CAE program is unique in that it is the only
governmental/non-profit partnership formally operating in the United States that aids anyone
who needs help during a mandatory evacuation. The New Orleans Office of Homeland Security
and Emergency Preparedness (NOHSEP) and Evacuteer work together as partners to manage the
CAE program, and NOHSEP (through its Ready.Nola.gov website) and Evacuteer (through
Evacuteer.org) are the two faces of the CAE Program outwardly displayed to city residents.
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Although Evacuteer also works to secure outside grant support and funding, the City of New
Orleans is Evacuteer’s primary financial contributor. The CAE program also functions with
assistance from a wide variety of city partner organizations, including the New Orleans Fire
Department (NOFD), the New Orleans Police Department (NOPD), the Louisiana SPCA, the
New Orleans Department of Health, New Orleans EMS, and the New Orleans Regional Transit
Authority (RTA), all of whom contribute valuable insight to the maintenance of a functional
evacuation assistance program in New Orleans.
Evacuation Assistance in the United States Today
Few other cities in the United States offer designated advance evacuation assistance, and
as a rule, those programs are significantly more restrictive than the New Orleans CAE program.
The two most notable examples of evacuation-assistance plans outside of the New Orleans CAE
program are Miami-Dade County’s Emergency and Evacuation Assistance Program (EEAP) and
the City of Houston’s State of Texas Emergency Assistance Registry (STEAR). Outlining the
limitations of these other programs can provide important context for understanding New
Orleans’ CAE program as a pioneering model for broad evacuation assistance.
Unlike New Orleans’ CAE Program, Miami-Dade’s EEAP is not available to anyone
who simply does not own a vehicle or have the financial resources to evacuate independently.
Instead, it provides evacuation support only to “residents who need specialized transportation
assistance or whose medical needs prevent them from evacuating on their own” and to their
“caregiver or companion,” who is expected to “accompany the evacuee throughout the
emergency period to ensure the evacuee’s needs are met in a timely manner” (Miami-Dade
County, 2019). The system is designed only for the person who needs assistance and their single
caretaker; it does not accommodate other family members who may want to remain with the
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special-needs individual during an evacuation. While the county’s website encourages residents
to register in advance if they anticipate utilizing Miami-Dade’s EEAP and states that those who
do will receive priority assistance, it also cautions that pre-registration does not guarantee
assistance (Miami-Dade County, 2019). A further limitation of Miami-Dade’s EEAP is that it
offers no provisions for pets and accommodates only registered medical support animals. Those
who need assistance evacuating must find an alternative caretaker for any pets during an
evacuation event.
The City of Houston’s STEAR is somewhat broader than Miami-Dade’s EEAP.
According to the city’s website, STEAR is designed for three groups: those who “don’t speak
English well or have any kind of disability which keeps them from communicating easily,” those
who “may need transportation assistance during an evacuation,” and those who “require
electricity for life-sustaining equipment (such as life support machines, electric wheelchairs, or
medication requiring refrigeration)” (City of Houston, 2018). Although there is little detail, this
suggests that the program will accommodate entire families who need assistance. Furthermore,
STEAR participants “will not be denied assistance” if they are traveling with a pet, but it is
unclear how pets will be evacuated or where they will be sheltered. Like the EEAP, STEAR
encourages potential evacuees to register in advance but cautions that registering in advance for
STEAR does not guarantee service.
Other locales, such as New York City and the State of North Carolina, have special-needs
registries intended to help emergency management teams estimate how many people may need
assistance in their areas during emergencies. However, these registries are not designed as fully
functional and organized evacuation-assistance programs that anticipate mobilizing wide-spread
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evacuation assistance in the event of a mandatory hurricane evacuation (New York City
Emergency Management, 2019; State of North Carolina Emergency Management, 2012).
Research Objectives
Although the city of New Orleans issued a mandatory evacuation notice 37 hours before
Hurricane Katrina made landfall, more than 100,000 residents failed to evacuate (Eisenmann, et
al., 20017). This was an extreme case, but it was not an anomaly. As American citizens
increasingly move in to coastal areas, our populations are at ever-greater risk for coastal storm
and flooding events. A recent report from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
(NOAA) states that 39 percent of our current total population lives in counties directly on U.S.
shorelines and that 52 percent of our current total population lives in counties that drain to
coastal watersheds, placing those counties at risk for flooding (2013). Coastal counties already
have a population density more than six times greater than inland counties (NOAA, 2013), and
by 2020, NOAA estimates that the total population of coastal areas will grow to roughly 134
million (2013). As more people move to areas where there is risk from storms, evacuation
planning for large population groups in coastal regions is of increasing interest, relevance, and
concern.
Much of the existing research regarding evacuation behavior comes from journals of
nursing, public health, and epidemiology and is intended to contribute to larger conversations
regarding hazard planning and preparedness strategies. This research tends to focus on
identifying and measuring the behavior of one or more categorically vulnerable population
groups, such as women with children (Bateman & Edwards, 2002), the elderly (Rosenkoetter et
al., 2007), the disabled (Willigen et al., 2002), or people with pets (Heath et al., 2001), and
typically studies actual evacuation outcomes for those groups after a catastrophic event (Bateman
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& Edwards, 2002; Rosenkoetter et al. 2007; Willigen et al., 2002; Health et al., 2001). What is
missing from health behavior literature specifically, and from emergency planning literature
more widely, are research methodologies that allow populations to self-assess their risks and
capabilities associated with a future evacuation event. As U.S. populations continue to diversify,
moving toward a model that allows for groups to self-identify unique strengths and weaknesses
should be a key component of all public health planning, with emergency preparedness planning
being no exception.
This dissertation examines New Orleanians’ perceptions of their city’s CAE program
through a quantitative survey based upon the Health Believe Model and auxiliary qualitative
research based upon survey results. Research objectives were to better understand citizenperceived barriers to program utilization, perceived benefits to program utilization, perceived
self-efficacy to utilize the program and cues to action for doing so, and perceived susceptibility
to and severity of hurricane risk in the city. My primary hope is that these research outcomes
increase the effectiveness of future programming strategies for Evacuteer and the New Orleans
CAE program. This research also seeks to aid understanding and assessment of future
behavioral trends in city-assisted evacuation program utilization more generally. As more cities
shift to proactive emergency evacuation planning strategies, planners will increasingly need to
find ways to assess citizen understandings and perceptions of their programming.
Overview of the Health Belief Model and its Application to Emergency Planning
U.S. Public Health Service social scientists developed the Health Belief Model (HBM) in
the 1950s to better understand the behavior of people who failed to participate in disease
protection and prevention programs (Glanz et al., 2008: 46). For example:
the Public Health Service was sending mobile X-ray units out to neighborhoods to offer
free chest X-rays (screening for tuberculosis). Despite the fact that this service was
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offered without charge in a variety of convenient locations, the program was of limited
success. (Rimer & Glanz, 2005:20)
The concept of the HBM is that to understand why situations like this occur and alleviate them in
the future, one must look at “personal beliefs or perceptions about a disease [or health risk] and
the strategies available to decrease its occurrence” (Glanz et al., 2008:31). The original
constructs of the HBM are perceived susceptibility, perceived seriousness, perceived benefits,
and perceived barriers. Two additional constructs, cues-to-action and self-efficacy were added to
later improve the model (Table 1.1; Glanz et al., 2008:47).
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Table 1.1: Key Concepts and Definitions of the Health Belief Model (Glanz et al. 2008:48)
Concept
Definition
Application
Perceived susceptibility
Belief about the chances of
- Define population(s) at risk,
experiencing a risk or getting risk levels
a condition or disease
- Personalize risk based on a
person’s characteristics or
behavior
- Make perceived
susceptibility more consistent
with individual’s actual risk
Perceived severity
Belief about how serious a
Specify consequences of risks
condition and its sequelae are and conditions
Perceived benefits
Belief in efficacy of the
Define action to take: how,
advised action to reduce risk
where, when; clarify the
or seriousness of impact
positive effects to be
expected
Perceived barriers
Belief about the tangible and Identify and reduce perceived
psychological costs of the
barriers through reassurance,
advised action
correction of misinformation,
incentives, assistance
Cues to action
Strategies to activate
Provide how-to information,
“readiness”
promote awareness, use
appropriate reminder systems
Self-efficacy
Confidence in one’s ability to - Provide training and
take action
guidance in performing
recommended action
- Use progressive goal setting
-Give verbal reinforcement
- Demonstrate desired
behaviors
- Reduce Anxiety
By studying evacuation behaviors using the HBM parameters and thinking of “failure to
evacuate” as a distinct health risk, we might be able to better understand generally why a wellintentioned city evacuation service was under-utilized, and, more specifically, what factors might
impact future evacuation event outcomes, based upon how citizens perceive evacuation
assistance programming in their areas.
A baseline premise in current health literature surrounding evacuation behaviors is that
those who do not use evacuation services face a barrier to accessing the service such as fear of
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losing a job (Elder et al., 2007), lack of access to a pet carrier or having multiple pets (Heath et
al. 2001), concern over property left behind being stolen or vandalized (Elder et al. 2007;
Eisenman et al., 2007), mistrust of the government or social services (Rosenkoetter et al., 2007),
personal financial constraints (Curtis, Mills & Leitner, 2007), or reluctance to take a long
journey (Jenkins and Laska, 2008). While barriers are certainly relevant to evacuation outcomes,
they cannot entirely explain them. Perceptions and attitudes also affect decision-making
practices. Using the HBM can help us to better quantify attitudes, perceptions, and beliefs
regarding the seriousness of evacuation in a measurable, concrete fashion. This type of data is
useful to city planners, health promotion campaign strategists, weather messaging specialists,
non-profit aid organizations, social scientists, educators, and—ultimately—the potential
evacuees who receive messaging in potentially high-risk situations.
Justification of Research
This research attempts to improve the success of the governmental/community-based
partnership between Evacuteer and the City of New Orleans CAE program through the
implementation of a replicable, evidence-based evaluation strategy. This is directly in line with
the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s (CDC) Public Health Capability 1:
Community Preparedness, which suggests a structured format for public and private
organizations to use jointly when undertaking risk assessments and risk reduction actions (CDC,
2016). Capability 1 intends to increase continuity in citywide planning efforts (CDC, 2016).
Evacuteer conducted some preliminary risk assessments prior to my research period. In
2016, they conducted a “Nola Readiness Ride” survey aboard RTA buses with input from city
planners and community leaders. Evacuteer staff and volunteers performed the evaluation to
assess awareness of CAE services among New Orleanians who will likely require evacuation
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assistance. The evaluation explored levels of familiarity with local pick-up locations and the
symbols used to designate Evacuspots. A team of 50 volunteers conducted the evaluation
interviews, completing 325 in-person survey interviews with New Orleans RTA passengers over
a three-day period. RTA riders were selected as the focus group, under the assumption that RTA
riders are less likely to have access to personal transportation, and therefore more likely to need
CAE assistance. Although the Readiness Ride survey was successful in highlighting a number
of areas that needed improvement, with only six questions, it was limited in scope. And with
participation only from RTA riders, it could not seek engagement and representation from
projected service communities beyond those who do not have access to personal transportation.
My research broadly incorporates the types of questions asked in the Readiness Rides but
is more comprehensive in scope and representation. Its aim was to use a standardized and
replicable research model, the HBM constructs, to develop questions regarding CAE utilization
practices. I first conducted a quantitative survey over the 2017 hurricane season in New Orleans
communities served by an Evacuspot, and then conducted a set of qualitative interviews within
those same communities the following year. Using the HBM to guide the creation of a
quantitative survey tool and to inform subsequent qualitative interviews allowed me to gain a
better understanding of self-perceived barriers to evacuation, self-perceived risks associated with
evacuation, perceived seriousness of evacuating, perceived benefits to evacuation, and perceived
self-efficacy and cues-to-action regarding evacuation. It also allowed me to engage with citizens
to better understand how these perceptions generally inform overall sentiments toward the CAE
program and Evacuteer.
This approach is consistent with findings from Ejeta and colleagues, working from the
Department of Disaster and Emergency Health in Tehran, Iran. They explain that an integral
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component of Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) is a high level of household and community level
preparedness (2016:2). The researchers posit that actions performed by communities and
individuals can make a significant impact on the ultimate reduction of deaths and injuries
suffered as a direct result of disasters. The researchers explain that a major concern among DRR
investigators is that, although communities often acknowledge the risk that potential disasters
pose to them, they also often exhibit low levels of preparedness. They go on to state that
research regarding the discrepancies between risk acknowledgement and levels of preparedness
need to be explored in order to create more effective DRR strategies. The authors hypothesize
that revising a model such as the HBM to suit community perceptions might be useful in
understanding community sentiment in places like Ethiopia, where flood risk is high and group
beliefs are often prevalent due to strong community cohesion (2016:3). Although populations in
Ethiopia and New Orleans vary in significant ways, I anticipate that using the HBM in the
United States to better understand the relationship between individual or community knowledge
and action (or lack of action), will lead to a more easily replicable research methodology that
planning and preparedness researchers can use across multiple types of events to create more
effective proactive preparedness strategies.
Planning and preparedness research in the United States currently assesses barriers and
risks associated in terms of vulnerability as defined by demographic characteristics (see Ch. II
below). Language in the field of emergency planning is only just beginning to include concepts
of self-efficacy, self-perception, or personal attitudes concerning evacuation as those concepts
relate to what constitutes vulnerability. In the future, using constructs such as the HBM to assess
self-perception of risk factors associated with potential catastrophic events may produce a better
understanding of the relationships between individual/community knowledge, perceptions, and
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action. Doing so could improve both how geographers and other social scientists currently
understand and define “vulnerability” and how public health practitioners target and tailor health
messaging, leading to improved outcomes for the populations they study and serve.
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CHAPTER II
LITERATURE REVIEW
Introduction
This research is situated widely within the body of literature that comprises “modern
disaster research,” as defined by Barkun in 1977. In an attempt to catalog a “comprehensive”
history of how we think of such events, Barkun created a typology of disasters with three
modalities, which he calls the homeostatic, metastatic, and hyperstatic. According to Barkun, all
result from changes in predictability, a source of stress, and perceptions of solvability
(1977:219). Barkun explains that disasters can be distinguished from one another by both
temporal and spatial boundaries, and categorizes the modalities as follows. Homeostatic
disasters are catastrophes that are natural events, which briefly affect the rhythms of nature
before nature returns to balance; floods, storms, and “natural” disasters are in this category, and
Barkun explains that this type was predominant prior to around 1750. Metastatic disasters are
those that are caused by human behavior; as such, spatial and temporal boundaries are unclear
because humans have tampered with them; conventional warfare, explosions, and economic
fluctuations are in this category. And lastly, hyperstatic disasters are catastrophes so intense that
they destroy any discernable spatial and temporal boundaries because they have systemdestroying properties; this category includes nuclear war, genocide, and world depression
(1977:220). Barkun situates modern disaster research within the period following World War II,
amid concerns over nuclear attacks in the 1950s (1977:220). He explains that homeostatic
disasters yield the most easily accessible, safest, and most economical research sites and are thus
the easiest to study, and that a disproportionate amount of disaster research lies within this
category. He then speaks to a need to increase the study of metastatic disasters, where humans
influence spatiality and temporality, and there is an awareness of disaster as a cultural artifact
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(1977:221). Today’s most accepted definition of what constitutes a “disaster” is more simply
defined in an easy to remember formula: (Vulnerability + Hazard / Capacity = Disaster) (IFRC,
n.d.). To explain, when existing vulnerabilities combine with a hazardous event and that
combination exceeds the local capacity of response to the event, the event can be considered a
disaster. In calling upon researchers to expand disaster research, Barkun further reminds that the
concept of a “disaster” is a mental construct imposed upon by experience and requires
“knowledge of a sense of vulnerability” (1977:221). It is precisely the idea of seeking out what
constitutes self-perceptions of vulnerability (or lack thereof) that guides this research.
More specifically, this research is interdisciplinary and is in conversation with literature
in public health practice surrounding emergency preparedness capabilities and functions, as well
as literature in geography surrounding evacuation, displacement, and migration trends related to
catastrophic events. This research also explores and pushes the boundaries of the ways that risk
is defined in both fields.
Linda Young Landesman, considered by many to be a pioneer in “clarifying the roles of
public health leadership and professional practice in multi-sector emergency management,”
helped to cement public health involvement in policy, foundational principles, and federal
emergency management response systems and capabilities (Wright, 2014: xv). In Case Studies in
Public Health Preparedness, Landesman recounts her involvement with Hurricane Floyd in 1999
as one of the first catastrophic events where FEMA’s Incident Command System (ICS) (the
organizing structure for managing emergencies in the U.S., originally designed to combat forest
fires), called upon the Department of Health to be integrated into the state’s response structure
following the storm (Landesman, 2014:45). Landesman explains that the role of public health
has since grown in importance, specifically in the aftermath of disasters, out of an expectation
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that the field is meant to protect people from environmental and safety hazards (Landesman,
2014:41). Although the response by public health practitioners to Floyd was not proactive, the
discipline did focus efforts on continuity of medical care, reuniting people, and coordinating care
for special-needs populations (Landesman, 2014:45). As the field of emergency management
within public health has progressed, efforts have remained focused on pre-designated at-risk
populations, but there has been a shift from pure response to pro-active planning protocols in an
effort to improve preemptively public health systems that will go in to place in the case of a
catastrophic event. Today, from an applied perspective, the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention’s (CDC) “Public Health Preparedness Capabilities: National Standards for State and
Local Planning” (CDC, 2016), as well as FEMA’s National Response Framework (FEMA, 2016)
outline the role of public health in emergency response practices.
This research seeks to contribute to methods used in CDC Capability One, Community
Preparedness, which asks that practitioners, “participate in awareness training with community
and faith-based partners on how to prevent, respond to, and recover from public health
incidents;” “engage public and private organizations in preparedness activities that represent the
functional needs of at-risk individuals as well as the cultural and socio-economic, demographic
components of the community;” and, “identify those populations that may be at higher risk for
adverse health outcomes.” Direct functions of Capability One that I seek to address include
Function One: “determine risks to health of jurisdiction,” and Function Four: “coordinate
training or guidance to ensure community engagement in preparedness efforts” (CDC, 2016). A
central theme of Capability One is a focus on educating constituency groups to identify risks, and
tailor preparedness efforts to best suit their own communities. Using Health Belief Model
(HBM) constructs to guide research on self-designated perceptions of risk and vulnerability
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allows for stronger continuity of community engagement from the initial assessment stage
through to planning and preparedness, because communities are able to self-assess their strengths
and weaknesses, rather than relying on a top-down government level assessment which generally
assumes more weaknesses than strengths.
Public Health Trends in Evacuation Behavior and Population Vulnerability Literature
Within public health literature, current research in evacuation behavior tends to focus on
understanding specific demographic groups as units and conducting studies as post-assessments
following mandatory evacuation non-compliance. The research has determined that these groups
are likely to behave in a specific way that is associated with unique characteristics of that given
demographic. Within such population group studies, researchers occasionally mention elements
of the HBM (such as perceived barriers), although they do not utilize all constructs of the model,
or formally identify the model by name as the foundation for informing survey designs or
measuring the likelihood of evacuation.
The research of Bateman and Edwards (2002) is an example of evacuation behavior
research by demographic groups. Bateman and Edwards (2002) specifically examined how
gender influences evacuation behavior in advance of hurricanes. The researchers examined
gendered variations in socioeconomic status, care-giving roles, evacuation incentives, and
exposure to and perception of risk, by conducting a cross-sectional telephone survey of 1,050
coastal households in North Carolina impacted by Hurricane Bonnie in 1998 (2002:107). The
authors found that women were more likely to evacuate than men, and they attributed this
behavior to gendered differences in the factors they studied. Analysis showed that, in part,
women were more likely than men to evacuate due to greater overall exposure to risk as defined
by housing type (permanent versus mobile structures), socio-economic status, access to a
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vehicle, and care-giving role status (2002:109). The researchers also conclude that women
possess heightened perceptions of risk, as measured by perceived risks of flooding and wind
(2002:111).
Elder and colleagues (2007) employ similarly demographic-driven research, focusing
specifically on the evacuation behaviors of African American populations in New Orleans, after
Hurricane Katrina. The researchers interviewed individuals who did not evacuate independently
and required emergency rescue in 2005. The researchers asked those who failed to evacuate
questions regarding their perceived vulnerability, perceived susceptibility, and perceived
experiences of racism and inequities experienced in the evacuation management of the storm
(2007:124). The authors concluded that there is a need for preparedness plans to be more
culturally sensitive in serving minority and low-income communities, and that this could be
achieved in part by decentralizing distribution systems for cash or vouchers to be spent on
expenses associated with evacuation (2007:128). The researchers in this study reported using the
HBM as the framework for developing their focus-group discussion guide. However, they did
use not all constructs of the model. While studying perceptions using a model-based approach
allows a group to self-report concerns to some degree, this particular research had a sample
population that was 100% African American, 67% male, and 73% single, so it does not fully
reflect populations in New Orleans or address full concerns regarding evacuation noncompliance for the city.
Another demographic that has been studied due to low compliance with mandatory
evacuation is pet-owners. Heath, Beck, and Glickman (2001) interviewed pet-owners who had
been asked to evacuate in anticipation of a flood event in Yuba County, California. The
researchers found that within pet-owning households, households that owned multiple pets
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evacuated less frequently than those with a single pet, as did households with “outdoor” dogs
(2001:659). Many of those who failed to evacuate also cited lack of access to a cat carrier
(2001:664). The researchers emphasize the importance of facilitating pet evacuation through
both pre-disaster education and pet-friendly resources (2001:663). While not explicitly stated,
many of the findings of Heath, Beck, and Glickman’s research could best be understood as
“perceived barriers” (using the constructs of the HBM), and most of their suggestions for
improving likelihood of evacuation have to do with eliminating some of the barriers identified
that pertain to the population studied.
Rosenkoetter and colleagues (2007) chose to study the elderly as a demographic unit,
focusing on their perceptions regarding hurricane evacuation both prior to, and after hearing
about the experiences of others and receiving education regarding what happened during
Hurricane Katrina. The researchers found that not believing media (specifically the television),
or county official’s warnings significantly decreased self-perceived likelihood of evacuation,
while hearing about what happened during Katrina significantly influenced (hypothetical) future
decisions to evacuate (2007:160). Again, this group of researchers employed some constructs of
the HBM without identifying a specific research model. Although the researchers claim to be
studying the elderly as their research demographic, their sample was also 100% African
American, and 100% low income (the population sample was drawn from donation sites offering
free meals), limiting the generalizability of their findings.
Examples of other demographic groups studied in recent evacuation behavior literature in
public health include studies of the evacuation behaviors of Vietnamese Americans (Vu,
VanLandingham, Do, and Bankston, 2009; Leong, Airriess, Li, Chen, and Keith, 2007), the
physically disabled (Willigen, Edwards, Edwards, and Hessee, 2002), and survivors of previous
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disasters (Bragin, 2014). While the work of each of these research teams lends valuable insight
into the likely behaviors of specific groups, and there are certainly many representatives of each
of these populations within New Orleans, none of the research reviewed is relevant to the
entirety of the portion of the New Orleans population that is likely to need to utilize CAE during
a future evacuation event.
Although not written with the CAE system specifically in mind, and not specifically
within the limited scope of public health research, Shirley Laska, a sociologist at the University
of New Orleans, foresaw severe shortcomings in studying evacuation from a limited setpopulation perspective. In “What if Hurricane Ivan Had Not Missed New Orleans,” Laska
pointed out that while approximately 600,000 residents of the Greater New Orleans Area
evacuated for Hurricane Ivan (2004) using the then newly instituted “contraflow” evacuation
plan (where vehicular traffic in incoming lanes is reversed to expand flow out of a given area),
an approximately equal number (who represented many distinct population groups) did not
(Laska, 2004:176). Of those that chose to remain, Laska found that many “felt safe in their
homes,” or were relying on a “cultural tradition of not leaving,” or were “discouraged by
negative experiences with past evacuations” (Laska 2004:176). Many of the results mentioned in
Laska’s 2004 article were echoed in concurrent research project outcomes from interviews with
would-be evacuees in twelve Louisiana parishes from the Spring of 2004 to the Spring of 2005
(Laska et al., 2005). In the twelve-parish survey, which encompassed both pre- and postHurricane Ivan results, Laska and colleagues focused on risk perceptions of Louisiana residents
when asked hypothetical questions about likelihood to evacuate in the face of a Category 3 storm
or higher. Laska and colleagues found that between Category 3 and Category 4 was the border
at which most people begin to perceive risk, that there was no evidence that Hurricane Ivan
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affected citizens perceptions of risk, and that willingness to evacuate was near identical in
parishes surveyed pre-Hurricane Ivan and post-Hurricane Ivan. Interestingly, the role of income
in affecting evacuation proved to be quite complicated and proved to have no consistent
relationship to evacuation behavior (Laska, 2005). Although Laska and colleagues did focus on
understanding self-perceptions, and factors that mitigated risk could be seen as protective, the
authors were not focusing on identifying perceived community strengths, or perceived benefits
associated with evacuation, and did not name a specific model approach.
Beyond exploring the social reasons that impact people’s decisions to evacuate, Laska
also warned of increased risk to those with medical challenges, those without personal
transportation, and homeless populations (Laska, 2004:176). Laska’s work turned out to be
prophetic, as many of the scenarios she had warned against played out during Hurricane Katrina
a year after her publication. In 2006 Laska and Morrow (2006) wrote about the social
vulnerabilities that hampered an effective evacuation in advance of Katrina. Rather than
focusing on the experiences of a specific population group, Laska and Morrow chose to focus on
the ways that “poverty, race, ethnicity, gender, age, health and physical ability, and housing
tenancy… affected hazard impact” (Laska & Morrow, 2006: 16). Laska and Morrow point out
that in many instances several factors associated with vulnerability (such as race, gender and
tenancy) converge, making mitigation, preparation, and evacuation studies geared toward a
specific unique population group ultimately ineffective (2006:19). The authors concluded by
calling for “social equity” during the recovery phase post-Hurricane Katrina, stating that without
it, social vulnerabilities will persist, and the city will not achieve resiliency (Laska & Morrow,
2006:22).
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Many of the socially vulnerable populations highlighted by Laska & Morrow (2006),
who were unable to participate in the contraflow evacuation process in advance of both
Hurricane Ivan and Hurricane Katrina, are precisely the population groups that the planners who
created CAE seek to target. In some ways, the program has been somewhat successful; in
unpublished focus group research with CAE participants, Evacuteer staff found that there were a
wide variety of categorically distinct populations that utilized CAE during the 2008 Hurricane
Gustav evacuation. Results of the focus groups conducted by Evacuteer showed that users of
CAE were: people who did not have a car or a reliable source of transportation, people who
could not drive long distances (or felt that they could not) due to health concerns or unreliable
transportation, people who had mobility issues or needed some other form of physical assistance,
elderly people, people who could not afford to evacuate independently and needed to stay in a
shelter, and even tourists who did not arrive to the city with personal transportation and were not
aware of other evacuation systems in place (Evacuteer, 2014).
Natural Hazards Research Trends in Evacuation Behaviors and Population Vulnerability
The field of natural hazards research has been influenced by a variety of social and
physical disciplines, all interested in contributing knowledge to how we conceptualize the ways
in which humans exist in hazardous environments, and how we can manage and improve upon
hazardous event outcomes. Geographers have been some of the earliest contributors to our
collective understanding of how humans and hazards interact. Geographers and public agencies
have considered evacuation as a component of human adjustments to flood-prone conditions
since the 1940s. In, Changes of Urban Occupance of Floodplains in the United States (1958),
White explores human behaviors, including relocation and evacuation, in response to hazards
(Boyd, 2011). In the 1950s, the federal document, “A Model Hurricane Plan for a Coastal
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Community” emphasized evacuation from flood-prone areas, rather than advocating for
structural defenses (National Hurricane Research Project Report, March 1959). In the article,
“The Floodplain and the Seashore: A Comparative Analysis of Hazard-Zone Occupance”(1964),
Burton and Kates also contribute to the historical narrative of how living in dangerous sites came
to be commonplace in America, stating that, while engineering works are the most prominent
forms of “human adjustments,” “permanent or emergency evacuation of population and
property” have also evolved as adjustments in response to flood hazards (1964:368). Burton and
Kates explore the advantages and allure of developing hazardous coastal areas and thus
increasing risk, citing opportunities for easy disposal of waste, opportunities for fresh water
(when rivers meet shorelines), relatively level land for building on, opportunities for harnessing
waterways to produce power, opportunities for fishing, and finally, but perhaps most
importantly, opportunities for recreational use of coastal land (1964:381-384). Further, in what is
perhaps the first behavioral assessment about how people who live in hazardous areas selfperceive risk, Burton and Kates interviewed “a number of managers of coastal property,” finding
that while, “a coast dweller without a little knowledge of storm potential has not been found,”
(1964:384), coast dwellers generally “tend to be optimistic in their assessments of the frequency,
likelihood, or probability of storm damage,” and “tend to underestimate the possible severity of
such damage” (1964:385).
While the literature in public health surrounding evacuation behaviors and evacuation
non-compliance is largely focused upon researching the characteristic behaviors of a defined
population at risk (such as the elderly, low income groups, or minorities), geographic
vulnerability research (where vulnerability is defined as a combination of the risk of
encountering a hazard and the ability to overcome or weather the potential hazard) has developed
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to focus on examining populations that either live in an area defined as “risky,” such as a flood
zone, or a coastal area, or, on using a collection of factors that are mappable demographic
characteristics (such as socioeconomic status, age, gender, and race/ethnicity) to determine social
vulnerability and produce a Social Vulnerability Index or SVI (see Cutter, 2003). Defining
demographic characteristics that increase vulnerability, and mapping them using GIS, allows for
a visual representation of where social vulnerability is likely highest and increased preparedness
efforts are needed.
Laska and Morrow used this approach to produce a map of “Combined Social
Vulnerability” in New Orleans, representing the city population in September of 2005, one
month after Hurricane Katrina (Laska & Morrow, 2006:20). Curtis, Mills, and Leitner (2007)
used a similar approach to illustrate “the geography of stress” in New Orleans following
Hurricane Katrina. For Curtis, Mills and Leitner, vulnerability is best mapped in terms of site
(the proximity to a hazard, such as a flood zone), and situation, which is defined as the social
context of a neighborhood (2007:315). According to the authors, social factors that are
situational and may be indicators of “stress” include housing condition and tenancy, vehicle
ownership, income, crime statistics, age demographic, birth weights, and evacuation and
relocation experiences. The authors show how such stressors can be mapped at the
neighborhood level and layered over something like flood maps to illustrate “geographies of
stress” following Hurricane Katrina. They then compare the maps produced to the “geographies
of stress” identified pre-Hurricane Katrina to help better understand which types of
vulnerabilities may indicate need for increased social support. The authors maintain that this
approach can be used to prioritize community outreach, although there is no direct input from the
community presumably being served.
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Although methods like the SVI and techniques for mapping “geographies of stress” show
areas of increased vulnerability as defined by combinations of demographic characteristics, such
methods are still limiting in that they do not consider how categorically vulnerable individuals
view themselves, their surroundings, or their capacities or desires to proactively participate in
reducing their own vulnerabilities or improving health outcomes by evacuating. In her most
recent work, Cutter agrees, stating, “[r]isk is an inherently spatial concept where location really
matters. However, very little work has been done to determine how geography enters into
people’s assessment of their own vulnerability when it comes to hurricanes” (Bowser and Cutter
2015:08). Additionally, while the aforementioned methods may be appropriate for identifying
risks, they are not designed to identify community strengths and incorporate those existing
strengths into planning protocols.
In addition to mapping vulnerability, natural hazards researchers have been questioning
what constitutes a hazard, how hazards may be (and often are) a product of human design rather
than natural occurrences, and how the production of man-made hazards plays in to the creation
of increased vulnerability. In Disasters by Design (1999), Dennis Mileti, sociologist and former
director of the Natural Hazards Center in Boulder, Colorado, discusses how economic, social,
and political decision-making processes have shaped natural events to create increased risk.
Mileti argues that many disaster losses are the predictable results of interactions between the
physical environment (which includes natural events like hurricanes and floods), social and
demographic characteristics, and the constructed environment (1999:3). Mileti explains that as
the population in the U.S. grows increasingly more diverse, “the need for mitigation and
response efforts that acknowledge the demographic differences among the nation’s citizens will
become even more critical” (1999:7).
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The purpose of this study is to add another dimension of analysis (beyond mapping
vulnerabilities as they are defined from top-down perspectives), to consider when assessing both
where and how to improve or increase evacuation assistance efforts. More specifically, this
study speaks to a need to conduct research in Louisiana, with a population group that includes
individuals previously affected by Hurricane Katrina. Writing in 2015, 10 years after Hurricane
Katrina, Cutter and Bowser state, “[t]here is a surprising lack of behavioral work focused on
carless populations even with the Hurricane Katrina and Hurricane Sandy experiences, and
unanswered questions remain about this group’s reliance on public transportation or peers,
monetary or mobility issues, and assistance needs during evacuations” (2015:36). While this
proposed research is not limited to carless populations alone, it does provide insight into how
that population group and other categorically vulnerable populations rely (or choose not to rely)
on public services and peer support. This research supports Mileti’s argument for a need to focus
more specifically on what he calls “social forces,” which comprise how people view both
hazards and mitigation efforts, and to make mitigation a basic social value. Mileti states,
“because social forces are now known to be much more powerful than disaster specialists
previously thought, a growing understanding of physical systems and improved technology
cannot suffice” (Mileti, 1999:139).
In At Risk, Wisner et al. (1994) agree with Mileti that researchers conducting
vulnerability assessments must look beyond natural hazards to examine social forces. For
Wisner and colleagues, the social forces at play are the systems of power that govern political
and economic systems, and the key to effective mitigation is understanding power dynamics
(Wisner et al., 1994:7-14). For Wisner et al., a good vulnerability analysis necessarily examines
the dynamics of power within a system, and a decrease in vulnerability is seen as a direct
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increase in power (Wisner et al. 1994:32-33). However, the authors caution that even when
understanding power systems is recognized as crucial to structuring effective mitigation, there is
often a reluctance to incorporate such data into planning because it is less difficult and more
expedient for planners (those in power) to simply address the technical factors of natural hazards
(Wisner et al., 1994:7). The model Wisner and colleagues use to think about this dynamic is
referred to as the Pressure and Release model, where first the “pressure” of an impending hazard
and potentially unsafe conditions are examined, and then reductions in vulnerability (through
increased agency or power) “release” individuals from being at risk (Wisner et al., 1994: 87-89).
Although Wisner does not identify his Pressure and Release Model as such, this concept of
power dynamics is roughly equivalent to the Social-Ecological Model in public health.
Prasad provides additional insight into the importance of studying evacuation from a
behavioral perspective, stating that:
Evacuation planning is a significant aspect of emergency preparedness and
response. Evacuation behavior, especially the decision to evacuate, can provide
important lessons for evacuation planning. Studies indicate that evacuation
behavior is impacted by the proactiveness of local emergency management in
communicating risk and in providing support and assistance with evacuation
efforts.” (2016:68)
I believe that the use of a framework such as the HBM will allow local emergency managers to
better communicate risk in the proactive manner advocated for by Prasad, to provide support
using language defined by the community itself, in order to tailor assistance which is culturally
specific to the increasingly diverse communities predicted by Mileti.
The most recent body of literature that directly relates to evacuation behavior and
population vulnerability can be found in the second edition of Natural Hazards: Explanation and
Integration, by Montz, Tobin, and Hagelman (2017). Tobin and Montz wrote the first edition of
Natural Hazards in 1997 and it served as a wide introductory synthesis of hazard research. This
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more recent edition is updated to include a chapter on the dynamics of risk and uncertainty.
Chapter four, “Perception Studies: The Individual in Natural Hazards,” specifically examines,
“individual perception of natural hazards as both a contributor and detractor from effective
response” (Montz, Tobin & Hagelman 2017:144). In this chapter the authors recognize that
studying hazards requires inquiry in to natural, social, political, and economic factors, and that
individual perceptions are an important component of social responses to hazards. In order to
provide a cursory introduction to perception studies, the authors outline four types of models:
behavioral, preference, utility, and political-economy models (2017:155). The authors explain
that each model tackles the subject of perception differently, and “illustrate[s] the evolution of
scholarly thought within hazards research on the importance and role of individual perception”
(2017:155). The authors also explain that some researchers prefer to use these models by
adopting quantitative approaches which often encompass questionnaire surveys, while others
prefer qualitative studies that document perceptions of hazards (2017:155). Incidentally, I have
chosen to use both approaches for this body of research. While I did not have the privilege of
reading this chapter prior to designing my own study of perceptions as they relate to potential
evacuation behaviors, I mention it here as a resource for future planners who are studying
perceptions to review as the most up-to-date overview of suggestions for and examples of
incorporating perception studies in to future hazards research.
In Medical Geography, Meade and Emch (2010) advocate for seeing the potential of
geography as a social science, enhanced by the capabilities of GIS. Other geographers have
stated the need for a mixed-methods approach as well, stating, “[t]he contemporary hazards
paradigm seeks to develop a dialogue between the physical setting, political-economic context,
and the role and influence of individuals, groups, and special interests in effecting adjustments to
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hazards” (Comfort et al. 1999). The research I have conducted seeks to expand potential social
factors as they relate to physical and political-economic contexts that the field of medical
geography can be considered capable of addressing.
City-Assisted Evacuation in New Orleans
Literature that directly references the City-Assisted Evacuation program in New Orleans
is scarce. During the time of this review, I only found one published reference on the subject,
one article in press, a blog post on a private emergency management services firm website, and a
self-published master’s thesis.
Following the first and only use (so far) of the City-Assisted Evacuation program in New
Orleans in 2008 in advance of Hurricane Gustav, researchers at the University of New Orleans
conducted a post-study of participant perceptions of the program. Dr.’s Kiefer, Jenkins, and
Laska compiled the “City-Assisted Evacuation Plan Participant Survey Report” in April of 2009
and submitted this report to the New Orleans Office of Emergency Preparedness. The report is
in the document archives of the Center for Hazards Assessment, Response and Technology at the
University of New Orleans, otherwise known as CHART-UNO. Kiefer and colleagues’ general
findings were that,
Almost three-quarters of evacuees were satisfied with their experience and would
use CAEP again. Almost 70% of participants rated their re-entry experience as
good or better. None of those surveyed expressed concern about how their pets
were sheltered and cared for. Over half of the participants rated transportation out
of the city as “good” or better. (2009:1)
Because Kiefer, Jenkins and Laska only spoke with those who had utilized the CAE program,
their research did not assess possible reasons that those who may have needed to use the program
in 2008 did not do so. However, among CAE riders in 2008, barriers identified in the report
included reported lack of adequate finances to evacuate—even with CAE support—reports of
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elderly family members whose reluctance to evacuate hampered the evacuations of those who
were ready to leave, lack of bus driver training and preparation, and reports of negative
experiences with shelter staff (2009:1). At the time that this report was written, Evacuteer had
not yet been formed. However, the authors did recommend, “that the city and state work
collaboratively toward continued improvement of the CAEP by involving city, state, federal,
non-governmental, private sector and academic organizations” (2009:2).
The most recent research to mention CAE to date is an article by Bian and Wilmot
entitled, “An Analysis on Transit Pickup Points for Vulnerable People During Hurricane
Evacuation: A Case Study of New Orleans,” which was in press in the International Journal of
Disaster Risk Reduction in July of 2017. Bian and Wilmot estimate the spatial distribution of
vulnerable populations in New Orleans using a modified dasymetric mapping method. Bian and
Wilmot define vulnerability for the purposes of their research as a combination of disability
status, age, and lack of car ownership. Once the authors created a composite map of vulnerable
populations, they hypothetically relocated the 17 current evacuation pickup points to optimal
sites to better serve vulnerable populations. The authors estimate that such a relocation would
triple the population that could be potentially served by the program, increasing potential future
utilization of the CAE program (2017:1).
Ashley Acevedo completed a master’s thesis in 2015 and submitted it to Southern
Connecticut State University. Entitled, “Social Service Agencies, Natural Disasters, and
Vulnerable Populations,” it examines what emergency preparedness programs existed prior to
Hurricane Katrina, and what programs were created in response, as well as how new programs
specifically addressed the needs of vulnerable population groups (Acevedo, 2015). The
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document lists both the New Orleans City-Assisted Evacuation program and Evacuteer as postHurricane Katrina improvements in emergency planning and preparedness in New Orleans.
The blog post appeared on the private emergency management firm IEM’s website. The
company IEM offers services to government agencies and private organizations to improve
disaster preparedness and strengthen defense. Blogger Eston Spain, an emergency planning
associate for IEM’s Puerto Rico division, wrote a piece entitled, “The New Orleans CityAssisted Evacuation Plan and How it Can be Improved” (Spain, n.d.). In regard to improving
CAE in New Orleans, Spain suggests augmenting the CAE program with GIS capabilities to
better locate evacuation pickup points, as well as the placement of CAE maps in local bus stop
shelters in New Orleans. He also recommends that improvements be made to CAE pickup point
maps to include the location of essential services in emergencies, such as hospitals, police
stations, and fire departments that are within close proximity to given pickup points. Although
Spain’s suggestions seem reasonable, they are not the advice of someone who is intimately
familiar with the CAE program in New Orleans. Part of the purpose of designating pickup
points in New Orleans was to preemptively avoid the potential for citizens who need assistance
to disperse to fire stations, police stations, and hospitals, and to allow those support agencies to
focus their efforts collectively in a centralized location during an emergency event.
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Chapter III
Methodology
This study focuses on perceived barriers and benefits associated with the evacuation
assistance programming in New Orleans and seeks to identify what populations that system may
not be serving effectively. To conduct this research, I first developed methods to identify and
sample the relevant population and to assess their awareness of and willingness to use CAE,
choosing to focus on “neighborhoods” surrounding each of the 17 “Evacuspots” placed by the
city of New Orleans. I developed a questionnaire and obtained responses from residents through
in-person surveys and analyzed their answers quantitatively using dependent-sample one-tailed
and two-tailed unequal variance t-tests and chi-square analysis. That analysis informed the
questions I developed for in-depth interviews with residents wherein they could talk more freely
about their experiences with and attitudes toward evacuation in New Orleans and CAE. Finally,
I transcribed these interviews and analyzed them for trends corresponding with the constructs of
the Health Belief Model (HBM).
Sampling
I first defined the parameters of the sample group or groups. The Evacuteer system
employs a series of 17 “Evacuspots” throughout Orleans Parish intended to provide at-risk
residents with locations where they can gather safely and facilitate efficient evacuation in the
event of a mandatory evacuation call (Figure 3.1). Anyone living in portions of Orleans Parish
presupposed to have populations in need of CAE services (as those populations are defined by
RTA) should be able to reach an Evacuspot and thereby access the CAE system during an
evacuation by walking no more than 1 kilometer.1 Therefore, this study defined sample groups

1

The City of New Orleans defined “Need” using only the factors of vehicle ownership and RTA
ridership statistics— however, this is a necessary limitation of this study.
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using each of the 17 spots as a locus for a 1-kilometer buffer area (Euclidian distance) research
site, selecting multiple houses in each radius.
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Figure 3.1. Evacuspots in New Orleans, Louisiana (Evacuteer, 2018)
34

This approach is consistent with Meade and Emch, who explain that when determining
the overall health or health potential of a neighborhood, “neighborhoods do not need to be
defined by existing areal units, and sometimes it makes sense simply to consider the area within
a given distance” (2010:234). Defining sample groups based upon a 1-kilometer radius from
each of the 17 Evacuspots yielded a great deal of valuable information about each potential
“Evacuspot Zone” as a unique neighborhood. For example, data gathered for the spot serving
the New Orleans East Vietnamese community (Spot 17) where residents were primarily in the
“very elderly” category (over the age of 85) and mostly foreign-born and non-English speaking,
was significantly different from data gathered from Mid-City residents (Spot 10), who were
mixed demographically speaking, and primarily concerned with localized flooding potential.
As discussed earlier, this study also employs the constructs of the Health Belief Model
(HBM) pioneered by Hochbaum in 1958 and adapted by Rosenstock in 1960 and 1974 (Glanz.
One of the main potential benefits of using the HBM to conduct an evaluation pertaining to
evacuation compliance is avoiding the assignment of risk or vulnerability for a given population,
and instead allowing the population or populations of interest to decide where their own
strengths and weaknesses lie. This method also allows for community members to engage in
dialog with the researcher to express potential strengths and perceived benefits of programming,
rather than relying solely upon vulnerability index parameters which are primarily negative risk/vulnerability- /barrier- based. Potential health beliefs identified during the literature review
process and informed by past research conducted by Evacuteer staff, volunteers during annual
“RTA Readiness Rides,” and focus group data following the first use of CAE after Gustav
informed the design of a mixed-method, prospective survey design study consisting of a 50question survey questionnaire, which included demographic questions, single-answer
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yes/no/unsure questions, and Likert Scale questions; and a semi-structured, 13-question personal
qualitative interview based upon emerging themes identified from preliminary survey
questionnaire results. Secor explains that a survey is often a good choice when a researcher is
looking to represent in summary form some basic characteristics of research subjects, which is
often then used as supplementary data to an interview-based study (2010, p. 196).

Figure 3.2. Survey Locations and 1-Kilometer Evacuspot Radii
Note: I created Figure 3.2 using ESRI’s ArcMaps function. Red dots represent the 231 surveys I conducted, and
blue overlays represent the 1-kilometer Evacuspot neighborhoods that were my 17 survey sites. Of the 231 surveys
collected, 14 ultimately fell outside of the survey site zones. This happened because people occasionally agreed to
fill out my survey at a given address, and then later explained that they considered another location in the city to be
their permanent address. On this map many of my survey clusters look small and are significantly overlapped but
increasing resolution does not preserve participant anonymity.

Both components of this study focused upon residents within each of the 17 “Evacuspot
Neighborhoods” over the 2017 hurricane season (survey period), and the 2018 hurricane season
(qualitative interview period). The quantitative survey initially identified houses using a
stratified randomized sampling technique of Two Stage Cluster Probability Sampling (Kotz,
Read, Balakrishnan, Vidakovic, & Johnson, 2005). In stage one, the study defined clusters using
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a 1-kilometer (Euclidian distance) radius around each of the 17 Evacuspots located throughout
New Orleans as pick-up locations for residents utilizing CAE. Stage two selected multiple
households within each cluster using addresses randomly generated by an address generator tool.
Interview days and times varied strategically in order to gain access to different demographic
groups within each neighborhood (Figure 3.2). Each neighborhood was surveyed at least five
days with at least one morning survey period, one evening survey period, and one weekend
survey period lasting an entire afternoon and into the early evening. However, safety concerns
prevented surveying after dark, which presumably excluded some population subsets. An
Evacuteer volunteer accompanied me on the majority of these survey excursions. This provided
several benefits. The opportunity to accompany me increased interest in my research from
Evacuteer and its members and volunteers. In addition, many of the Evacuteer volunteers were
also undergraduate students in various social science disciplines who were eager to gain firsttime field work experience. Allowing them to act as my assistants and notetakers allowed me to
capture data beyond the answers to the actual survey questions. Having an assistant present for
most fieldwork days also significantly increased safety. Many Evacuspots are in areas where it
is not the norm to be a pedestrian or to go knocking door to door at people’s private addresses.
Finally, for Evacuspot 17, having an assistant was absolutely crucial because many nearby
residents speak only Vietnamese. My assistant, Hoang Tao, served as an interpreter, thereby
allowing me to collect survey data from the Vietnamese community. Hoang generously
translated my survey tool in to Vietnamese in advance and spoke with participants on my behalf
while I served as notetaker.
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After selecting an initial home to begin the survey session, I attempted to randomize
selection of additional houses to be surveyed using a coin-flip and die rolling technique.2 Curious
neighbors and people observing our research group outdoors who also wanted to participate
complicated the successful completion of this task. Initially, I excluded data from residents who
walked up to me on the street wanting to be surveyed or who called me over to their yards or
porches asking to participate. However, I later realized that this was a usual occurrence in
almost every neighborhood and that excluding willing participants was causing me to lose
rapport in the neighborhood as I progressed down streets. People were noticeably slighted and
offended when I skipped houses, particularly when they were sitting right outside in front of
them on their front porches.
The number of residents sampled in each cluster was determined using the following
methodology. First, GIS LandScan enabled the determination of the 1-kilometer buffer zones
and the entire population of all clusters (in this case the 17 “Evacuspot neighborhoods” discussed
above). LandScan is a nationally consistent raster dataset that depicts estimated ambient
(average over 24 hours) residential populations at a spatial resolution as small as 1-kilometer
squared zones. Oak Ridge National Laboratory produced LandScan through a Department of
Defense contract and makes this data available to research communities (Oak Ridge National
Laboratory, N.D.) Data outputs produced by LandScan are significantly more reliable than
census-based mapping approaches because LandScan data is a composition of fused remote
sensing data, Census Bureau Data, and additional GIS datasets. Additionally, non-developed

2

For a detailed description of the coin-flip and die-rolling technique, see Appendix 1. For an
example of research that employs and provides instruction on this sampling technique, see
Stanifer et al. (2016). “Neighborhood clustering of non-communicable diseases: results from a
community-based study in Northern Tanzania.” BMC Public Health (2016) 16:226 or
https://doi.org/10.1186/s12889-016-2912-5.
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land and public lands (areas where no one lives) are incorporated into the modeling approach
using dasymetric modeling to redefine population distribution to more accurately account for
population density at levels smaller than the census tract or ZIP code level (Wildfire Decision
Support System, 2016). As of this writing, the most recent LandScan dataset available is from
2016, so my population estimates are fairly recent, and reflective of post-Katrina population
shifts and development.
LandScan data provided a population count of ambient populations at a 1-kilometer
squared resolution for each Evacuspot zone (Figure 3.3) and assessed populations existing in
overlapping radii as a single map shape so that overlapping radii did not have double-counted
population portions (Figure 3.4). The total number of people residing within these zones was
147,310. Next, I removed residents under the age of 18 from that aggregate total population
number of all existing non-overlapping space because residents under the age of 18 are not
permitted to use City-Assisted Evacuation independently and are generally not living alone as
single, independent residents. This left 113,742 adult residents. Finally, I reduced the
population size to account for households where couples reside by assessing census data for
Orleans Parish of adults currently married or in common-law marriages. This was necessary
because prior research findings have consistently shown that evacuation decisions are generally
made by households and not individuals (Perry, 1979 and Han, 2016). In other words, it is
highly uncommon for one member of a household to decide differently to remain behind or to
evacuate without the remaining members of a household. Approximately 42% of adults in
Orleans Parish are either married or in a common-law relationship, according to both
StatisticalAtlas.com (2018), and DataCenterResearch.org (2018). The final number of 89,856
non-overlapping residents in 1-kilometer walking zones, over the age of 18, at one presumed
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representative per household reflects the households potentially served by Evacuteer to the best
of my abilities. This number of households provided the basis for assessing the number of
samples I needed to reach statistical significance at a reasonable confidence level and interval.

Figure 3.3. 1 Kilometer Euclidian Distance Evacuspot Neighborhood Zones
Note: I created Figure 3.3 using Population Explorer (2018) which employs LandScan data. This tool provides
population statistics and certain demographic characteristics for the area indicated by each blue circle.
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Figure 3.4. Removing Overlapping Population Numbers
Note: Figure 3-4 demonstrates the capability to define new shapes around target population areas using Population
Explorer (2018) in order to remove overlapping population numbers.

Initially, I intended to conduct a sample of households in each Evacuspot zone to account
for varying population density in each zone and obtain the correct proportionally representative
sample from each of the 17 zones. However, because some zones are still involved in the postKatrina recovery process, an initial analysis weighed across population density left me needing
to collect as few as three surveys in some low-population areas. Unfortunately, these areas, such
as Evacuspot 14, in the Lower Ninth Ward, are some of the spots with the city’s most vulnerable
residents, where evacuation assistance resources are likely to be most needed. Conversely, the
Evacuspot with the densest population, Evacuspot 11, is located in the French Quarter area,
where residences are small and compact and populations are dense with tourists, but need of
evacuation assistance may be low. As a social science researcher, first and foremost, I decided it
was more important to give due diligence to exploring all neighborhoods fully and equitably
rather than weighing according to density and not getting to know certain Evacuspot
neighborhoods well. I also made this decision because I felt that equitable knowledge of the
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various communities served would be more valuable to Evacuteer, since many neighborhoods
may have unique service needs. Therefore, I attempted to distribute my overall samples evenly.
Although the results are not proportional to population density, they provide a more solid, indepth view of each community served. Ultimately, I conducted a total of 211 valid and complete
surveys over the hurricane season of 2017. Most Evacuspot zones are represented by fifteen
surveys, but several zones fell short of this representation for various reasons discussed in
limitations at the end of this chapter.
Ultimately, the number of surveys I was able to conduct fell just short of statistical
significance at the regularly assumed confidence level of 95% and interval of 5. However, at an
interval (margin of error) of 7, with a survey zone population of 89,856, 196 surveys would have
been needed. This tells me that although my quantitative survey set falls just short of the
industry standard for public health research, it is still highly relevant. Because this study is the
first of its type, and I ultimately chose a mixed-methods approach where my quantitative survey
set was then supported by auxiliary qualitative data, I am confident in saying that this research is
successful and valuable as a preliminary research pilot study that demonstrates a need for further
exploration of this topic on a larger scale, with more researchers and funding.
Quantitative Methods
The quantitative survey tool that I created is a questionnaire format survey that consists
of a series of questions designed to target perceptions regarding each of the constructs of the
HBM (See Appendix C for survey). The questions address aspects of perceived susceptibility to
hurricanes, perceived seriousness of hurricane associated risks and evacuation messaging and
protocols, perceived benefits of choosing to evacuate using the City-Assisted Evacuation
program, perceived barriers to utilizing the program effectively, cues-to-action noticed by
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respondents in local messaging campaigns, and perceived self-efficacy for being able to take
advantage of the program. I created questions within the HBM framework, incorporating input
from both the Director of Evacuteer and the Community Outreach Coordinator of the Orleans
Parish Emergency Operations Center. This ensured that the data collected would be of use and
interest to future organizational programming and planning.
The questionnaire format consists of a series of close-ended, single construct questions
paired with Likert Scale response options at the conclusion of the survey in order to measure
attitudes regarding a given statement. The survey consists of 19 demographic questions, 23
yes/no response questions, and five concluding Likert Scale questions (Appendix C). The survey
concluded with an optional space to provide contact information if the respondent was willing to
potentially be contacted for a qualitative interview at a later date. The Dillman, Smyth, and
Christian (2014) “Tailored Design Method,” which provides in-depth resources for constructing
surveys that reduce reluctance to response, are easy to navigate, effective at collecting the
intended data, and properly structured to reduce question ambiguity, informed the survey design.
Prior to being allowed to complete the survey, participants were asked to read a participant
consent form, and agree to participate in research (Appendix B). In each instance the consent
form was also explained verbally, line by line, in order to ensure participant understanding prior
to asking for consent to begin the survey. Participants were also reminded that although they had
given consent to participate, they were under no obligation to answer any question that they did
not feel comfortable answering, and that even if they participated they were under no obligation
to provide any personal contact information, unless they preferred to do so.
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Qualitative Methods
I conducted the qualitative portion of my research during the next hurricane season,
summer of 2018, after a preliminary analysis of the quantitative survey data collected the year
before. This analysis, along with additional input from Evacuteer staff and volunteers, informed
my development of initial qualitative interview questions. Once I created pilot interview
questions, I performed three pilot interviews to gauge question clarity and collect feedback. I
then revised interview questions to remove unclear, frustrating, or confusing questions before
taking them out into the field.
The qualitative interview was a directed, open-ended, semi-structured interview session
where individuals answered the same question set, but also received the opportunity to talk
openly about their own prior evacuation experiences or imagined future experiences, their
knowledge of CAE, their likeliness to utilize the system, their perceptions of and/or knowledge
regarding Evacuteer and CAE, and any other personal opinions that they wanted to share
regarding their potential evacuation behaviors or their perceptions of the free evacuation services
offered in New Orleans. Interviews were recorded on smart-phones using Voice Record Pro (an
MP3 generator), because qualitative researchers have found that using a cell phone is less
intimidating and more in keeping with cultural norms than a separate audio recording device and
utilizing smart-phones did not require us to carry any additional equipment. At the end of each
interview session, interviewees were given the opportunity to ask the interviewer any questions
they might still have regarding utilization of CAE or how the program operates.
All interviews were conducted by a team of two researchers- myself, and Shalini Persaud,
a research assistant from Tulane University’s joint MA program in Social Work and Disaster
Resilience Leadership, who assisted me as an Evacuteer Intern over the summer of 2018 and
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gained independent study credit for her participation. The decision to work as a team was made
for several reasons. First, and most importantly, I had learned during the initial quantitative
survey process that people seemed to prefer to speak inside their own homes, rather than
outdoors on a porch or in a public space; I believe this is largely due to the fact that New Orleans
summers are uncomfortably warm, particularly so for many of my older participants. Since I
knew we would be entering people’s homes, for the sake of safety, I preferred to collect
interviews as a team. For each survey appointment, there was also a third party (an Evacuteer
staff member) who knew our team appointment time, and address, and who we checked in with
at the conclusion of interviews. Secondly, having a secondary researcher present enabled us to
capture significantly more data and to validate data we collected against each-other’s perceptions
following the interview process. For each interview session, one researcher was the primary
interviewer, and the other researcher sat by and took notes. We switched roles following each
interview so that one researcher would not have the emotional toll of interviewing 4-5 informants
back to back on a given day. The researcher occupying the note-taker role would occasionally
interject if they thought of a particularly relevant follow-up question that the interviewer had not
asked. Both researchers turned on their recording devices to ensure that no data was accidentally
lost due to technical malfunctions. Finally, my decision to choose this particular individual as
my research assistant stemmed from a desire to provide a masters student with the type of first
qualitative research experience in the field that I wished I had had. My assistant was grateful to
gain experience working in the field, and to see how a qualitative research process is designed,
executed, and analyzed. She reported learning much from the experience and found it a
tremendous help.
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Each interview we conducted was designed to complete in as little as 20 minutes.
However, the average interview time was in fact just over 40 minutes, because people were quite
excited to discuss this topic and had many valuable opinions.
Data Analysis
This two-hurricane-season research process produced two sets of data: the initial
quantitative survey dataset, and the later qualitative interview set. As mentioned previously,
analysis of the quantitative data informed the development of qualitative interview questions. To
do so, I amalgamated the initial survey data into an Excel file and divided it into three distinct
parts: demographic data, yes/no questions by HBM perception type, and Likert Scale questions.
I compared demographic data to Orleans Parish population data to ensure that respondents were
roughly representative of the Parish as a whole across key indicators such as race, age, sex,
educational status, and income. I then tallied Yes/No response data to look for emergent trends
that immediately appeared obviously significant, regardless of demographic characteristics.
These trends informed the qualitative interview process. I was also able to compare the results
of my surveys with data collected during the 2016 Readiness Ride, a bus stop outreach program
wherein Evacuteer volunteers spoke with RTA bus riders about hurricane preparedness and City
Assisted Evacuation (CAE). Comparing the model-driven approach of utilizing the HBM as a
program evaluation tool to Readiness Ride results produced by Evacuteer provided useful insight
into the potential value of the HBM as an evaluative tool in further planning and preparedness
research. Finally, I analyzed quantitative data using STATA statistical analysis software. One
and two tailed t-tests, chi-square analysis, and multivariate regressions were run using STATA to
compare research variable result outcomes to results reported in existing literature. Significance
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of test results were reported at the 90% confidence level and higher to capture all possible
emergent trends, because this is a pilot study with a relatively small sample population.
I transcribed the qualitative interviews and analyzed the results in two ways. First, raw
transcriptions were run through Voyant as a collective unit. Voyant is a web-based text reading
and analysis tool that provides computer-assisted analysis with no initial researcher-led code
input (Sinclair and Rockwell, 2016). Capabilities of Voyant include providing an overview of
frequency and distribution of terms and producing analyses of frequencies of terms that appear
close in proximity to key-words. The biggest advantage of utilizing an analysis tool like Voyant
is that it reduces researcher bias. Another advantage of Voyant is that it can produce exciting
and innovative visual representations of qualitative data that are informative and visually
appealing to those who may not be highly familiar with content analysis but are interested in the
results of this research. Therefore, Voyant representations were shared with interested Evacuteer
staff and volunteers.
After utilizing Voyant to define initial trends using computer-run analysis, I checked
these trends for relevancy to the research questions at hand: namely, how people perceive
various aspects of the New Orleans CAE program. To do so, I entered transcriptions into NVivo
Qualitative Analysis Data Software and assessed them using both content analysis (key themes,
words and phrases used across transcripts) and narrative analysis (how are stories told and how
are things recounted). During analysis, I specifically looked for elements of the HBM (selfperceived barriers to evacuation, self- perceived risks associated with evacuation, perceived
seriousness of evacuating, perceived benefits to evacuation, and perceived self-efficacy and cues
to action regarding evacuation), and coded data with these themes in mind. My research assistant
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also conducted some initial coding exercises, keeping our research themes in mind, in order to
cross-check and validate our NVivo code list.
Methodological Pitfalls: New Orleans Stories
New Orleans is a truly unique place to do research. To say that New Orleans residents are
eccentric would be an understatement. Often, I had to make decisions on whether eccentric
residences were potentially dangerous, and should be skipped, or whether they were merely
showcasing local flavor. In many cases the uniqueness of New Orleans worked to my significant
advantage. New Orleans may be one of the few places left in the United States that has a vibrant
outdoor, shared, and public community or neighborhood life. It was easy to approach people
who were already outside on their front porches, surveying the neighborhood happenings, and
happy for someone to talk to.

Figure 3.5. Sign Posted on a Door in Central City near Evacuspot 3.
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Many of my fieldwork difficulties were singular. I encountered a man in the Lower
Ninth Ward who answered the door mid-way through butchering a whole hog for a barbecue.
Several residents wanted me to stay for dinner. Several were happy to continue whatever illicit
drug habit they had started in on for the afternoon through the survey or interview process.
However, over the course of my research process there were several notable methodological
pitfalls that were larger neighborhood trends. Each of the following scenarios are unique to New
Orleans, regionally exacerbated, or called for a regional solution. I mention them here, both to
provide insight in to what it is like to do research in New Orleans, and also to account for some
variance to my initial intended research plan.
My first challenge occurred over my first few fieldwork outings. Initially, I had intended
to conduct a door hanging type survey approach. My surveys each had a note explaining that the
surveys could be completed, and then left back on the door, folded inside out, for pick-up the
next day. Although Dillman et al. (2014) mention that door-to-door inserts may be as effective
or more effective than return-addressed mailers, out of over 100 surveys hung over three days,
only two were returned. It quickly became obvious that this method was going to be costprohibitive, time-prohibitive, and ultimately ineffective. To repair this approach, I began
knocking on people’s doors, explaining my research, asking specifically if they would be willing
to fill out my survey, and then, after explaining and obtaining written consent and receiving
verbal affirmation that they would complete the survey, giving people the survey and letting
them know that they could hang it back on their door when they had completed it. This approach
achieved marginally improved results, but I was still losing the vast majority of my surveys.
Finally, I began going door to door as my sampling method dictated and knocking on doors and
asking people if they would help me by filling out a survey while I stayed with them and
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collected it upon completion. What I learned was that most people were more than willing to
help, but that many asked me to ask them the questions, or to read them aloud to them, rather
than to fill out the survey independently. Often people told me that they did not read very well,
or more frequently, that they could not see the survey writing. Many people who needed glasses
to read did not own them, particularly in less affluent neighborhoods. Once I realized this, I
began keeping my surveys and my consent forms on a clipboard, knocking on doors, and asking
people if I could have about ten minutes of their time to ask some questions about how they felt
about evacuation and the evacuation support program in New Orleans. If an individual said yes,
I explained to them that I first needed to share a consent form with them before I could ask any
survey questions. If I was allowed to continue, I then asked if the individual would prefer to read
the consent form themselves, or have me read it to them. In the cases where I read the consent
form to them, I would explain each aspect of the consent form fully, while I stood next to the
individual and read with my finger tracing the words. At the end of the reading I would then ask
the individual to sign if they gave consent to participate, and I would reiterate that even though
they gave consent they did not have to answer any question they did not want to answer and
could simply say “pass” or “next.” After explaining consent, I would then go through the survey
questions verbally, and mark the answers for individuals who preferred not to do so themselves.
Although this sounds like a lengthy process, I quickly developed a rhythm and routine for it, and
it generally went quicker than it had gone when I was handing all surveys over to residents.
Once I began this approach, my success rate rose to 85.6 percent. The vast majority of people
who opened their doors to me consented to taking a survey and were enthusiastic participants.
Incidentally, the average survey time was almost a half hour rather than my estimated ten
minutes because many questions generated much lengthier opinions than the yes/no responses
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that were requested. During the instances where individuals expressed opinions beyond the
survey questions, my research partner for the day would jot down relevant notes in a notebook to
capture additional relevant perceptions about evacuation. Although it is a generalization, it
would not be wrong to say that New Orleanians love to talk.
Although this improved method generated significant survey success, further pitfalls
arose when I could not present myself to potential participants face-to-face. This happened for
three reasons. In one particular New Orleans neighborhood, homes have significantly different
architecture than other neighborhoods in Orleans Parish, prohibiting me from reaching doors; in
another neighborhood, I encountered a cultural norm against answering doors; and in yet another
neighborhood, technology such as “smart doorbells” inhibited my ability to conduct research.
I encountered architectural pitfalls in the two Evacuspot neighborhoods in Algiers,
Evacuspots 1 and 12, located across the Mississippi River from the rest of the city. Homes in the
working-class neighborhood of Algiers3 have a significantly different architectural style than the
rest of Orleans Parish; many working-class homes are single story cottages that were built in the
1940s-1960s. The homes have no porches, which discourages people from lingering outside.
The homes also have a front yard that sets the home back from the sidewalk by approximately 15
feet (unlike traditional New Orleans residences, which typically sit right against the sidewalk).
These front yards are often fenced in by a waist-high chain-link fence, and access to the front
door is typically blocked by a padlocked gate. Dogs in many of the front yards further deter
anyone trying to reach the residents inside. I surveyed this neighborhood over seven attempts

3

These homes are unlike those in historic Algiers Point, which has largely 19th and early
20th century architecture and is a registered historic landmark.
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but was never able to get a full data-set. The majority of people living here are intentionally
inaccessible.
The neighborhood around Evacuspot 17 was difficult to assess because few residents
were willing to answer their doors. This spot is located in front of Mary Queen of Vietnam
Church in New Orleans East, and the majority of residents in this particular neighborhood are
Vietnamese. Aware of the ethnic composition of the neighborhood, I enlisted a Vietnamesespeaking assistant, Hoang Tao, a Ph.D. student at The University of New Orleans and dedicated
Evacuteer volunteer. Hoang had translated the survey to Vietnamese in advance and was
prepared to ask the questions aloud to encourage participation. However, on our first survey
attempt, we knocked on more than fifty doors — and only one person answered. (Incidentally,
that person was from Honduras, and I was able to conduct the survey in Spanish myself.) On our
next survey attempt, we were lucky enough to approach someone working on his car in his
garage. While he was visiting his parents from out of state and could not answer the survey
himself, he provided valuable insight into our difficulties obtaining interviews in the
neighborhood. He explained that first of all, most of the elderly Vietnamese residents in the
neighborhood would be outdoors in their back yards, gardening during the day, and they likely
would not hear knocking or doorbells ringing. He also informed us that most people in the
neighborhood entered their homes through their back doors and side gates, and that only
strangers typically knocked on the front door. He recommended that we yell “Hello!” over back
yard fences in Vietnamese. This turned out to be the ticket to success, and the rest of our survey
time went smoothly. We successfully conducted three surveys in Spanish, twelve in Vietnamese,
and none in English for this neighborhood.
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The instance of technological interference I mentioned occurred in Lakeview. Lakeview
is a well-to-do neighborhood of large, single family homes set against Lake Pontchartrain. The
majority of homes are new, raised construction built after Hurricane Katrina, and they often had
“smart doorbells.” This fairly new technology allows homeowners to view and manage wouldbe house guests from their smart phones via an internet-connected doorbell with a motion sensor
and camera. The majority of houses in Lakeview had a Vivant brand doorbell, and the bells
were all brand new — many still sporting their protective film. It was obvious that people were
enjoying their newly acquired ability to see who was knocking on their door without actually
having to answer it. During my first survey attempts I would often see the doorbell cameras
move to sense me, and although I could see lights or a television on or even someone in the
home looking at his or her smartphone, no one would answer the door for me. Only one person
answered— expecting an Uber Eats delivery, and he was angry that he had accidentally opened
the door for me instead. I reflected on what I looked like through the doorbell camera with my
school ID badge and clip-board and decided to try again dressed differently. On my next and
subsequent outings, I chose to wear either my Louisiana State University Tigers shirt or my
Saints football jersey, and I kept my clipboard tucked in my side-bag. This yielded significantly
better results. People would answer the door, and once they heard what I was doing, most were
happy to take my survey. (Unfortunately, this group was also pretty excited to talk sports,
particularly since a surprising number turned out to be alumni of Louisiana State University.)
While I did my best to collect purely randomized data from each Evacuspot
neighborhood using a tested and approved sampling model, I must recognize that there is always
implicit bias in the relationship between a researcher and participants. It is difficult to say
precisely why people chose to engage with me in each instance that they agreed to take my
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survey or participate in a qualitative interview, or why others would not respond. However, I am
confident that the sample of people I engaged with, through whatever means I was ultimately
able to reach them, are representative of the richly diverse city that I chose as my home and my
fieldwork site.
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CHAPTER IV
QUANTITATIVE RESULTS
This study is based on in-person surveys with residents of Orleans Parish intended to
assess what influences the decision whether or not to evacuate, as detailed in Chapter III. The
answers to questions asked during these surveys provide the basis for eight statistical inquiries
examining the following possible factors: (1) outside influences, such as neighbors, family, or
religious leaders; (2) gender; (3) pet ownership; (4) age; (5) disability; (6) exposure to warning
messages; (7) home ownership; and (8) trust in the city of New Orleans. Details regarding how I
conducted the analysis follow.
Description of the Study Sample
During the official hurricane season of 2017, I surveyed residents in Orleans Parish that
lived within a one-kilometer Euclidian distance radius of one of the 17 designated evacuation
pick-up points (Evacuspots) located throughout the City of New Orleans that are a part of the
City-Assisted Evacuation program. The program is open to anyone who needs help evacuating
for any reason, and so the survey included residents within what I considered to be reasonable
walking distance of the pick-up points as potential participants, and therefore, viable survey
candidates. Individuals at households within the one-kilometer zones were surveyed at random
(a detailed description of survey design and randomization techniques is included in Chapter III,
and the survey instrument can be found in Appendix C). Survey participants were 46.45% Black,
39.34% White, and 12.32% other races (1.89% of participants chose not to disclose their race)
(Table 4.1). Participants were also 45.50% male and 54.50% female. According to U.S. Census
Bureau estimates for Orleans Parish as of July of 2018, overall, parish residents are 60.1% Black,
34.9% White, and 10.7% other races (there is a slight overlap in Census Bureau statistics due to
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the ability of Census participants to select two or more races). Census Bureau estimates for July
of 2018 also report Orleans Parish residents to be 47.4% male and 52.6% female.
Table 4.1. Survey Participant Characteristics (N=211), Hurricane Season 2017,
New Orleans Evacuspot Neighborhoods
Variable

Frequency (no.)

%

Gender
Male

96

45.50

115

54.50

18-24

13

6.1

25-34

45

21.1

35-44

33

15.49

45-54

51

23.94

55-64

27

12.67

65+

40

18.77

2

1.93

Asian

12

5.69

Black

98

46.45

White

83

39.34

Hispanic or Latino

10

4.74

Minority (non-white)

4

1.89

Missing or Refused

4

1.89

No high school diploma

26

12.32

High school diploma

33

15.64

Female
Age

Missing or Refused
Race

Educational Level

(Table 4-1. Cont’d. Next Page)
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Table 4.1. Survey Participant Characteristics (N=211), Hurricane Season 2017,
New Orleans Evacuspot Neighborhoods
Some college

37

17.54

Associates degree

18

8.53

Bachelor’s degree

44

20.85

Master’s degree

33

15.64

Doctoral degree

14

6.64

6

2.84

< $20,000

29

13.74

$20,000 - $29,999

16

7.58

$30,000 - $39,999

14

6.64

$40,000 - $49,999

14

6.64

$50,000 - $59,999

18

8.53

>$60,000

63

29.86

Missing or Refused

57

27.01

1

37

17.53

2

82

38.86

3

46

21.8

4

25

11.84

5

10

4.73

6+

11

5.24

0

143

67.77

1

41

19.44

Missing or Refused
Annual Income

Number of People in Household (including self)

Number of Children in Household

(Table 4.1. Cont’d. Next Page)
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Table 4.1. Survey Participant Characteristics (N=211), Hurricane Season 2017,
New Orleans Evacuspot Neighborhoods
2

16

7.58

3

8

3.79

4

2

0.95

5+

1

0.47

Owner

107

50.71

Renter

90

42.65

Other

11

5.21

3

1.43

None

169

80.10

Self

29

13.74

Other Household member

27

12.79

Yes

93

40.75

No

118

59.25

Yes

171

81.04

No

40

18.96

Home Ownership

Missing or Refused
Physical Disability in Household

Pet Ownership

Working Car in Household

Description of Quantitative Analysis Inquiries
Statistical inquiries made using survey result data collected over the summer of 2017 in
Orleans Parish inform the quantitative results that follow. The first five inquiries made are in
direct conversation with conclusions presented regarding evacuation behavior drawn from
existing literature surrounding hurricane evacuation behaviors widely, across disciplines. The
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final three inquiries pertain directly to the unique relationship between residents of Orleans
Parish and the City Assisted Evacuation (CAE) program in New Orleans, Louisiana. No study
has yet examined the potential efficacy of the CAE program or the potential behaviors
surrounding program participation, and these inquiries serve as the basis for recommendations
for further CAE research in New Orleans. An explanation of how survey result outcomes
confirm or reject the current existing literature in the field, or how they can be used to inform
further research on the CAE Program can be found in Chapter VI.
Inquiry 1: Outside Influence Impacts on Decisions to Evacuate
The following tables depict dependent-sample one-tailed and two-tailed unequal variance
t-tests of survey results indicating the degree outside influence impacts decisions to evacuate by
race. Each table includes summary statistics detailing the number of observations (Obs.),
averages (Mean), standard errors (Std. Err.), and standard deviations (Std. Dev.) for each subgroup, and reports test statistics as well as p-values associated with one-tailed and two-tailed
tests. Due to small sample size, this particular analysis assessed only White and Black
populations, while omitting other minority groups (Asians, Hispanics, and Minority-Non-White).
There were 83 representative White respondents and 98 representative Black respondents for
each of the three variables assessed. A survey respondent received White or Black classification
if s/he self-identified as White or Black. All respondents were over the age of 18, and there was
no upper age limit. The variables assessed were whether or not respondents believed that they
would be influenced to evacuate by neighbors (Table 4.2), by family members (Table 4.3), or by
their priest, pastor, or religious organization (Table 4.4).
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Table 4.2: Impact of Race on Neighbor Influence
Ho: µWhite
<µBlack
Obs.

Mean

Std.
Err.

Std.
Dev.

Ho: µWhite
=µBlack

Ho: µWhite
>µBlack

t-test p-value

p-value

p-value

0.3228

0.1614

White

83

0.482 0.055 0.503 0.992 0.8386

Black

98

0.408 0.050 0.494

Combined

181

0.442 0.037 0.498

Difference

0.074 0.074

Note: Neighborhood influence was coded as 1 if the respondent answered “yes” to the question, “I will evacuate if
my neighbor does.” The variable was coded as 0 if the respondent answered “no,” or “unsure.”

Table 4.3: Impact of Race on Family Influence
Ho: µWhite
<µBlack
Obs.

Mean

Std.
Err.

Std.
Dev.

Ho: µWhite
=µBlack

Ho: µWhite
>µBlack

t-test p-value

p-value

p-value

0.9745

0.4873

White

83

0.747 0.048 0.437 0.032 0.5127

Black

98

0.745 0.044 0.438

Combined

181

0.746 0.032 0.437

Difference

0.002 0.065

Note: Family influence was coded as 1 if the respondent answered “yes” to the question, “I will evacuate if my
family asks me to.” The variable was coded as 0 if the respondent answered “no,” or “unsure.”
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Table 4.4: Impact of Race on Pastor/Priest/Religious Influence

Obs.

Mean

Std.
Err.

Std.
Dev.

t-test

Ho:µWhite
<µBlack

Ho: µWhite
=µBlack

Ho: µWhite
>µBlack

p-value

p-value

p-value

0.0026

0.9987

White

83

0.301 0.051 0.462 -3.058 0.0013

Black

98

0.520 0.051 0.502

Combined

181

0.420 0.037 0.495

Difference

-0.219 0.072

Note: Religious influence was coded as 1 if the respondent answered “yes” to the question, “I will evacuate if my
pastor/ priest/ or religious support system urges me to do so.” The variable was coded as 0 if the respondent
answered “no,” or “unsure.”

For the question “I will evacuate if my neighbor does” (Table 4.2), the mean column
indicates that 48.2% of White respondents and 40.8% of Black respondents answered “yes.” The
difference in means between White and Black respondents (0.992) is not statistically significant
at a .05 level of significance (p-value = 0.3228). There is no association found between races in
relation to neighborhood influence on evacuation behavior. Further analysis via a chi-square test
of independence examined the relation between race and neighbor influence. The relation
between these variables was not significant (X2 Value = 0.9914, df = 1, p-value = 0.319).
For the question “I will evacuate if my family asks me to” (Table 4.3), the mean column
indicates that 74.7% of White respondents and 74.5% of Black respondents answered “yes.” The
difference in means between White and Black respondents (0.032) is not statistically significant
at a .05 level of significance (p-value= 0.9745). There is no association found between races in
relation to family influence on evacuation behavior. Further analysis via a chi-square test of
independence examined the relation between race and family influence. The relation between
these variables was not significant (X2 Value = 0.0010, df = 1, p-value = 0.974).
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For the question “I will evacuate if my pastor, priest, or religious leader urges me to do
so” (Table 4.4), the mean column indicates that 30.1% of White respondents and 52% of Black
respondents answered “yes.” The difference in means between White and Black respondents (3.058) is statistically significant at a .01 level of significance (p-value= 0.0026). The nullhypothesis of equal means can be rejected at the 1% level. There is an association found
between races in relation to religious influence on evacuation behavior. In this instance, Black
respondents are more likely than White respondents to evacuate if their pastor, priest, or religious
leader urges them to do so. To confirm rejection of the null hypothesis, further analysis via a chisquare test of independence examined the relation between race and religious influence. The
relation between these variables was significant at the 1% level (X2 Value = 8.8649, df = 1, pvalue = 0.003). Black respondents were more likely to report being influenced by their pastor,
priest or religious leader than White respondents.
Inquiry 2: Gender and Evacuation Behaviors: Perceptions of Risk, Perceived Preparedness,
and Preference for Evacuating
The following tables depict dependent-sample one-tailed and two-tailed unequal variance
t-tests of survey results indicating perception of risk (Table 4.5), preference for evacuating
(Table 4.6), and perceived evacuation plan preparedness (Table 4.7) by gender. Each table
includes summary statistics detailing the number of observations (Obs.), averages (Mean),
standard errors (Std. Err.), and standard deviations (Std. Dev.) for each sub-group, and each also
reports test statistics and p-values associated with one-tailed and two-tailed tests. This analysis
assessed populations by gender. There were 96 representative male respondents and 115
representative female respondents for each of the three variables assessed. A survey respondent
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received a male or female classification if he/she self-identified as male or female. All
respondents were over the age of 18, and there was no upper age limit.
Table 4.5. Impact of Gender on Perception of Risk
Ho: µMale
<µFemale

Ho: µMale
=µFemale

Ho: µMale
>µFemale

Obs.

Mean

Std.
Err.

Std.
Dev.

t-test

p-value

p-value

p-value

Male

96

0.885

0.033

0.320

0.170 0.5634

0.8732

0.4366

Female

115

0.878

0.031

0.328

211

0.882

0.022

0.324

0.007

0.045

Combined
Difference

Note: Perception of risk was coded as 1 if the respondent answered “yes” to the question, “Hurricanes are a
potential threat to me or to my family.” The variable was coded as 0 if the respondent answered “no,” or
“unsure.”

Table 4.6. Impact of Gender on Evacuation Plan Preparedness
Ho:
Ho:
Ho:
µMale<µFemale µMale=µFemale µMale>µFemale
Obs.

Mean

Std. Err.

Std. Dev.

Male

96

0.469

0.051

0.502

Female

115

0.548

0.047

0.500

Combined

211

0.512

0.034

0.501

-0.079

0.069

Difference

t-test

p-value

p-value

p-value

-1.142 0.1274

0.2548

0.8726

Note: Evacuation plan preparedness was coded as 1 if the respondent answered “yes” to the question, “I currently
have an evacuation plan.” The variable was coded as 0 if the respondent answered “no,” or “unsure.”
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Table 4.7. Impact of Gender on Evacuation Preference
Ho: µMale
<µFemale

Ho: µMale
=µFemale

Ho: µMale
>µFemale

Obs.

Mean

Std. Err.

Std.
Dev.

t-test

p-value

p-value

p-value

Male

96

0.688

0.048

0.466

-1.858 0.0323

0.0647

0.9677

Female

115

0.800

0.038

0.402

Combined

211

0.749

0.030

0.435

-0.113

0.061

Difference

Note: Evacuation preference was coded as 1 if the respondent answered “yes” to the question, “In the event of a
hurricane, I prefer to evacuate.” The variable was coded as 0 if the respondent answered “no,” or “unsure.”

For the question “Hurricanes are a potential threat to me or to my family,” (Table 4.5),
the mean column indicates that 88.5% of male respondents and 87.8% of female respondents
answered “yes” to the question. The difference in means between male and female respondents
(0.170) is not statistically significant at a .05 level of significance (p-value = 0.8732). There is no
association found between genders in relation to perceived threat of hurricanes. Further analysis
via a chi-square test of independence examined the relation between gender and perceived threat
of hurricanes. The relation between these variables was not significant (X2 Value = 0.0257, df =
1, p-value = 0.873).
For the question “I currently have an evacuation plan” (Table 4.6), the mean column
indicates that 46.9% of male respondents and 54.8% of female respondents answered “yes” to
the question. The difference in means between male and female respondents (-1.142) is not
statistically significant at a .05 level of significance (p-value = 0.2548). There is no association
found between genders in relation to having an evacuation plan. Further analysis via a chi-square
test of independence examined the relation between gender and having a plan. The relation
between these variables was not significant (X2 Value = 1.3094, df = 1, p-value = 0.252).
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For the question “In the event of a hurricane I prefer to evacuate” (Table 4.7), the mean
column indicates that 68.8% of male respondents and 80% of female respondents answered
“yes” to the question. The difference in means between male and female respondents (-1.858) is
statistically significant at a .10 level of significance (p-value = 0.0647). The null-hypothesis of
equal means can be rejected at the 10% level. There is an association found between genders in
relation to evacuation preference. In this instance, male respondents are more likely than female
respondents to prefer evacuating. Current literature on gender influence on evacuation behaviors
does not support this finding. Consequently, this analysis includes a multivariate regression
controlling for both children under 18 living in the household and indoor and outdoor pets in the
household to test the hypotheses that regardless of gender, people with children under 18 or pets
may be more inclined to prefer to evacuate (Table 4.8).
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Table 4.8. Impact of Gender on Evacuation Preference, Controlling for Children and Pets
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

0.112*

0.115*

0.124**

(0.0597)

(0.0593)

(0.0587)

0.132**

0.135**

0.138**

(0.0635)

(0.0631)

(0.0625)

Evacuation Preference
Male

Minor

Any Pet

-0.128**

-0.138**

(0.0598)

(0.0589)

Indoor Pet

-0.145**
(0.0602)

Outdoor Pet

-0.111
(0.110)

Constant

Observations
R-squared

0.688*** 0.706*** 0.805*** 0.808*** 0.758*** 0.643*** 0.698***
(0.0441)

(0.0361)

(0.0397)

(0.0384)

(0.0312)

(0.0485)

(0.0534)

211

211

211

211

211

211

211

0.017

0.020

0.021

0.027

0.005

0.038

0.063

Note: Evacuation preference was coded as 1 if the respondent answered “yes” to the question, “In the event of a
hurricane, I prefer to evacuate.” The variable was coded as 0 if the respondent answered “no,” or “unsure.”
Control variables against the indicator variable are respondent gender, minor (under 18) in household, any pet in
household, indoor-only pet in household, and outdoor-only pet in household. P-values associated with two-tailed
tests are reported. Standard errors are presented in parentheses. Significance is denoted by * p < 0.10, ** p< 0.05,
and *** p < 0.01.

Males are more likely to have a preference to evacuate at the 10% level (Table 4.7). The
analysis of gender on evacuation controlling for children and pets indicates that individuals with
children are more likely to evacuate than those without at the 5% level, and that people with pets
are less inclined to evacuate at the 5% level (Table 4.8). However, even controlling for having
children and pets, men are still more likely to evacuate, and this is significant at the 5% level.
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Inquiry 3: Pets and Evacuation Preference and Planning
The following tables depict dependent-sample one-tailed and two-tailed unequal variance
t-tests of survey results indicating preference for evacuating (Table 4.9), and perceived
evacuation plan preparedness by pet ownership (Table 4.10). Each table includes summary
statistics detailing the number of observations (Obs.), averages (Mean), standard errors (Std.
Err.), and standard deviations (Std. Dev.) for each sub-group and reports test statistics and pvalues associated with one-tailed and two-tailed tests. This analysis assessed populations by pet
ownership of both indoor and outdoor pets. There were 118 representative respondents with no
pets, and 115 representative respondents with either an indoor or outdoor pet, or both, for each of
the three variables assessed. A survey respondent received a non-pet owner or a pet owner
classification if he/she self-identified as a non-pet owner or pet owner. All respondents were
over the age of 18, and there was no upper age limit.
Table 4.9. Impact of Pet Ownership on Evacuation Preference
Ho: µNP
<µPets

Ho: µNP
=µPets

Ho: µNP
>µPets

Obs.

Mean

Std.
Err.

Std.
Dev.

t-test

p-value

p-value

p-value

No Pets
(NP)

118

0.805

0.037

0.398

2.094 0.9812

0.0376

0.0188

Pets

93

0.677

0.049

0.470

Combined

211

0.749

0.030

0.030

0.128

0.061

Difference

Note: Evacuation preference was coded as 1 if the respondent answered “yes” to “In the event of a hurricane, I
prefer to evacuate” and coded as 0 if the respondent answered “no,” or “unsure.”
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Table 4.10. Impact of Pet Ownership on Evacuation Preparedness
Ho: µNP
<µPets

Ho: µNP
=µPets

Ho: µNP
>µPets

Obs.

Mean

Std.
Err.

Std.
Dev.

t-test

p-value

p-value

p-value

No Pets
(NP)

118

0.492

0.046

0.502

-0.663 0.2541

0.5082

0.7459

Pets

93

0.538

0.052

0.501

Combined

211

0.512

0.034

0.501

-0.046

0.070

Difference

Note: Evacuation plan preparedness was coded as 1 if the respondent answered “yes” to the question, “I currently
have an evacuation plan” and coded as 0 if the respondent answered “no,” or “unsure.”

For the question “In the event of a hurricane, I prefer to evacuate” (Table 4.9), the mean
column indicates that 80.5% of non-pet owner respondents and 67.7% of pet owner respondents
answered “yes” to the question. The difference in means between non-pet owning and pet
owning respondents (2.094) is statistically significant at a .05 level of significance (p-value =
0.0376). The null hypothesis of equal means can be rejected at the 5% level. There is an
association found between pet ownership and having a preference to evacuate. In this instance,
people without pets have a higher preference to evacuate. Further analysis via a chi-square test
of independence examined the relation between pet ownership status and having a plan. The
relation between these variables was significant at the 5% level (X2 Value = 4.5067, df = 1, pvalue = 0.034).
For the question “I currently have an evacuation plan” (Table 4.10), the mean column
indicates that 49.2% of non-pet owner respondents and 53.8% of pet owner respondents
answered “yes.” The difference in means between non-pet owning and pet owning respondents
(-0.663) is not statistically significant at a .05 level of significance (p-value = 0.5082), showing
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no association between pet ownership status and having an evacuation plan. Further analysis via
a chi-square test of independence examined the relation between pet ownership status and having
a plan. The relation between these variables was not significant (X2 Value = 0.4425, df = 1, pvalue = 0.506).
Inquiry 4: Elderly Status and Evacuation
The following tables depict dependent-sample one-tailed and two-tailed unequal variance
t-tests of survey results indicating preference for evacuating (Table 4.11) by elderly status. They
report summary statistics including number of observations (Obs.), averages (Mean), standard
errors (Std. Err.), and standard deviations (Std. Dev.) for each sub-group, and report test statistics
and p-values associated with one-tailed and two-tailed tests. This analysis assessed populations
by age, dividing those under the age of 65 and those 65 or older. There were 169 representative
respondents under the age of 65 and 40 representative respondents aged 65 or older for the
variable assessed. A survey respondent received the classification as over or under 65 if s/he
self-identified as over or under 65. All respondents were over the age of 18, and there was no
upper age limit.
Table 4.11. Impact of Age on Evacuation Preference
Ho:
µ -65<µ65+
Obs. Mean

Std.
Err.

Std.
Dev.

t-test p-value

p-value

p-value

0.0794

0.0397

Under 65

169

0.775 0.032 0.419 1.789 0.9603

65+

40

0.625 0.078 0.490

Combined

209

0.746 0.746 0.030

Difference

Ho:
Ho:
-65=
65+
µ
µ
µ-65>µ65+

0.150 0.084

Note: Evacuation preference was coded as 1 if the respondent answered “yes” to the question, “In the event of a
hurricane, I prefer to evacuate.” The variable was coded as 0 if the respondent answered “no,” or “unsure.”
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For the question “In the event of a hurricane, I prefer to evacuate” (Table 4.11), the mean
column indicates that 77.5% of respondents under 65 and 62.7% of respondents 65 and over
answered “yes” to the question. The difference in means (1.789) between respondents aged
under 65 and respondents aged 65 and over is statistically significant at a .10 level of
significance (p-value = 0.0794). The null hypothesis of equal means can be rejected at the 10%
level. There is an association found between elderly status and having a preference to evacuate.
In this instance, people over the age of 65 have a lower preference to evacuate. Further analysis
via a chi-square test of independence examined the relation between elderly status and
evacuation preference. The relation between these variables was significant at the 5% level (X2
Value = 3.8524, df = 1, p-value = 0.050). Figure 4.1 illustrates a further breakdown of
evacuation preference by each of the age categories outlined in Table 4.1, showing that while the
relationship between age and likelihood of evacuation is not linear, those in the youngest group
are the most likely to evacuate and that those in the oldest group are the least likely to evacuate.

Percentage Preference to
Evacuate

Evacuation Preference by Age
1.
0.75
0.5
0.25
0.
1

2

3

4

5

6

Age Category
Evacuation Preference

Figure 4.1. Evacuation Preference Percentages by Age
Note: Age categories are as follows: Category 1:18-24; Category 2: 25-34; Category 3: 35-44; Category 4: 45-54;
Category 5: 55-64; Category 6: 65+
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Inquiry 5: Disability Status and Evacuation
The following table depicts a dependent-sample one-tailed and two-tailed unequal
variance t-test of survey results indicating preference for evacuating by physical disability status
(Table 4.12). The table details summary statistics including number of observations (Obs.),
averages (Mean), standard errors (Std. Err.), and standard deviations (Std. Dev.) for each subgroup, and reports test statistics and p-values associated with one-tailed and two-tailed tests.
This analysis assessed populations by physical disability status. There were 196 representative
respondents who self-reported no physical disability for themselves or any other member of the
household, and 42 representative respondents who self-reported that they, or a member of the
household, had a physical disability. All respondents were over the age of 18, and there was no
upper age limit.
Table 4.12: Impact of Household Disability on Evacuation Preference
Ho:
µND<µD

Ho:
µND=µD

Ho:
µND>µD

Obs.

Mean

Std.
Err.

Std.
Dev.

t-test

p-value

p-value

p-value

No Disability
(ND)

169

0.728

0.034

0.446

-1.562 0.0614

0.1228

0.9386

Disability in
Household (D)

42

0.833

0.058

0.377

Combined

211

0.749

0.030

0.435

-0.106

0.068

Difference

Note: Evacuation preference was coded as 1 if the respondent answered “yes” to the question, “In the event of
a hurricane, I prefer to evacuate.” The variable was coded as 0 if the respondent answered “no,” or “unsure.”

For the question “In the event of a hurricane, I prefer to evacuate” (Table 4.12), the mean
column indicates that 72.8% of respondents with no reported disability in the household and
83.8% of respondents with a reported disability in the household answered “yes.” The difference
in means between non-disabled household and disabled household respondents (-1.562) is not
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statistically significant at a .05 level of significance (p-value = 0.1228). There is no association
found between households where a member is disabled, and households where no member is
disabled in relation to preference to evacuate. Further analysis via a chi-square test of
independence examined the relation between disability and evacuation preference. The relation
between these variables was not significant (X2 Value = 1.9915, df = 1, p-value = 0.158).
Inquiry 6: Warning Message Exposure
The first two tables in this inquiry set depict dependent-sample one-tailed and two-tailed
unequal variance t-tests of survey results indicating awareness of evacuation assistance
programming and the CAE Program by education level. The tables detail summary statistics
including number of observations (Obs.), averages (Mean), standard errors (Std. Err.), and
standard deviations (Std. Dev.) for each sub-group. 96 representative respondents self-identified
as having no college degree or less education, and 109 representative respondents self-identified
as having a college degree at the associate’s level or higher. All respondents were over the age
of 18 with no upper age limit. The variables assessed were whether or not respondents were
aware that evacuation assistance of some kind was available in New Orleans (Table 4.13), and
whether respondents had seen or heard any information about how to use CAE (Table 4.14).

72

Table 4.13. Impact of Educational Level on Awareness of Evacuation Assistance
Programming
Ho: µND
<µCollege+
Std.
Dev.

Ho: µND
>µCollege+

t-test p-value

p-value

p-value

0.2166

0.8917

Obs.

Mean

No Degree
(ND)

96

0.615

0.050 0.489 -1.240 0.1083

College +

109

0.697

0.044 0.462

Combined

205

0.659

0.033 0.475

-0.083

0.067

Difference

Std.
Err.

Ho: µND
=µCollege+

Note: Awareness of evacuation assistance was coded as 1 if the respondent answered “yes” to the question, “I
know that New Orleans has an evacuation program that is open to anyone who needs help evacuating.” The
variable was coded as 0 if the respondent answered “no,” or “unsure.”

Table 4.14. Impact of Educational Level on Exposure to CAE Usage Information
Ho: µND
Ho: µND
Ho: µND
<µCollege+ =µCollege+ >µCollege+
Obs. Mean

Std. Err.

Std.
Dev.

t-test

p-value

p-value

p-value

0.552

0.051

0.500

-0.240 0.4055

0.8109

0.5945

College + 109 0.569

0.048

0.498

Combined 205 0.561

0.035

0.497

Difference

0.070

No
Degree
(ND)

96

-0.017

Note: Exposure to CAE usage information was coded as 1 if the respondent answered “yes” to the question, “I
have seen or heard information about how to use City-Assisted Evacuation.” The variable was coded as 0 if the
respondent answered “no,” or “unsure.”
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The next table in this inquiry set (Table 4.15) depicts dependent-sample one-tailed and
two-tailed t-tests of survey results of awareness of evacuation support programs by race. For this
analysis there were 207 representative respondents, of whom 124 identified as non-white (races
combined) and 83 identified as white. All respondents were over 18 with no upper age limit.
The variable assessed was the same as for Table 4.13 (whether or not participants had knowledge
that an evacuation support program of some kind exists in New Orleans). For the question “I
know that New Orleans has an evacuation program that is open to anyone who needs help
evacuating” (Table 4.13), the mean column indicates that 61.5% of non-college educated
respondents and 69.7% of college educated respondents answered “yes.” The difference in
means between non-college educated and college-educated respondents (-1.240) is not
statistically significant at a .05 level of significance (p-value = 0.2166). No association is found
between education levels in relation to awareness of evacuation assistance in New Orleans.
Table 4.15. Impact of Race on Awareness of Evacuation Assistance Programming
Ho: µNW
<µWhite

Ho: µNW
=µWhite

Ho: µNW
>µWhite

p-value

p-value

p-value

0.613 0.044 0.489 -2.266 0.0123

0.0246

0.9877

Obs. Mean
Non-White 124
(NW)

Std.
Err.

Std.
Dev.

White

83

0.759 0.047 0.430

Combined

207

0.671 0.033 0.471

Difference

t-test

-0.146 0.064

Note: Awareness of evacuation assistance was coded as 1 if the respondent answered “yes” to the question, “I
know that New Orleans has an evacuation program that is open to anyone who needs help evacuating.” The
variable was coded as 0 if the respondent answered “no,” or “unsure.”
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For the question “I have seen or heard information about how to use City-Assisted
Evacuation” (Table 4.14), the mean column indicates that 55.2% of non-college educated
respondents and 56.9% of college-educated respondents answered “yes.” The difference in
means between non-college educated and college-educated respondents (-0.240) is not
statistically significant at a .05 level of significance (p-value = 0.8109). There is no association
found between education levels in relation to exposure to City-Assisted Evacuation usage
information in New Orleans.
For the question “I know that New Orleans has an evacuation program that is open to
anyone who needs help evacuating” (Table 4.15), the mean column indicates that 61.3% of NonWhite respondents and 75.9% of White respondents answered “yes.” The difference in means
between Non-White and White respondents (-2.266) is statistically significant at a .05 level of
significance (p-value = 0.0246). The null-hypothesis of equal means can be rejected at the 5%
level. There is an association found between races in relation to awareness of evacuation
assistance. In this instance, White respondents are more likely than Non-White respondents to
have awareness of evacuation assistance programming.
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Table 4.16. Impact of Race on Exposure to CAE Usage Information

Obs. Mean

Std.
Err.

Ho:
µNW<
µWhite

Ho:µNW=
µWhite

Ho: µNW>
µWhite

Std.
Dev.

t-test

p-value

p-value

p-value

-0.710 0.2394

0.4787

0.7606

NonWhite
(NW)

124

0.540 0.045

0.500

White

83

0.590 0.054

0.495

Combined 207

0.560 0.035

0.498

Difference

-0.050 0.070

Note: Exposure to CAE usage information was coded as 1 if the respondent answered “yes” to the question, “I
have seen or heard information about how to use City-Assisted Evacuation.” The variable was coded as 0 if
the respondent answered “no,” or “unsure.”

For the question “I have seen or heard information about how to use City-Assisted
Evacuation” (Table 4.16), the mean column indicates that 54% of Non-White respondents and
59% of White respondents answered “yes.” The difference in means between Non-White and
White respondents (-0.710) is not statistically significant at a .05 level of significance (p-value =
0.4787). There is no association found between races in relation to exposure to City-Assisted
Evacuation usage information in New Orleans.
The results in Table 4.15 were statistically significant, which prompted me to conduct
further testing to control for the possibility that white residents in New Orleans had greater
knowledge of evacuation support services due to other contributing factors. The final table in this
inquiry set (Table 4.17) contains the results of a multivariate regression model to check for both
awareness of evacuation services (as addressed in Table 4.15) and exposure to CAE information
(as addressed in Table 4.16) against race, while controlling for the factors of gender, having
children in the household, and having pets. The reasoning for controlling for these factors is to
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help assess whether Whites may have had higher exposure than other groups to evacuation
program messaging, or whether certain non-race related factors (such as having a pet or a child)
might have led White individuals to be exposed to (through schools or pet-related services),
additional information.
Table 4.17. Impact of Race on CAE Awareness, and Evacuation Support Service Awareness,
Controlling for Gender, Children, and Pets
(1)

(2)

(3)

CAE Awareness
White

Evac. Assistance Awareness
0.0184

0.146**

0.151**

0.131*

(0.71)

(0.74)

(0.25)

(2.21)

(2.31)

(1.88)

0.111

0.104

0.163**

0.158**

(1.60)

(1.49)

(2.53)

(2.46)

-0.0722

-0.0758

-0.0762

-0.0783

(-0.98)

(-1.03)

(-1.11)

(-1.14)

Any Pet

R-squared

(6)

0.0525

Minor

Observations

(5)

0.0500

Male

Constant

(4)

0.0987

0.0583

(1.33)

(0.85)

0.540***

0.502***

0.478***

0.613***

0.547***

0.533***

(12.08)

(7.74)

(7.11)

(14.63)

(9.09)

(8.52)

207

207

207

207

207

207

0.002

0.020

0.028

0.023

0.060

0.063

Note: The first outcome variable in Table 4.17 is an indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if the respondent
answered “yes” to the question, “I have seen or heard information about how to use City-Assisted Evacuation.”
The indicator variable takes a value of 0 if the respondent answered “no” or “unsure.” The second outcome
variable in Table 11 is an indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if the respondent answered “yes” to the
question, “I know that New Orleans has an evacuation program that is open to anyone who needs help
evacuating.” The indicator variable takes a value of 0 if the respondent answered “no” or “unsure.” Control
variables against the indicator variables are respondent gender, minor (under 18) in household, and any pet in
household. P-values associated with two-tailed tests are reported. Standard errors are presented in parentheses.
Significance is denoted by * p < 0.10, ** p< 0.05, and *** p < 0.01.

Results of the examination of the impact of race on City-Assisted Evacuation knowledge and
evacuation support service knowledge controlling for children and pets indicate that in regard to
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City-Assisted Evacuation knowledge, there is no significant difference in knowledge levels
between Whites and all other combined races, even after accounting for the factors of gender,
children, and pets (Table 4.17). In addition, Whites are significantly more likely at the 10% level
to have knowledge of evacuation support services than other combined races even controlling for
the factors of gender, children and pets (Table 4.17).
Inquiry 7: Home Ownership and Evacuation Compliance
The following table depicts a dependent-sample one-tailed and two-tailed unequal
variance t-test of survey results indicating self-reported evacuation compliance by home-owner
status (Table 4.18). The table reports summary statistics including number of observations
(Obs.), averages (Mean), standard errors (Std. Err.), and standard deviations (Std. Dev.) for each
sub-group, and shows test statistics and p-values associated with one-tailed and two-tailed tests.
This analysis assesses populations by home-ownership. There were 101 representative
respondents who self-reported as renters or “other,” and 107 representative respondents who
self-reported that they were the owners of their residences. All respondents were over the age of
18, and there was no upper age limit.
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Table 4.18. Impact of Home Ownership on Self-Reported Evacuation Compliance
Ho: µOthers
<µOwners
Obs. Mean

Std.
Err.

Ho: µOthers
>µOwners

Std.
Dev.

t-test p-value

p-value

p-value

0.827 0.7954

0.4093

0.2046

All Others

101

0.822 0.038

0.385

Home
Owners

107

0.776 0.041

0.419

Combined

208

0.798 0.028

0.402

Difference

Ho: µOthers
=µOwners

0.046 0.056

Note: Evacuation compliance was coded as 1 if the respondent answered “yes” to the question, “If the City of New
Orleans tells me to evacuate, I will evacuate.” The variable was coded as 0 if the respondent answered “no,” or
“unsure.”

For the question “If the city of New Orleans tells me to evacuate, I will evacuate” (Table
4.18), the mean column indicates that 82.2% of non-home-owner respondents and 77.6% of
home-owner respondents answered “yes.” The difference in means between non-home-owners
and home-owners (0.827) is not statistically significant at a .05 level of significance (p-value =
0.4093). There is no association found between homeowners and non-home-owners in relation
to self-reported evacuation compliance.
Inquiry 8: Trust in the City of New Orleans
The two tables in this inquiry set depict dependent-sample one-tailed and two-tailed
unequal variance t-tests of survey results indicating trust in the City of New Orleans during an
evacuation by race and education level. The tables report summary statistics including number
of observations (Obs.), averages (Mean), standard errors (Std. Err.), and standard deviations (Std.
Dev.) for each sub-group. For the first data-set (Table 4.19), there were 124 representative
respondents who self-identified as a race other than White (Black, Hispanic, Asian, or Minority
Non-White), and 83 representative respondents who self-identified as White. For the second
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data-set (Table 4.20), there were 96 representative respondents who self-identified as having no
college degree or less education, and 109 representative respondents who self-identified as
having an Associate’s degree or higher. All respondents for both data-sets were over the age of
18, and there was no upper age limit. The variable assessed was whether or not respondents
trusted the city of New Orleans to keep them safe during an evacuation. The results of Table
4.20 are further broken down in Graph 4.2 to show each education level outlined in Table 4.1.
Table 4.19: Impact of Race on Trust in the City of New Orleans During an Evacuation
Ho: µNW
<µWhite
Obs. Mean

Std.
Err.

Std.
Dev.

Ho: µNW
=µWhite

Ho: µNW
>µWhite

t-test p-value

p-value

p-value

0.0005

0.0003

Non-White
(NW)

124

0.411 0.044 0.494 3.514 0.9997

White

83

0.193 0.044 0.397

Combined

207

0.324 0.033 0.469

Difference

0.219 0.062

Note: Trust in the city during an evacuation was coded as 1 if the respondent answered “yes” to the question “I
trust the city to keep me safe during an evacuation.” The variable was coded as 0 if the respondent answered
“no” or “unsure.”

For the question “I trust the City of New Orleans to keep me safe during an evacuation”
(Table 4.19), the mean column indicates that 41.1% of Non-White and 19.3% of White
respondents answered “yes” to the question. The difference in means between Non-White and
White respondents (3.514) is statistically significant at a .01 level of significance (p-value =
0.0005). The null-hypothesis of equal means can be rejected at the 1% level. Further analysis
via a chi-square test of independence examined the relation between race and trust in the city
during an evacuation. The relation was significant at the 1% level (X2 Value = 10.8454, df = 1, pvalue = 0.001). There is an association found between race in relation to trust in the City of New
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Orleans during an evacuation. In this instance, Non-White respondents are more likely than
White respondents to trust the city to keep them safe during an evacuation.
Table 4.20: Impact of Education Level on Trust in the City of New Orleans
Ho: µND
<µCollege+
Obs. Mean

Std.
Err.

Std.
Dev.

Ho: µND
=µCollege+

Ho: µN
>µCollege+

t-test p-value

p-value

p-value

0.0080

0.0040

No
Degree
(ND)

96

0.417 0.051 0.496 2.681 0.9960

College+

109

0.243 0.040 0.431

Combined

205

0.322 0.032 0.468

Difference

0.173 0.065

Note: Trust in the city during an evacuation was coded as 1 if the respondent answered “yes” to the question “I
trust the city to keep me safe during an evacuation.” The variable was coded as 0 if the respondent answered “no”
or “unsure.”

For the question, “I trust the City of New Orleans to keep me safe during an evacuation”
(Table 4.20), the mean column indicates that 41.7% of respondents with no college degree or less
education, and 24.3% of respondents with an Associate’s degree or higher answered “yes” to the
question. The difference in means between non-college educated and college-educated
respondents (2.681) is statistically significant at a .01 level of significance (p-value = 0.0080).
The null-hypothesis of equal means can be rejected at the 1% level. Further analysis via a chisquare test of independence examined the relation between education level and trust in the city
during an evacuation. The relation between these variables was significant at the 1% level (X2
Value = 7.1853, df = 1, p-value = 0.007). There is an association found between non-college
educated persons and college-educated persons in relation to trust in the City of New Orleans
during an evacuation. In this instance, non-college educated respondents are more likely than
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college-educated respondents to trust in the city to keep them safe during an evacuation. There
was a noticeable decline in trust with education (Figure 4.2).

Figure 4.2. Trust in City by Education Level
Note: Levels of completed education are as follows: (1) no high school diploma; (2) high school diploma; (3) some
college; (4) Associates degree; (5) Bachelor’s degree; (6) Master’s degree; and (7) Doctoral degree.

82

CHAPTER V
QUALITATIVE RESULTS
I conducted a series of qualitative interviews in summer of 2018 wherein I asked
participants a series of questions intended to reveal how their evacuation-related behaviors and
attitudes relate to the constructs of the Health Belief Model. After transcribing these interviews,
I examined them using two data analysis software programs, Voyant and NVivo. These tools
allowed me to extract themes that recurred across interviews and to gauge their relative
prevalence and significance to the informants. Finally, I examined transcripts in detail to analyze
how these emergent themes related to the constructs of the Health Belief Model.
Description of the Study Sample
While my efforts during summer 2017 to solicit individuals to complete a short, in-person
quantitative questionnaire were successful, I had less success during the summer of 2018 when
attempting to reach individuals who were willing to speak with me at length for a recorded
interview. I intended to use contact information provided by questionnaire respondents who
indicated they were willing to talk with me in the future to randomly identify 2 individuals from
each of the 17 Evacuspot neighborhoods. This proved impossible. The 20 individuals
mentioned below are only random in that they include every single contact whose phone
numbers had not changed or been disconnected, who responded willingly, who had not moved or
left the city, and who showed up or answered the door at the appointment time we had agreed to
for an interview. These individuals do come from all neighborhoods, and all walks of life, and
include both New Orleans natives and transplants. However, the minority representation for the
qualitative portion of my research does not reflect the city population as a whole, likely because
minority populations tend generally to be more transient and to have less stability in terms of
addresses, internet access, and telephone number. These factors should be important
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considerations for emergency planning processes. Furthermore, I recognize that there must be
some implicit bias held by the 20 people who ultimately agreed to participate in my survey. If
pressed, I would venture to guess that each would fit in to one of three overlapping categories:
(1) they were often students, educators, academics, or individuals who were otherwise personally
invested in helping me complete what they felt to be valuable research or who wanted to help me
complete my dissertation and saw some value in that; (2) they cared about evacuation and
emergency planning in our city, and in many cases believed that specific friends or neighbors (or
they themselves) would benefit from improved city programming; or (3) they were retirees or
stay-at-home types who had more available time than many of my other previous quantitative
informants.
The individuals I interviewed were nonetheless far from homogenous. In lieu of
perfunctory demographic characteristic, which do not accurately depict social diversity, I have
chosen to provide short biographies of each interviewee which describe him or her not only in
terms of who they are demographically, also in terms of where they fit in to the wider social
fabric of New Orleans4. There are two reasons for including these biographies. First, readers
may refer to this list any time they read a numbered informant quote and wonder about the
speaker’s background. More importantly, planners should consider this group as a collective
case-study, and to think hard about the myriad diverse needs represented by such individuals
when attempting to build comprehensive plans for city-wide populations.

4

In some cases, I have chosen to withhold details that would identify an interviewee to local
readers and thereby destroy his or her anonymity.
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Informant 1: The International Student
This individual is a 35- to 44-year-old Chinese man. He described moving from China
and working in Silicon Valley for several years before changing careers and coming to New
Orleans to study law. At the time of our interview, this individual was in his second year of law
school and had lived in New Orleans for just over two years. He had no familiarity with CityAssisted Evacuation or Evacuteer, and he was also very unsure about what to expect from
hurricanes in general, having never personally experienced or prepared for one. He also
expressed concern that his English skills would make it difficult to understand emergency
messaging. He lived about a block from an Evacuspot but could not recall the location of the
spot or how to use it although I had shared this information with him the year before and left him
with a brochure explaining city programming.
Informant 2: The Musician and Healer
This individual is a 45- to 54-year-old White woman from California. She described
working as an artist, performer, healer, and a music educator. This individual had lived in New
Orleans approximately ten years at the time of our interview but reported having no past
experience with hurricanes. Although she owned a car at the time of our interview, one of her
biggest concerns was how to evacuate with most of her instruments (including an upright bass),
and how to decide which instruments to leave behind, and how to protect those from potential
flooding. This individual knew about City-Assisted Evacuation, as well as where the nearest
Evacuspot was in relation to where she lived, but she was very concerned that the communities
where she regularly worked might not possess this basic knowledge.
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Informant 3: The Bar Owner
This individual is a 35- to 44-year-old White man. He owns a neighborhood bar in the
part of New Orleans frequented by university students. He is a Louisiana native who grew up in
Lafayette and had lived in New Orleans for five years at the time of interview. While he did
have some prior experience with hurricanes and was aware of the City-Assisted Evacuation
program, as a business owner he is the type to prefer sheltering-in-place, rather than evacuation,
in order to look after his business.
Informant 4: The Carpenter
This individual is a 45- to 55-year-old White man. He is a carpenter from Arkansas,
although he had lived in New Orleans for over twenty years at the time of our interview. He has
a dog. Although he dislikes evacuation, and dislikes driving generally, he would leave if an
evacuation were issued, and he would take his pet with him. He was aware of the City-Assisted
Evacuation program and reported that people in his neighborhood were also mostly aware of
where their Evacuspot was located because he had shared this information with them. He was
very neighborhood-oriented and was able to point out houses where individuals lived who might
need assistance. He would check on these neighbors and make sure they could reach an
Evacuspot before evacuating himself.
Informant 5: The Engineer
This individual is a 35- to 44-year-old White man. He works on the North Shore for a
marine dredging company and is a life-long New Orleanian. This individual was able to talk
about his previous hurricane experiences at length. Although he did not feel personally
threatened by hurricanes, as a marine engineer, he recognized that flood-water inundation was a
significant risk that factors in to his evacuation decisions.
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Informant 6: The Elderly Local
This individual is a 75-year-old Black woman. She was born and raised in New Orleans,
but was displaced to Houston following Hurricane Katrina and did not return home until her
mother’s death in 2013. She weathered Katrina on the top floor of a hotel on Canal Street where
a family member had then worked as manager and was rescued from the city a week later. She
lives alone and reported that she would have to rely upon City-Assisted Evacuation to evacuate if
need be because she no longer has living relatives, is unable to drive, and has limited financial
means.
Informant 7: The Grants Manager
This individual is a 45- to 54- year-old woman of undisclosed race. She is a New Orleans
native, and works as a grants manager for local non-profits. She was aware of both CityAssisted Evacuation and Evacuteer, because there is a woman in her neighborhood who posts
social-media posts about the programming regularly to promote programmatic awareness. As
someone with significant storm-related experience, she is more inclined to evacuate than to try
and shelter-in-place.
Informant 8: The Hospitality Worker
This individual is a 35- to 44-year-old White woman. She is not a New Orleans native,
but had lived in the city for about twenty years at the time of our interview and reported being
from a coastal city where she grew up with significant hurricane-related experience. This
individual has always worked in the hospitality industry, either for hotels or as a waitress. She
has three cats, no local family, and lives alone. Her sole source of transportation is her bicycle
and her income is limited, so she reported needing to use City-Assisted Evacuation if she felt she
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had to evacuate. She was well-aware of the program but was also very concerned about the
logistics of trying to evacuate alone with her three pets.
Informant 9: The Paramedic and National Guardsman
This individual is a 35- to 44-year-old White man. He was born in New Orleans but
reported having grown up all over the South in the Gulf Coast area and moving back home about
five years prior to this interview. As someone who grew up along the coast, he has significant
storm-related experience. He was able to provide unique perspectives on evacuation trends and
evacuation assistance in New Orleans because as a National Guardsman he will be required to
report for duty during an evacuation and will be responsible for rescuing those who choose to
stay behind if those people become endangered. This individual has a wife, a child, and a dog,
and he has plans for his family to leave the city if evacuation is necessary even though he himself
will be unable to.
Informant 10: The Student and Bartender
This individual is a 25- to 34-year-old White man. He works as a bartender and is an onagain/off-again student studying sociology and prison justice reform. He was born in a Gulf
Coast city in Florida, and at the time of this interview reported having lived in New Orleans for
seven years. This individual’s evacuation decisions are affected by the fact that he is a renter and
does not own a vehicle. He is aware of City-Assisted Evacuation and knows where his closest
Evacuspot is but is not sure he would use the program. He is more comfortable with the idea of
evacuating with friends or sheltering in place since he lives in a second-floor apartment unit.
Informant 11: The Retiree
This individual is a White man over age 70. At the time of our interview he had lived in
New Orleans for less than a year. He was born in Iowa but had also lived in several major cities
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during his career years. However, he had never lived in a coastal city, and had no experience
with hurricanes or evacuations and no real understanding of how hurricane evacuations function
or how City-Assisted Evacuation works. He had not noticed his neighborhood Evacuspot. I
interviewed this individual shortly after the August 5, 2017 flood in New Orleans, and after
seeing water levels rise in his own neighborhood and threaten his car and home, he expressed
worry about future flood potential in the city during a hurricane.
Informant 12: The Doctor
This individual is a 35- to 44-year-old White woman, who grew up in Louisiana. She is a
physician who is married with two children and three pets. Although this individual reported
that evacuating would be logistically difficult for her with family and pets, she reported
understanding the need for evacuation compliance because as a physician she regularly sees the
costly outcomes of non-compliance in her own field. Her neighborhood had flooded during
Katrina and she reported feeling a great deal of stress each hurricane season.
Informant 13: The Hotel Manager
This individual is a 48-year-old Black man who is single and has no pets or children. At
the time of interview, he had lived in New Orleans for two and a half years and worked as a
manager at a luxury hotel chain. He reported being more inclined to stay than to evacuate,
stating that he might be responsible for hotel guests during an emergency event in the city. As a
manager, this person is very familiar with City-Assisted Evacuation, as the program is a
component of the emergency planning protocols for guests at his place of work.
Informant 14: The Civic Activist and Business Owner
This individual is a 35- to 44-year-old Black man. He is a life-long New Orleanian who
lived several blocks from his original childhood home. He has significant storm-related
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experience and understands the risks associated with hurricanes in New Orleans. This individual
owns a local business, is an active member of his local church, and is involved in several
neighborhood safety and improvement groups. This individual is well versed in the CityAssisted Evacuation program and served as an Evacuteer neighborhood volunteer ambassador in
2015. As such, he was able to provide valuable information from a volunteer perspective.
Informant 15: The Nurse
This individual is a 45- to 54-year-old White man who works as a nurse. At the time of
our interview he reported having lived in New Orleans for ten years. This individual is a
homeowner in a flood-prone portion of New Orleans, where he resides with his wife (who is also
a nurse) and their young granddaughter. He had previously lived in Florida and has extensive
storm-related experience. This individual was not familiar with City-Assisted Evacuation or
Evacuteer before our initial meeting, but he and his wife both work in a field where they are
considered essential personnel and not allowed to evacuate.
Informant 16: The Manufacturing Facility Employee
This individual is a 35- to 44-year-old White man. He is a native New Orleanian who
works for a local manufacturing facility. Because this individual has lived in New Orleans his
entire life, he has deep familial ties to the city. While this individual was somewhat familiar
with City-Assisted Evacuation, he reported feeling obligated, as part of a large family, to go help
older and more vulnerable family members with evacuation preparation and execution himself
rather than allow them to rely on city services. He reported anticipating difficulty boarding up
and preparing several homes in the city for hurricane evacuations, should the need arise.
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Informant 17: The Community College Student
This individual is a 25- to 34-year old White woman who lives with her spouse and her
grandmother, who is 98 years old. She serves as her grandmother’s caretaker, works full-time
during the day, and attends college courses for physical therapy at night. This individual was
born in Louisiana but left at the age of seven and lived abroad until two years prior to our
interview. Therefore, her experience with hurricanes and knowledge of local evacuation support
resources were both minimal.
Informant 18: The Mother and Volunteer
This individual is a 35- to 44-year old White woman. This individual is currently staying
at home to raise her two young children. She also reported volunteering at her children’s school,
volunteering at her church, and volunteering with a local neighborhood organization. This
individual was aware of her local Evacuspot because it is directly in front of the local library
where she regularly walks her children, but also had not seen any hurricane preparedness
information at any of the public places where she volunteered. As such, she was not aware of
how the spot functioned or its relationship to City-Assisted Evacuation.
Informant 19: The Local Musician
This individual is a 35- to 44-year-old White man. He is a native New Orleanian and a
local musician who is married but has no children. At the time of our interview, this individual
was living with a friend, having been temporarily displaced because his own residence was being
raised following flooding associated with Hurricane Katrina. This individual was familiar with
City-Assisted Evacuation.
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Informant 20: The Retired Academic
This individual is a White woman over the age of 65 who served as faculty, and later
dean, at a local university. This individual is a New Orleans native who is now retired and lives
alone after the death of her mother and husband. As a career social scientist, this individual had
thought about the social implications of a city-assisted program at length and was eager to share
her thoughts with me. She was also able to discuss her thoughts on evacuation planning and
execution as an elderly woman living alone.
Voyant Results
As mentioned in Chapter III, I began content analysis by running all qualitative interview
data through the web-based, computer-assisted analysis tool Voyant. I did not code the text fed
in to Voyant, but I did “clean” it prior to input by removing interviewer speech segments. This
gave a truer raw count of informant words and allowed Voyant to provide more meaningful data
concerning associated words and connections that were my informant’s words and not my own.
Once the cleaned texts were put in to Voyant, I examined the text collectively for initial
trends using Voyant’s “Cirrus” tool, which creates “word clouds.” The word clouds created by
Cirrus show words that appear more or less frequently as larger or smaller text, and the user can
ask the software to include only words with a specified minimum frequency. Because some
words (such as “and,” “or,” “the,” “if,” and numbers) are rarely relevant to analysis, Voyant
includes them on a “stop word” list and automatically removes them from the word cloud. For
this analysis, I chose to add several additional words to Voyant’s default stop word list to yield
more meaningful results. The words that I added were “isn’t,” “um,” “yeah,” “I’m,” “it’s,”
“just,” and, “that’s.” These words initially had high frequency counts but were not meaningful
content-wise.
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Figure 5.1. Word Cloud Showing Overall Frequency of Mention Across All 20 Qualitative
Interviews
“People” is the word that occurred most frequently in this corpus (147 times), followed by
“going” (133 times) and “probably” (85 times) (Fig. 5.1). I set a scale for this word cloud to
omit any term that occurred less than 20 times to avoid an overly crowded and difficult to read
product. Incidentally, “people going, probably” could have been a good alternative title for this
dissertation, as it nicely sums up what we currently know about how effective City-Assisted
Evacuation might be.
When using the Cirrus tool in the live format, users can click on each word to see the
number of times it occurred, which informants used it most, and its relationship to other words.
In a live format, Voyant users can select any word in the Cirrus tool and see linked connections,
or they can explore by using a search function to find specific words that might interest them. I

93

selected “people,” “going,” and “probably” to see how those words relate to other words in the
corpus (Figure 5.2). “People*” is included to insure inclusion of matching terms starting with
that word, and “people’s” is included so that if the word was pluralized content was not missed.

Figure 5.2. Terms Most Frequently Associated with Keywords “People,” “Probably,” and
“Going.”
Note: Keywords are shown in blue. The thickness of the lines connecting words indicates the strength of the
connection, with thicker lines connecting words that are more strongly associated.

This analysis suggests relatively strong association between these keywords and “don’t,”
“storm,” and “think,” and “I’m,” and relatively weaker associations between these keywords and
“cars” or “houses” (Figure 5.2).
While I found Voyant to be a somewhat useful tool for raw-transcription analysis, and the
implications of some of my initial Voyant results appear in Chapter VII (Analysis), I ultimately
found the tool to be more useful as a secondary way to look at data after I had coded that data in
NVivo.

For example, if I created a node in NVivo for “barriers to evacuation,” and one of the

most frequently occurring words in text associated with that node was “traffic,” it was then
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helpful to me to return to Voyant and use various visual tools with the word “traffic” to gain
additional insight. I determined that ten of the 20 informants mention “traffic,” with some
informants mentioning the word more frequently than others (Figure 5.3). In the live format,
Voyant allows me to scroll over each space on the graph to see the number of times each
informant used the word or click on an informant space on the graph to be taken to the places
where the informant used the word in the corpus. Voyant is quite useful in showing frequency
and distribution across a corpus. This is a good check-in of sorts to make sure that if “traffic”
was coded as a barrier 30 times, it was somewhat evenly distributed across the corpus and
mentioned in multiple interviews, rather than just an anomaly where one individual was
inordinately concerned with traffic. Just as with “traffic,” I used Voyant to double-check the
distribution of each of the nodes discussed in this chapter to ensure that codes were
representative of themes in the corpus as a whole.
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Figure 5.3. Frequency of traffic in interviews
Note: X labels would identify the interviewees and have therefore been removed. The y-axis indicates the
frequency of mention across the corpus.
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I also used Voyant to look for words closely associated with each of the keywords associated
with the NVivo nodes. For example, for “traffic,” I used the Voyant “Cirrus Links” tool to
create a radiating map where all the words surrounding the word I am interested in appear
(Figure 5.4). Figure 5.4, below, shows all the words associated with “traffic.” Again, in the live
format of Voyant, scrolling over each of these words brings up the frequency, or number of times
the words were linked, and clicking on that linked word will take you to the location of that link
in the corpus.
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Figure 5.4. Words most closely associated with “traffic.”
The ability to see which words are most strongly associated with a given keyword helps
me to better understand how people feel about the word or idea in question. For example, words
like “sitting,” “uncomfortable,” “fear,” “waiting,” “stuck,” and “clusterfuck” stand out, painting
a pretty vivid picture of how my informants feel about the barrier to evacuation that is “traffic”
(Fig. 5.4). This also allows me to confirm the coding choices I made in NVivo. Here, I had
coded “traffic” as a barrier to evacuation. If the majority of the associated words surrounding it
were positive terms, this would prompt a review of the data to consider re-coding mentions of
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traffic as something other than a barrier. Of course, it was still incumbent upon me as a
researcher to check Voyant results thoroughly and use personal judgement. For example,
looking at the links to “traffic” (Fig. 5.4), the word “fun” appears. Because “fun” is so different
from most of the other associated words, it is essential to explore it for further context.
Investigation reveals that the term occurred only once in relation to “traffic,” and examining the
full context, the program brings me to the quote by Informant 4, which reads, “I mean, waiting in
traffic isn’t fun.” Because “isn’t” is a stop word excluded from visual results, only a review of
the full context would show this association.
As mentioned earlier, although the initial Voyant outputs were numerically interesting,
they were ultimately not useful as preliminary analysis tools without exposing significant context
that only the interviewer could have known. However, Voyant was very helpful when checking
my coding choices in NVivo. Therefore, in the next section, which covers NVivo results, the
reader should know that the coding outcome list reflects cross-checking through Voyant using
the methods described above.
NVIVO Results
Coding in NVivo was a multi-step process. My search for trends in my text corpus began
with using the elements of the Health Belief Model as the lens for initial coding. This seemed a
sensible approach because the HBM influenced the development of both the original quantitative
survey tool and the qualitative questionnaire. As mentioned previously, the elements of the HBM
are perceived benefits, perceived barriers, cues-to-action, self-efficacy, perceived susceptibility,
and perceived severity (Glanz, 2008:160). Although the ultimate purpose of this research was to
find out how people in New Orleans feel about City-Assisted Evacuation, I knew I needed to
find out how they feel about evacuation in general. This is important for several reasons. First,
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if people are reluctant to evacuate regardless of whether or not certain barriers (like not having a
car) are removed by the city, this has important implications for the popularity of City-Assisted
Evacuation as well. Second, the existing literature in the field deals with evacuation behaviors,
not City-Assisted Evacuation compliance behaviors (which have never been studied), and part of
my goal was to position my work within this literature. And finally, although I did ask specific
questions about City-Assisted Evacuation, any answers I received from informants about
program-specific barriers and benefits were purely hypothetical, because the system in its current
incarnation (as a city/non-profit/volunteer-run hybrid) has not been tested during a hazardous
storm under a mandatory evacuation warning5.
Therefore, when considering the elements of the HBM as codes, I considered those codes
in relation to the behavior of evacuating generally. The first set of codes I came up with were:
Barriers to Evacuation (perceived barriers), Benefits to Evacuation (perceived benefits),
Evacuation Information Sources (cues-to-action), Preparedness Behaviors (self-efficacy), Risk
Perception (perceived susceptibility), and Weather Beliefs (perceived severity). The Weather
Beliefs code was designated to perceived severity of storm impacts, rather than perceived
severity of what people thought might happen to them if they stayed behind, since the latter
would be an inappropriate question for people who may not have resources to evacuate. Using
the HBM as a framework for evaluation also allowed me to provide my qualitative survey
assistant with non-negotiable, base-line codes to use as a starting point during her portion of the
pre-code reconciliation process. These initial codes were non-negotiable because they
represented the framework of the evaluation model I decided to use for my research. At this
point, with the elements of the model as the code-framework, my assistant was asked to code

5

While City-Assisted Evacuation existed and was enacted during Gustav, it was not the robust partner program that
it is today.
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five of our interviews and provide any additional codes that she felt were necessary. In the
meantime, I did the same exercise with the same five interviews, and we reconvened and shared
our coding results. Working together, we realized that several of our additional independent
codes could be folded back in to our initial six main codes. For example, the code
“Fear/Anxiety” turned out to be fear or anxiety over unknowns surrounding City-Assisted
Evacuation programming each time. Therefore, “Fear/Anxiety” could always be coded as a
“Barrier to Evacuation.”
We also had several useful additional codes that we realized would be more relevant as a
unified singular code. For example, my research assistant had a code for “Weather/Storm
Information,” which she understood to be all of the information people receive before a storm,
and I had a code for “News Information Sources,” which I understood to mean all the multiple
ways people hear about storm or evacuation related messaging, such as via the news, the radio,
and internet. This eventually became a single code for “Evacuation Information Sources,” which
we both considered to be all the resources that people turn to when deciding whether or not to
ultimately evacuate. These might be weather apps, city websites with updates, local or national
news sources, radio broadcasts, storm tracking data, or any number of other things that people
decided to use in their evacuation decision making processes.
Ultimately, our initial set of six codes yielded several other mutually agreed upon, morespecific sub-codes. Under “Barriers to Evacuation” a new category for “Trust in the City” was
needed because there were so many direct mentions of this topic, and it is a very New Orleansspecific barrier that deserves its own analysis and discussion. Under “Benefits to Evacuation” a
new code for “Mandatory Evacuation” became necessary, and under “Evacuation Information
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Sources” a code for “Evacuteer” was relevant because we wanted to be able to share specific
mentions of “Evacuteer” back with that organization.
Next, there were several other themes that were much more ambiguous in terms of
whether they could be considered barriers or benefits or cues-to-action, or whether they
contributed to perceived severity or perceived susceptibility. In other words, when we went back
and overlapped codes (when a sentence was coded under multiple codes) these were codes that
were often in contradictory categories depending on specific content. I call these codes “switchcodes.” These codes were “Floods,” “Social Influence,” “Hurricane Memories,” “Katrina,” and
“Other Disaster Experiences.” For example, if someone told me proudly about how they rode
out Katrina unscathed, that same individual may have also told me that they were unlikely to
heed future evacuation warnings, and that instance might have been coded under both “Katrina”
and “Barriers to Evacuation.” However, if a New Orleans transplant told me about how many
horrible Katrina stories they had heard from their neighbors and how they never wanted to live
through that sort of event themselves, that instance would likewise have been coded under
“Katrina,” but also under “Benefits to Evacuation.”
Finally, following several re-readings, after developing a useful set of codes, sub-codes,
and switch-codes, three other code designations became necessarily apparent. Those three codes
were “New Orleans Native,” “New Orleans transplant,” and “Occupation.” I call these codes
identity-codes. Although these codes might seem like categorical designations rather than
content designations, thinking about a full Health Belief Model approach to gauging the potential
actions of each individual in light of their own particular life circumstances was extremely useful
and necessary. For example, an individual’s occupation was often a barrier if that individual felt
obligated to stay during an evacuation or was required to remain behind and report to some sort
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of essential service duty. However, an occupation could also be considered a benefit if that
individual reported receiving evacuation preparedness related messaging at work. Figure 5.5,
which follows, shows the final code map that recaps the code designations described above in a
format that is more approachable for quick reference.
Primary Codes

Sub-codes

Switch Codes

Identity Codes

Barriers to Evacuation

ß Trust in the City

Floods

New Orleans
Native

Benefits to Evacuation

ß Mandatory
Evacuation

Social Influence

New Orleans
Transplant

Evacuation Information
Sources

ß Evacuteer

Hurricane Memories

Occupation

Preparedness Behaviors

Katrina

Risk Perception

Other Disaster
Experiences

Weather Beliefs
Figure 5.5. Final NVivo Nodes Keyed to Elements of the Health Belief Model.
What follows are qualitative results representing each of these codes. For the sake of
clarity, I have organized the data in terms of the six primary codes, and when other codes appear
(sub-codes, switch codes, and identity codes) they will be discussed as they relate to each of
those six primary sections representing the core elements of the HBM, rather than in an
independent section. Therefore, readers may see representations of the latter three code groups
appear intermittently, rather than as a set. This is intentional. Also, a great deal of relevant data
that I was able to capture from my interviews are also well-documented contributors to
evacuation behavior outcomes in the existing literature, particularly as evacuation relates to
vulnerability. At this time, I refrain from making those connections in an effort to provide a
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clean HBM-driven interpretation of results. How these results connect to the wider body of
literature on evacuation behaviors will be discussed in Chapter VI, Discussion.
Content Analysis
While reading this section, it is important to keep in mind that informant opinions are rich
and complex, and that nearly every quote displayed can be analyzed through multiple codes from
my code list (Figure 5.6). In each instance, I have grouped data by the six primary codes based
on the elements of the Health Belief Model, with the knowledge and understanding that much of
the data can also be seen as belonging to another category or categories or having other
overlapping relevant themes. The ways in which many of my sub-codes, switch codes and
identity codes relate to these six primary codes will be described at length in Chapter VI:
Discussion.

Figure 5.6. Interview Quote Color-Keyed to NVivo Nodes.
1. Primary Code: Barriers to Evacuation
Many of the relevant recurrent themes surrounding the code “Barriers to Evacuation” are
documented as vulnerabilities in existing literature. These themes are pet ownership (Heath,
2001), financial concerns (Elder et al., 2007), personal transportation concerns (Rosenkoetter
et.al, 2007), elderly status (Jenkins, Laska, & Williamson, 2008), and weather beliefs (which
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here have their own code, “Perceived Severity”) (Bowser & Cutter, 2015). Other emergent
themes are considered less often, and a few are not cited in existing literature at all. These
themes are shelter-in-place investments, anxiety, property ownership, and anti-evacuation
attitudes. Finally, a number of themes are New Orleans-specific and reflect the relationship New
Orleanians have with their city, the way they perceive their environment, and the way they
understand city evacuation programming. These themes are concerns over traffic, lack of
hurricane preparedness information, trust in the city of New Orleans, and misunderstandings
regarding program operation.
a. Theme: Pet Ownership
Eight of my informants had reported having pets in their initial quantitative surveys, and
during their interviews, four of those eight specifically raised concerns regarding the difficulty of
evacuating with pets. Informant 8, who has self-designated as someone who will have to rely on
City-Assisted Evacuation, was concerned with the physical logistics of carrying three pet-carriers
in addition to her other luggage. She reported,
I do have the three cats, and just trying to get them in to boxes and travel with them
by myself is almost impossible. So, really, it’s just kind of hope that nothing bad
happens, more than anything else. Or figure out which cat to leave behind. That’s
not really a viable option either.
When asked more about the logistics of evacuating with her animals, Informant 8 expressed
concerns beyond simply gathering them up and leaving the city. For this informant the entire
process of evacuating, being evacuated, and returning were framed by the perceived difficulty of
pet ownership:
It’s easy to find a ride from somebody if you don’t have any animals. But if you
have three, and especially if they are cats, people are not…excited about that.
And just finding the room for them anyway. Where do you go? Go to a motel?
Most places don’t take pets. So, then you have to lie about it, which I’m not
inclined to do. I would rather just camp out in a car.
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Although the informant mentioned preferring to camp out in a car, she does not personally own a
vehicle.
When asked directly what the most difficult personal aspect of an evacuation is, other
informants responded similarly:
Um, (pause) the logistics with the dog. The dog is better than a kid in some ways
and worse than a kid in some ways, you know? (Laughs) Like everything is just
kind of a pain in the ass with a dog. (Informant 5)
The packing up because we have three kids and because we have all these
animals, like just packing up the logistics of that is stressful. Um. (Pause) Trying
to think if there’s anything else (pause) no, that’s the, that’s the biggest thing.
(Informant 18)
So, this is another concern, to take my dog with me. So, I really can’t impose an
animal [on someone else], I have to have some independence to evacuate. And
that’s my dog, that’s Treme. (Informant 4)
Informant 5 has a Rottweiler Lab mix, and Informant 18 has two large dogs, one small dog, and
an indoor/outdoor cat. Informant 4 also has a dog, an energetic Blue Heeler mix, and, in addition
to the logistical concerns expressed by other pet owners, he expressed concern over subjecting
other people to his pet.
b. Theme: Financial Concerns
Another frequently mentioned barrier to evacuation was money or financial constraints.
Several informants mentioned expecting or needing to rely on family or friends should an
emergency arise. Informant 8 describes what the process of evacuating would be like for her.
A: Ok. If a mandatory evacuation was called, can you describe what that process
might look like for you?
Informant 8: (Long pause.) Absolute panic. Um, yeah. I mean really if
mandatory evacuation is called the first thing I would have to do is call all of my
relatives at home and see who could send me money. Um, after that I need to call
my friends here and find out who could give me a ride out of town. I generally
don’t, I mean I don’t have any savings. I’m paycheck to paycheck so there’s
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no—you better hope that if a hurricane happens it happens when I’ve just gotten
paid and I can avoid paying some credit cards or something. So hopefully if I
have the money to go somewhere else I’ll do that. Otherwise I’m just going to
have to count on my friends and family to tap in and get me out of here.
In addition to relying on friends and family for resources, Informant 8 mentions that timing plays
an important role in her ability to evacuate: she hopes evacuation lines up with a period when
she has just gotten paid, so that she can spend the money evacuating and skip out on paying other
bills. This informant’s situation is similar to the struggle that many faced when deciding whether
or not to evacuate for Katrina on August 20, 2005. Literature documents that vulnerable
populations (or populations on income assistance programs such as veterans’ benefits, disability
aid, unemployment assistance, and social security) were out of resources for the month by the
time that Katrina hit (Jenkins, Laska & Williamson, 2008).
Informant 8’s decisions on whether to spend her limited resources evacuating are further
complicated by the possible emotional toll of spending money evacuating for an event that
ultimately is not a true threat.
A: What factors do you consider when you’re deciding whether or not to
evacuate?
Informant 8: Well, money. Obviously. Cats. Transportation. Where I can go.
Who’s going to take me in. That’s not a huge—You can just keep driving North.
I know so many people, somebody’s going to take me. But what is the weather
REALLY saying? Because we have had a lot of false, “everything is going down,
AUUGGHHH!!,” situations, and then it’s really like a light rain, the electricity
goes off for three hours or something. You could waste a lot of money like that.
Although Informant 8’s primary concern is obviously financial, the previous quote also ties in to
weather beliefs (a primary code in this study) and trust in the city of New Orleans (a sub-code of
barriers to entry). Only a few months before this interview took place, the city of New Orleans
had issued a curfew for a Tropical Storm Nate – a situation that turned out to be a non-event for
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New Orleans. The larger context of this discussion shows that Informant 8 was referring back to
Tropical Storm Nate, although she does not mention it by name in this quote.
c. Theme: Personal Transportation
Three of the informants I interviewed expressed concern that they did not own a car.
Several other informants did not own cars but had come up with alternative plans for evacuation.
One of them knew she would rely on City-Assisted Evacuation (Informant 6), and another
planned on staying no matter what, but mentioned that he had the financial resources to buy a
plane ticket if he needed to (Informant 13). Concerns among all of these car-less informants
were similar.
Informant 8: I don’t have a car, so I don’t have a way of, a straight-up way to
evacuate on my own, which is why I was so excited when you came and told us
about the program.
Informant 10: Um, I don’t have a car, living in the city, so how I would get out of
town, how long it would take to get out of town?
Informant 3: I don’t have a car, but I also know that I’ve talked pretty extensively
with my friends here. I know who I would evacuate with. And that was part of my
decision last year too, I know since I don’t have my own car, that like, at which
point C. and A. evacuated with their kids, that would be the point at which I
would go.
Of the three informants who specifically expressed concern about not having their own vehicle,
not one understood how City-Assisted Evacuation worked or was aware that they could use the
resource if needed.
Other transportation concerns included informants being aware of neighbors in their
community who do not own vehicles and would need a ride out of town (Informant 14 and
Informant 4) or having personal concerns over whether or not their own vehicle would work at
the time of an emergency or be reliable enough to travel distances (Informant 3).
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d. Theme: Age
Age or elderly status is considered to be a standard metric on Cutter’s Social
Vulnerability Index (Cutter, 2001). While no informant specifically named their age as a barrier,
Informant 6 mentioned not being able to drive any more due to age-related complications,
Informant 20 mentioned concerns that she could not do the physical work necessary to properly
board up or storm prepare her home after her husband’s death, and Informant 17 expressed
concerns over the design of the City-Assisted Evacuation program, stating,
But, I mean, like my grandmother is 95. And she can walk, but she can’t walk to
the one [the Evacuspot] that’s nearest to us. That would wear her out completely.
You know? (Informant 17)
Importantly, while not invalid, Informant 17’s concerns regarding elderly populations’ ability
use City-Assisted Evacuation have been somewhat addressed by a registration program tied to
evacuation assistance in New Orleans. Now, where those who must rely on City-Assisted
Evacuation are not able to physically get to an evacuation spot without assistance, those
individuals can pre-register to be picked up by calling in to 3-1-1 on a non-emergency day or
visiting a city website. Using this system does require advance knowledge and proper
understanding of programming as well as a permanent address and a working telephone number
or internet access, which brings up a host of new barrier-related concerns for elderly populations.
e. Theme: Shelter-in-place Investments
When asked about hurricane preparedness actions, three of my informants had generators
and one was eager to show me his new outdoor gas-line, which he explained would enable him
to continue to cook hot meals using a grill if electricity was compromised during a storm. A
preference to shelter-in-place and remain at home in relative comfort, is described by Informant
3 and his girlfriend:
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We also have a portable A/C which we could run off of a generator, which would
make staying much, much, more comfortable. I know that we have resources that
we could use…it would be city camping or whatever.
Girlfriend: Yeah, we would have a pretty relaxed hurricane party.
The implications of making sheltering-in-place a more comfortable and appealing option than
evacuation are explored in the discussion chapter.
f. Theme: Anxiety
Anxiety was another barrier to entry discussed by my informants. I asked informants to
describe generally what they thought the evacuation process might look like for someone using
City-Assisted Evacuation. While the research model I used aims to seek out personal
perceptions, in this question I asked people to disassociate and generalize in hopes that they
would not feel uncomfortable sharing their thoughts regarding the CAE program or feel forced to
disclose their possible need to use the program themselves if they did not want to do so. This
specific question, and often several follow-up questions testing knowledge or beliefs about how
the process works, brought out anxious responses in several participants. One informant
described her thoughts on the process succinctly, stating, “I think it’s [the City-Assisted
Evacuation process] probably going to be very scary, confusing, and probably really difficult”
(Informant 12). A second expressed very specific concerns about why CAE might not be safe:
A: So, assuming that they [a person using the City-Assisted Evacuation plan]
could get to one of those evacuation pick-up points, do you know what the
process would look like from there?
Informant 8: Well, I mean, standing and waiting for a bus to arrive, and then the
bus taking people. But then where do they go? I don’t know where they go. An
evacuation point outside of the city that’s safe? But then how long are they there,
and are they catalogued in some way? (Voice rising in near tears) And now I’m
thinking of the…I’m thinking of those missing ICE kids. Do we lose our OLD
people now?! Sorry. I have no clue what happens to them. I have no idea what
the program entails once they get to where they are going. And how long? How
long are they fed, and how do they get back when it’s time, and what happens? If

110

they have no friends and family, who is keeping an eye on their house who can
tell them when it’s safe to come back?
In the above quote, Informant 8 is missing a great deal of information that might make her feel
more confident in program outcomes. The questions that she is asking regarding the logistics of
where people are taken, how long they will be gone, whether anyone is keeping track of them,
how they are fed, and who is looking after their property while they are gone are not answered
on city information sites. In some cases, this is because the information (such as where shelters
are located) changes with each possible hurricane, but in other cases the information could be but
simply is not shared anywhere with the general public.
A few informants also mentioned their own personal anxiety as a concern more
specifically. One informant mentioned being medicated by a doctor to reduce anxiety symptoms
and being particularly anxious during hurricane season. Informant 6 mentioned her feelings
regarding evacuation planning directly.
A: When you’re thinking about evacuating, what do you feel is the most difficult
part of planning that?
Informant 6: Being…um…just being calm enough doing what you have to do I
think. I get nervous.
Informant 6 is elderly, lives alone on a fixed income, cannot drive and does not own a vehicle,
and was emergency evacuated during Katrina. She named her feelings of nervousness as her
number one concern in planning an evacuation.
g. Theme: Property Ownership
When informants were asked whether they were more inclined to evacuate during a citywide evacuation call or to try to shelter in place, several individuals brought up concerns
regarding personal property. Informant 11 expressed concerns over not being allowed back in to
the city to tend to his home if he evacuated, stating,
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Well, you know, that’s a real—I’m probably more inclined to evacuate. But I
would worry that there would be damage to the house that I might be able to fix,
or at least ameliorate. And I worry about not being able to get back to do that. My
step-daughter lived in New Orleans during Katrina, and she came to Los Angeles,
and by the time she was able to get back in to New Orleans, practically everything
in the house had been destroyed.
Informant 11 is a New Orleans transplant who has lived in the city for only a very short time and
who has no previous hurricane experience, but what he has heard about Katrina shapes his
considerations regarding evacuation. Like informant 11, informant 16 was also likely to
evacuate but worried about his property, stating, “deciding what I would need to bring and what I
would need to do in order to make sure that stuff didn’t break while I was gone, those would be
my major concerns.”
Property ownership was also mentioned frequently in response to the question, “What
about hurricanes do you consider to be most threatening or dangerous?” I asked the question
expecting to be able to gauge people’s perceptions of risk surrounding various weather events,
such as flooding or wind or rainfall, but I often heard responses regarding property concerns
instead.
Informant 5: (Long Sigh) I would need to lock down the property, do what I could
to protect the property from wind and water damage during the storm, and also
protect it from other… potential issues… while I’m not able to get back to it. Um,
so there’d be a little process with setting up the house for being left alone like
that. I might shut off the gas, things like that.
The “other potential issues” that Informant 5 is referring to are the stories regarding looting and
vandalism following Katrina. While Informant 5 was uncomfortable mentioning that concern
specifically, other informants discussed looting as the “most threatening or dangerous” part of
hurricanes more directly:
Informant 4: (Long pause) Oh. I hate to say this, but looting… What can be the
ultimate threat… is that people are going to come in and loot the place.
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Informant 15: [My biggest concern] Is worrying about looters. I mean, it wouldn’t
take much to kick in a glass door…I mean, I would probably board them up [the
doors], but you can only board so much and people are resilient, especially—if
they came in and took my food, that’s one thing, but if they came in just to pillage
my TV and stuff, that’s another. That was my issue with the whole evacuation for
Katrina, was people going in—I didn’t even care if you took the booze, I get it.
Informant 3, who owns a bar, also mentioned looting concerns, although in his case those
concerns were about his bar rather than his home.
h. Theme: Anti-Evacuation Attitude
Another barrier to evacuation is an anti-evacuation attitude. I did not encounter this
attitude often during my qualitative interviews, perhaps because the individuals likely to possess
that sort of attitude were not likely to be the same individuals who volunteered to be interviewed.
However, I did encounter it during several of my quantitative surveys, and it was re-iterated by
one of my informants:
Informant 10: I feel like mandatory evacuations may not always be necessary. I
don’t know too much about like what the protocol is, when they order mandatory
evacuations and everything. If they did…my friends and I are the kind of people
that would say, “Fuck that!” You know? Hurrication!…Get some candles and
stuff. And yeah, we’ve got like flashlights and stuff for if we’re out of power, we
just keep that stocked in case of any event…you know, the zombie apocalypse or
whatever.
The term hurrication is used frequently in New Orleans, particularly during hurricane season. It
is short for “hurricane vacation,” and is understood to mean the sudden unexpected but welcome
time off from work that an impending storm brings if that storm is big enough to shut down nonessential services. During hurrication, many locals plan “hurricane parties,” where they might
enjoy the company of neighbors who are also staying home riding out the storm. Together they
may drink, watch the weather roll in, and cook a big feast of everything that is perishable within
refrigerators or freezers, knowing that the power will likely go out and that anything not cooked
and shared will go to waste. Given the community nature of a hurrication, where locals may
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look forward to unexpected down-time eating and drinking with friends, it is not surprising that a
certain degree of the population has an anti-evacuation mindset.
i. Theme: Traffic
Perhaps surprisingly, the most frequently cited barrier to evacuation was traffic. As
mentioned earlier in this chapter (see Figure 5.3), ten of the twenty individuals interviewed cited
“traffic” as a potential problem, and several of those informants cited “traffic” as the single most
difficult aspect of an evacuation.
S: What would be the most difficult aspect of an evacuation for you?
Informant 7: (No pause) Traffic.
S: What would be the most difficult aspect of an evacuation for you?
Informant 8: I don’t really have a fear of hurricanes. Like a bigger fear would be
a fear of sitting in traffic for twelve hours.
A: What do you think of as the most difficult or stressful or annoying aspect of an
evacuation?
Informant 20: Well, obviously when I’ve gotten stuck in traffic. That’s the worst
part. I know back roads…and it can be fun (said sarcastically).
A: What is the most difficult aspect of an evacuation for you guys?
Informant 12: I would say probably just the traffic. The traffic and the time that it
takes to actually get out of the city. When we evacuated for Katrina, it took, I
don’t know, six hours to get across the lake? So that to me is the sort of thing that
I dread.
A: Ok. What would you consider to be the most difficult aspect of an evacuation
for you?
Informant 17: (Quick interrupting, hard sigh) Traffic!
Several informants had prior experience with traffic during evacuations for Katrina and Gustav,
while others had heard anecdotally that traffic leaving New Orleans is a significant concern
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during a hurricane evacuation. Informant 20 elaborated that she would leave around 3am when
most people were asleep to avoid the worst of it.
More specifically, people’s concerns over traffic are geographic in nature. Informant 4
mentions crossing “the bridge” which is the causeway between the city of New Orleans and the
North Shore of Lake Pontchartrain, stating, “Well I don’t like to travel outside my three-mile
bubble so just crossing the bridge is a f--king nuisance. I don’t like traveling, I don’t like
driving.” Informant 17 mentioned that New Orleans is essentially an “island” in that any
direction one might choose to travel, and the likelihood of getting stuck on a bridge for a long
period is high:
The traffic! Well, just in general, anybody who’s trying to leave the city in a car,
we’re on this island. So, you could wind up on a bridge somewhere. And I mean,
so many of my family members…I wasn’t here but they evacuated for Katrina
and they spent ten hours going to Baton Rouge, or Lafayette, or where ever they
were going. It just took way longer than it should of because there were SO
MANY people trying to get out.
Similarly, Informant 2, a transplant with no evacuation experience, had geographic concerns
regarding Interstate 10, remarking, “I’m wondering how that would actually work considering
there’s only one freeway out of town. Like I said, how would that, how would that even work?”
Informant 2’s statement that there is only one major interstate through New Orleans is not
incorrect, but there are several other ways out of the city that she seems to be unaware of.
Compounding concerns about sitting in traffic for hours, with no access to facilities or
gasoline refills, is the concern that an one might not be able to secure a place to stay and might
consequently wind up driving significantly longer than anticipated. Informant 4, who mentioned
earlier that he had concerns over whether or not his truck was always reliable, explains this
concern, stating,
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The biggest thing is what happens is everybody takes up the hotels, so you don’t
really have to evacuate that far to get out to safety, there’s just no readily
accessible places to stay. And so you just have to keep going and keep going and
keep going until next thing you know you’re like six hours away where you can
finally find a hotel room.
Informant 2 had similar concerns:
And then, you know, you decide if it’s worth it to go and sit out there on Highway
10 in the hopes that it’ll move some day. That’s a thing. If it was easy to get out
of town, we’d be like, oh yeah, we’ll go out of town somewhere. But then all the
hotels are filled up.
Other traffic-related concerns mentioned by informants include the possibility of being stuck on
an evacuation bus in standstill traffic, of having a car that runs out of gas or overheats, and of
needing to take frequent restroom stops but being unable to able to move quickly enough in
traffic to exit the highway to do so.
j. Theme: No Hurricane Preparedness Information
The next barrier revealed by my research is the distinct lack of hurricane preparedness
information circulated throughout the city. I asked people during the middle of peak hurricane
season in 2018 whether they had seen any information, and with the exception of one of my
twenty informants, every conversation went something like this:
A: Have you encountered any hurricane preparedness information this year in any
form? Is there anything you’ve seen or heard around the city?
Informant 7: No. When did I see you? Like a year ago? That was the last
hurricane preparedness info I saw.
Informant 7 is referring to the fact that after she agreed to participate in my survey, I left her (and
other participants) with pamphlets explaining how to access the City-Assisted Evacuation system
in an emergency. The pamphlets also detailed what to pack, what to expect, and where to look
for more information. These pamphlets were created by the city of New Orleans’s community
outreach council, but the city rarely distributes them. Evacuteer has held volunteer canvassing
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events to distribute pamphlets in several neighborhoods in previous years, but they had not done
any neighborhood canvassing in 2018.
Informant 19, who also had not seen or heard any preemptive information, expressed
concern about how emergency messaging is disseminated during a mandatory evacuation call.
In this instance, he reflects that elderly people may not receive timely messaging, stating,
And maybe they don’t have access to the 24-hour news cycle, you know? They
don’t know that they’re being put under a mandatory evacuation until someone is
knocking on their door, saying like, it’s TIME TO GO, and buses are leaving
from one spot, and they can’t get to it in time.
The single informant who did recall maybe seeing preparedness information couldn’t precisely
recall what he had seen:
Informant 9: I think I’ve seen… I don’t know if it was a poster or a flyer.
Something like, “Do You Have a Plan? Get Prepared.” Or something. I think I
just saw that or was reading the information about it. I vaguely recall seeing
something like that.
A: Do you recall where you saw it?
Informant 9: It was in Chalmette, actually.
While the neighborhood that Informant 9 mentioned encountering information in might be
considered categorically vulnerable, it is somewhat ironic that there is no Evacuspot in that
neighborhood, and that Chalmette is actually not in Orleans Parish at all, but rather in St.
Bernard Parish, and therefore outside of the jurisdiction of the City-Assisted Evacuation
program.
k. Sub-Code: Trust in the City
An integral part of an effective program is trust in the capability of the entity running the
program. If participants judge programming to be ineffectual or possibly even dangerous, they
are unlikely to participate. In the case of City-Assisted Evacuation, when I asked informants
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what they imagined the process might look like for a participant using the system, these were the
kinds of responses I received:
Informant 11: Well, what I imagine it would probably look like is utter
pandemonium. With buses that…that are late or don’t work. Or—I don’t have
much faith in that possibility [the possibility of the program running well].
Informant 17: I think that would look chaotic. And I think part of the chaos would
be produced by those trying to use the service, and just being upset and worried
and wanting to leave maybe. Especially if they’ve experienced other things that
have happened here in New Orleans. But I…. well… while it’s great that they
have it [City-Assisted Evacuation], I don’t imagine that…not because they don’t
want it to…I just don’t imagine it working very well.
Informant 2: How do you evacuate without a car in a hurricane, or in a rainstorm?
Would these, the buses? You know—I mean I would be very impressed if the city
got it together enough to actually pick up all the people that don’t have cars. But
you know, they could’ve done that during Katrina. They had the transportation to
do it and didn’t.
In the above instances, previous negative experiences with the City of New Orleans, paired with
experienced or understood knowledge of what went wrong during Katrina, may affect ultimate
program efficacy.
l. Theme: Misunderstanding of Programming
The barrier of misunderstanding programming is tied to lack of preparedness information.
Because informants had not encountered details of how to use the system, they were unclear
about how to do so effectively. When I asked participants to describe how they would use CityAssisted Evacuation if they needed to do so or if they needed to direct a friend or neighbor to do
so, responses were often vague. Other informants admitted to not having that knowledge. The
most concerning responses I received reflected not only low programmatic knowledge, but also
incorrect understanding of the program goals:
Informant 3: I don’t know what I would do to start that process. To try and find an
evacuation center? I would say that for the people who are here at the latest times,
the people who ignore the evacuation orders, that’s probably the best resource that
the city can provide. For assurance of life you know? To save as many people as
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possible. But there’s always going to be people who make that calculus last
minute, so the way to employ that service is as late as possible. For those people
who don’t listen to evacuation warnings. Even probably a few days after the storm
too I imagine, for people who didn’t listen to the evacuation orders, and now all
their stuff is destroyed.
In this example, Informant 3 understands City-Assisted Evacuation is to occur after regular
mandatory evacuation, and perhaps even after a hurricane has landed. He assumes that it serves
as a sort of safety net for those who require emergency assistance because they did not or could
not evacuate. In reality, City-Assisted Evacuation functions simultaneously with a mandatory
evacuation call for 48 hours and ceases prior to anticipated landfall to allow volunteers time to
safely leave the city themselves or to get to a safe shelter. Therefore, people who expect to use
the system must do so preemptively.
2. Code: Benefits to Evacuation
The second element of the Health Belief Model I used to code informant’s responses was
perceived benefits to evacuation. Perceived benefits are “one’s belief in the efficacy of the
advised action to reduce risk or seriousness of impact” (Glanz and Rimer,1997, p 3). In my
interviews, not much data coded as a perceived benefit. It seems that people generally see
evacuation as a costly nuisance. However, among informants that reported that they would
follow a mandatory evacuation order unquestionably, the overall theme was generally personal
comfort.
Several informants saw maintaining personal comfort or retaining access to certain
expected amenities as the biggest benefit to evacuation. Many of the informants who cited
maintaining their personal comfort as a benefit to evacuating were those who are local or had
other previous negative hurricane-related experiences that they did not wish to repeat:
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Informant 7: We were sorry we stayed [for Katrina] because it was just so hot it
was like a vacuum…You know because, I just know that if we don’t have utilities
it’s just not, it’s not fun. It’s very uncomfortable.
Informant 12: [I would evacuate] Because I really like to have electricity. And
I’ve lived for days and days with no electricity, and it’s really not fun in the
middle of summer.
Informant 3: Yeah, the week our central air-conditioning was out was “hurricane
preparedness week,” and X told me that sitting in the house with no A/C was my
hurricane preparedness training. I don’t want to do that again.
In these instances, the comfort individuals were looking to maintain was physical.
In several other cases, individuals were more concerned with their psychological comfort
and personal safety. One individual (Informant 11) cited concerns over a breakdown of civil
order. That quote is not mentioned here because it is mentioned later in the result section for
“Trust in the City.” Informant 8 had similar concerns. In this case, her concerns over not having
access to resources if she remains are tied to her lack of trust in the City of New Orleans to
maintain order. She stated,
The fact that the city…doesn’t have its sh-t together. Um, the resources are not
there, so when it does flood, when the electricity goes out, the odds of having
somebody come to help you are very low, so I’m afraid of being stuck here for
weeks and weeks. No help, disease, no food, no cool—that would suck, and
obviously the crime level. Especially being a single woman on my own. That
would be the biggest thing, I would be afraid I would get stuck in my place and
raped and murdered…
Informant 8 is single, living paycheck to paycheck, has no transportation of her own, and would
need to use the City-Assisted Evacuation system to evacuate herself and her three cats if she
could not find a friend to give her a ride. However, to her, the benefits of leaving outweigh the
risks, and override the inconveniences that she anticipates if she needs to use the program.
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3. Code: Cues to Action / Evacuation Information Sources
In the case of hurricane evacuation, the HBM metric cues-to-action manifests as
information that urges citizens to perform the positive health action of evacuating. When I asked
informants what sources they turn to when considering whether to evacuate, their responses
covered the map. Almost every informant listed multiple information sources that they turn to or
rely on, making it difficult to categorize quotes into unique independent units. However, the
sources that were mentioned follow, with a very relevant caveat that several informants reported
not being able to trust in or rely on the news, which indicates that for some residents, weather
information sources are not seen as valid cues-to-action. An example of a mixed quote where an
informant is actively seeking out cues-to-action, but also wary of the validity or quality of the
information they encounter, follows:
Well, I always look at the local news, and then I’m always looking at the Weather
Channel too. I monitor both. And then I go to CNN or national news just to see
what they’re… you want to make all the comparisons, you know? Sometimes you
look at just one channel, and they’ll give you misguided information, you know
what I’m saying? (Informant 14)
Another informant mentioned similar concerns, expressing the need to compare data before
feeling confident in making an evacuation decision.
Well, my grandmother watches the news 24/7, so we do have that, but I use the
internet as well, different weather sources on the internet. Sometimes they
conflict, and sometimes I like comparing them because sometimes the
information doesn’t match up. (Informant 17)
One of the reasons cited for mistrust in evacuation information sources was that informants
perceived such sources to be “inflammatory,” or partaking in “fearmongering” to drum up
ratings. Informant 10 conveyed this sentiment well, stating,
I don’t like just keeping the TV like on, you know, the Weather Channel. All they
do is just, they fearmonger. They propagate fear. They hype it up way more than
the actual problem.
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One informant also specifically mentioned Jim Cantore when talking about over-blown media
representations of danger.
Jim Cantore—if he shows up, leave (laughing). He’s like, he wants to be in the
middle of all this. Bless his little heart. But damn man. You know? He’s like the
freaking Angel of Death, just hanging out, waiting. (Mimes Jim Cantore yelling
through the wind in to a microphone). Really? Can’t he find another way to make
a dollar? (Informant 15)
Setting aside for a moment whether evacuation information sources are reliable, below are the
places my informants mentioned that they turn to when seeking out cues-to-action.
a. Information Source: Local News on Television
Only one informant mentioned local weather station television broadcasts, although
during my quantitative survey period the year prior, several other survey participants mentioned
specifically liking to watch meteorologist Margaret Orr. The informant who relies on local news
is Informant 6, who is elderly, has limited means, does not use the internet, and lives alone.
Informant 6: I get my news on the television. The news people. I love my news,
yeah baby.
A: Do you like local news on the television?
Informant 6: Yeah baby, because they give you actual—you know, they tell you
what to do and stuff. Evacuate. Whatever…Eight. Channel Eight. I like Eight. I
used to look at Four. Eight, Six too, Nine…
A: Have you come across any hurricane preparedness information anywhere this
year?
Informant 6: Hmm, not yet.
b. Information Source: Internet
Several informants mentioned turning to the internet for information. Unlike Informant 6
who did not have the internet, Informant 8 turns to the internet because she does not own a
television:
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Well, I don’t have television, I have the internet. So, as long as wi-fi is still
working, then I have WeatherChannel.com and whoever can text me,
and…Facebook…I guess. Ugh. That is the way that people share news now,
whether it’s good or bad.
Informant 8 makes a good point that if wi-fi fails her access to information is cut off. She also
mentioned Facebook reluctantly, crediting the site as a place for information exchange, but not
liking having to rely on it for information as she believes it is frequently unreliable.
Online sources that individuals mentioned visiting include Weather.com, NOAA’s
official website, WeatherChannel.com, Reddit, LSU’s Tiger Droppings, and Weather
Underground. Less specifically, one informant stated that she would just go online and google
phrases, explaining, “I would just google ‘evacuation New Orleans,’ or ‘how to evacuate New
Orleans,’ or something, and see what would come up. Or, ‘City of New Orleans evacuation—
you know?’” (Informant 12). I wanted to see what would happen when I searched the phrases
this informant suggested. When googling any of the three search combinations my informant
suggested, the top three search hits are the “Hurricane” page from ready.nola.gov, the page for
City-Assisted Evacuation from nola.gov/nofd (the New Orleans Fire department’s site), and the
“Evacuation Plans” page from the New Orleans Regional Transit Authority (Norta.com). All of
these sites have valuable information on how the evacuation process works in New Orleans.
c. Other Information Sources
Other information sources mentioned by informants were nationally broadcast television
(specifically the Weather Channel, which was mentioned five times); local radio (specifically
WWOZ); word of mouth from co-workers, friends, or neighbors with more storm experience;
weather related apps (while no one could name an app directly, several informants mentioned
finding “any radar app” to track storm movement); city-oriented apps (specifically Next Door
where people can communicate with their neighbors); cell phone text messaging services from
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the City of New Orleans (which several informants assume will occur in an emergency since we
regularly get boil-water alerts); and emergency messaging services from their universities.
d. Place of Work Sponsored Messaging
In addition to the above sources, several informants mentioned getting emergency-related
messaging from their place of work:
Informant 13: Like I said, we are connected at the [hotel name redacted]—
the Director of Engineering is always on, so he’s always you know, sending
messages and letting us know exactly what’s going on.
A: Ok. Have you encountered any hurricane preparedness information this year?
Informant 16: I have…I have…Yes! From my work.
A: Ok. What was it that they shared with you?
Informant 16: It was a flyer reminding us of what their policies are, and what their
plan is, as well as some tips to stay safe on our end.
It should be mentioned here that Informant 13 is a hotel manager and Informant 16 works at a
manufacturing facility. Both informants mentioned not being able to evacuate because their
places of work needed them in order to continue operations. Informant 15’s situation as a nurse
was very similar. The emergency-related information that each mentions was more geared
toward how to report to work safely and what to bring than how to leave the city.
e. Evacuteer / Evacuspots
Although Evacuteer does not have the manpower or financial resources to issue
widespread messaging, the Evacuspot statues themselves represent a physical cue-to-action to
individuals who know what the statues represent. When asked about whether or not they had
seen or heard any hurricane preparedness related messaging for the 2018 hurricane season,
several mentioned Evacuteer or their nearby Evacuspot.
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Informant 20: Well, you know we have an evacuation spot right here, at Mater
Dolorosa. So, whenever I pass by that I think about it.
Informant 5: Um, no. Well okay, actually yeah, um, on Next Door they’re trying
to get people to come to the Evacuteer introductory program. There’s someone in
my neighborhood who’s trying to get some stuff rolling with Evacuteer and that’s
about it I would say that I can think of. Yeah.
Several informants could not recall Evacuteer or Evacuspots by name, but they still understood
the purpose of the statues.
Informant 15: I think the little old ladder climbing dudes, the statues, are pretty
effective. I was really surprised that people don’t know what they’re for.
Informant 18: And, I don’t listen to satellite radio, I listen to local radio stations,
um just about hurricane preparedness and uh where to look for your signs, you
know like the man that’s out front of the library.
The positive and negative implications of having static statues permanently located in set
locations throughout the city is discussed in the next chapter.
f. City-Issued Information
Despite the multitude of ways that people report seeking out or receiving hurricane
preparedness or evacuation-related messaging, the information source that is conspicuously
absent is the City of New Orleans itself. No one directly named the city as a source of
information, which is relevant because printed information does in fact exist, is updated
annually, and is supposed to be widely distributed to New Orleans residents. The city also
operates several information websites geared toward serving New Orleans residents in an
emergency, and actually runs the programming necessary to evacuate. A closer look at the path
this information takes will be discussed in the next chapter.
Informant 14 specifically noticed that “official” information was absent, stating, “But as
far as like, official awareness information, like from the city, I haven’t really seen any, like ‘get
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ready for a hurricane’ or whatever, no.” This informant went on to describe a method that he felt
would work well for sharing this type of information:
What would be cool is if everyone gets something mailed to them once a year.
Listen, if something happens, they have this, just a simple little flyer that
everyone has. You have it, you’re aware, you know? If you have a problem, this
is where you need to go. Just black and white, simple you know? That would just
make, you could probably touch people even more. But I think as far as the
evacuation process itself, how it’s structured, how it’s set up, I mean it’s, it should
work.
The above informant has spent a great deal of time thinking about how to improve outreach
specifically because he served as an Evacuteer and continues to be active in a community that
could benefit from being more aware of this resource.
Informant 18, who also spends a great deal of time volunteering, though not with
Evacuteer, had similar thoughts that the city does not seem to be doing all it can do to
disseminate preparedness knowledge, stating,
Um, you know if the city is implementing like a campaign, then it needs to be
something that all of us, we hear it, we see it, over and over and over. So, at a
marketing conference I went to one time, someone went “pop pop” and then we
all went “fizz fizz” you know? And so, if you have your message out there
correctly, people are going to immediately be able to repeat it.
In this case, the informant imagines a catchy phrase that all New Orleanians know that
effectively represents the New Orleans City-Assisted Evacuation program. Evacuteer had hoped
to be that emblem and catch-phrase, using the unique terminology of “Evacuteer,” and
“Evacuspots,” but has thus far not been effective in achieving this goal. Possible solutions for
working toward this goal are discussed in the next chapter.
The only mention of city involvement that I encountered during my interview period was
somewhat veiled and debatable in efficacy. In the case below, Informant 17 is not aware that the
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City of New Orleans Emergency Operations Center Community Outreach Department organized
the event she is mentioning. She describes an event she saw at a public place, recounting,
Actually, at one of the public libraries I go to I saw something. They were
handing out hurricane preparedness kits. They were backpacks that they had
packed with like canned food, flashlights, all of this. I didn’t want to take one
because I felt like I had what I needed at home, but they were like, “we actually
have to leave, and we’re going to have to just like put these on the street, so
would you take one?” So, I took a few and I was able to give them to other
people, so like that was one of the things, it was a really nice thing for people to
have thought to do. I guess they didn’t like publicize enough though and people
hadn’t come to get them, but I was still really impressed with the idea.
The event is the standard method that the City of New Orleans uses to conduct public health
outreach. Events are held at public venues where community members gather, such as at
libraries or New Orleans Recreational Development Centers (NORDC), and staff set up tables
and hand out promotional materials or goods. Often those disseminating information are
AmeriCorps Interns fulfilling their service agreements. The intent of these events is to capture
the attention of whoever is present without advance advertising.
4. HBM Element: Preparedness Behaviors
In consideration of the elements of the Health Belief Model, self-efficacy, or the belief in
one’s own ability to properly perform a given action, would be tied to the capability to evacuate.
I spoke with each informant at length about the extent and nature of their preparedness plans as
they relate to evacuation. While I asked about preparations for the possibility of evacuation
specifically, most people gave me the entirety of their preparedness plans, which ranged greatly.
Some planned on doing nothing at all, some planned to do something but not had not done it yet,
some had plans for sheltering in place but not for evacuation, some only had evacuation plans,
and – occasionally – someone had both thought through and prepared for both the possibility of
staying or leaving.
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Informant 10 was a good example of an individual who had done nothing at all and did
not seem proactive about changing that:
S: What have you done to prepare for this hurricane season?
Informant 10: Not shit.
S: Do you plan to do anything to prepare?
Informant 10: Get a life-raft? I’m joking, I’m joking. I wish it was funny.
When asked further whether he would do anything to prepare, his answer was not a precise yes
or no, but was nevertheless an important response:
S: So, do you plan on doing anything later on? Because hurricane season as you
know, started June 1st. As we get closer and closer to maybe a storm brewing in
the Gulf, do you plan to do anything to prepare?
Informant 10: I mean I’m not a homeowner. I feel like if I were I would definitely
put more investment in it, but you know, I just rent, so I feel like it’s my
landlord’s problem. Plus I live upstairs. And this apartment—Uptown is a higher
elevation than Mid-City, so it doesn’t flood as bad up here.
It is unclear from Informant 10’s response whether he is more inclined to stay or go. What is
clear is that he does not intend to put much advance thought toward either scenario. At a later
point in the interview, Informant 10 mentioned “having some flashlights and candles around
anyway”; having or attending a hurricane party; or perhaps “getting out of town with friends.”
While Informant 10 seems overall to be poorly prepared, it is worth noting that he seems to feel
that he has a strong social network that he can rely upon in either situation.
When I asked about people’s evacuation plans, many informants began by detailing their
shelter-in-place plans instead. Regarding shelter-in-place behaviors, people generally mentioned
behaviors like stocking up on canned goods, having a non-electric can-opener, having extra
water on hand, and having batteries and flashlights and candles. For most informants, these were

128

not so much activities that they had completed at the start of this specific hurricane season as
they were a way of life or general level of preparedness for living in New Orleans.
Informant 17: Umm, we buy a lot of bottled water, we make sure we have
flashlights that work in the house. We have an old fashioned can opener. We have
some canned foods on hand in the house, those kinds of things.
Informant 5: We have a kit, um… (long pause) we might break it out and look at
it, but unlikely.
Most informants mentioned some combination of plans for staying or leaving and were not sure
which they were more inclined to do. Informant 8 sums up this behavior pattern well, stating,
Yeah, I mean, I always have extra supplies in my house, extra water, and candles,
and batteries, and flashlights, and all of that…And yeah, I have supplies in my
house, and I’ve talked to friends about what we can do, those of us who don’t
have vehicles.
Informant 8 has no means of personal transportation, and three cats. When she mentions that she
has “talked to friends about what we can do,” she is meaning that she has shared the CityAssisted Evacuation plan information that I had given her a year prior with other friends who
also don’t have vehicles. Informant 7’s response was similar. She had some baseline level of
home-preparedness and some vague idea of where she might go if she had to evacuate:
Um, just get supplies like batteries and water and candles. Um, but really just
formulate a plan of you know, leaving town if we’re in the path…We have some
friends in Tennessee that we may go visit. Um. Yeah. So, we have that, we do
have like ideas of what we’ll do.
Informant 6, who is elderly, retired, and has limited means, had not yet started preparing for the
year, but had ideas about what she hoped to do in the near future:
Informant 6: I’m going to do it this month or next month (referring to packing a
bag). Soon as I get my money and supplies and stuff. My little bag, get it packed,
for IF I evacuate (all laughing). But I don’t know, might stay here. I don’t know.
It depends you know.
A: And what kind of supplies do you have in mind?

129

Informant 6: Oh, like food. Canned food you know. Products. Soap and tissue and
stuff like that. Crackers. You know. Pork and beans, etcetera, etcetera, the main
things. Water, stuff you need, you know? As long as I got my little supplies, my
little wine, I’m fine…I’ll get my supplies, my bag and my supplies. Crackers.
Cigarettes definitely. (All laughing) A bottle of water. You know its stuff you
need in that little bag right there (pointing toward a duffle on a chair). My clothes,
deodorant, my medicines.
Informant 6 had told me earlier that she planned to use City-Assisted Evacuation. It was unclear
to me whether the planning activities she outlined above were for staying or using the evacuation
program or some combination of both. When I asked her to elaborate, she explained that the
types of supplies she would buy were the same for both plans.
Some respondents were able to provide more evacuation-specific examples of how that
had prepared or intended to prepare. When I asked Informant 14 how he had prepared for the
possibility of an evacuation, he was able to give me several concrete examples, elaborating,
Having a truck. Having a vehicle and getting out. You know, cars-- you get two
feet of water and it’s over. So, having some kind of truck or something. You
know, access to a vehicle that’s a little bit elevated…Having some money saved
up. Having a rainy-day fund just in case we need to leave and we have a little
money just for like, hotels and things like that. And also being aware of the
people that are close to you. If something needs to happen and we need to pick
you up, you know, having some type of plan.
In the case above, Informant 14 has prepared not only for himself, but also for several of those
around him. He went on to explain that he had two extra seats in his vehicle that would be
available, and also that he had shared City-Assisted Evacuation program plans with several of his
neighbors who do not own vehicles.
I mean, it’s simple, we’re having these talks and you know, like, “you ever saw
this sign, and you know what this means?” You know? I made that a point to just
let everyone know that it’s available. And I think that’s a good step for
preparation in case a storm happens.
Informant 4 also had a ready vehicle, and room for extra people:
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For relevance, I just got the van properly prepared for hurricane season so that if
evacuation is necessary everything’s taken care of. Tires, oil, front end work.
And ideally I can take one or two people with me as well.
Multiple informants mentioned collecting sentimental items and important paper work as
part of their plans. In some instances, documentation was ready to go, or stored in a place where
it is easily accessible.
Informant 15: So we load up what we can, maybe a few personal items and the
stuff that we think—you know we’ve got a binder and the box of data, documents,
birth certificates, and stuff like that. And I may take my Nikolopoulos print with
me too, it’s going to go. Gotta have a little touch of home, wherever you go. But
that’s basically it, just have to load it up.
Informant 18: Um so we make sure that we have all of our documentation from
pediatricians and all doctors. Um with this, um, any sort of you know, paperwork,
tax documents, flood insurance, all of these documents go with us. We pack up
particular pieces of artwork that we love, and we have family in Mississippi so we
know-- like we have a plan about where we go and who we stay with. And the
children’s schools stay really abreast of like everything with parents and have
school records readily available in case anything happens. And, I mean as far as
boarding up the house, which is the usual you know, you board your windows,
and you lock your doors, and you make sure you’ve turned off like gas and water
and things if you’re going to be gone for a while.
Informant 19: Gathering up important documents and stuff like that. We have
everything kind of in a file folder for that. Gathering stuff like that, packing
clothes, packing food, our dogs, some irreplaceable things, and getting on the road
and probably heading towards Nashville or Memphis.
Informant 20: Um, you know… I would throw some clothes… and I have a pouch
with all my important papers in it, and I would grab that. I don’t have a pet. So, I
would board up my house as much as I could, and probably go across the lake to
my sister’s as a first stop. And I would probably leave at 3 in the morning to avoid
traffic.
In several of these examples, informants mention securing or boarding up their homes as an
important element of evacuation. This activity was problematic prior to Hurricane Katrina, and
the implications of wanting to board properties but not having preemptively purchased the
supplies to do so, are discussed in the next chapter.
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5. Code: Risk Perception
Gauging risk perception is an important aspect of utilizing the HBM to anticipate
compliance or willingness to perform or engage in an activity that has a positive health outcome.
In this case, those who decide to evacuate or heed a mandatory evacuation order will not be in
danger should a catastrophic event occur. One aspect of the decision-making process for an
individual is deciding how much personal risk they are willing to take on before crossing a
threshold and leaving. In an effort to gain better insight into people’s risk perceptions about
hurricane risks, I asked informants whether or not they considered hurricanes to be a threat to
themselves or to their households.
a. Low Perception of Risk
Several of my informants did not see hurricanes as particularly threatening. Reviewing
the coded data, I realized that those with low risk perceptions seemed to fall in to two categories:
they either did not have enough storm-related experience for the risk to seem real or relevant, or,
they had too much.
In the first instance, the two informants that follow are recent New Orleans transplants.
Informant 1 arrived in the city about two years prior to this interview, and Informant 13 had lived
here approximately three years. Both informants were from geographic locations that did not
experience hurricanes.
A: So, now that you live here in Louisiana, do you consider hurricanes to be a
threat to you or to your household?
Informant 1: Uh…kind of? I’m not very sure it’s a real threat. I mean, in reality.
But, I have been cautioned. Our professors told us to be prepared for a hurricane,
at the beginning of the summer I think.
A: Right, I’m asking if you personally consider hurricanes to be a threat to you?
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Informant 13: (Pause) You know I’m going to say no. Because I haven’t had to
deal with it yet. So. You know.
With no concrete evidence or personal experience to pin perceptions on, these two informants
have decided that hurricanes may not actually be a legitimate threat.
Those who fall in to the category of “too-experienced” also had similarly low risk
perceptions. In the next two examples, both informants seem to have a “lightening does not
strike twice” mentality.
S: Ok, living here, do you consider hurricanes to be a threat to your or to your
household?
Informant 18: No.
S: (Clarifying) You don’t consider them to be a threat?
Informant 18: I mean I know that it’s a possibility, but I also know that, um, I
know a hurricane of the magnitude of Katrina, Camille, Betsy, you know, it just
doesn’t come around that often.
Informant 5: So no, unless it’s a once in a lifetime thing like Katrina, which I feel
like wasn’t even a storm really, then I just don’t see the risk.
Both of the above informants feel that an event with a magnitude similar to Katrina is simply
unlikely, since such events are infrequent.
The next two informants who are “too-experienced” grew up on the Gulf Coast, and the
second has additional experience with hurricanes while living in Guam. Both have so much
experience with hurricanes that they describe them as “commonplace” experiences.
There hasn’t really been a “major” hurricane that I’ve lived through. When we
were living in Florida we were never really worried about hurricanes. My parents,
they live in Corpus Christi, Texas and they just went through Harvey. I remember
Hurricane Mitch very well too. Gustav and Ivan- I was in Baton Rouge for those.
When we were younger, we lived in Florida for Hurricane Andrew. To the point
where I’m not even scared anymore. They are just a part of life. Commonplace in
a way… You know, when I was a kid, I was out in the street playing in the
hurricanes. Or even when the beaches were closed we would go down just to see
the huge waves. We wouldn’t go out in the water. Me and my brothers, when we
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were young we would have the skateboard and the umbrella, and we would just
let the wind take us down the street. It was awesome, but also dangerous.
(Informant 9)
And I lived in Guam too—I’ve been through typhoons. They call 100-mile-perhour typhoons “banana storms” because all they do is knock over banana trees.
There’s nowhere to go, I mean, you’re on an island, where are you going to go?
So, it’s just like eh (shrugs shoulders). You sit out on the porch and just watch
stuff blow by. And I still have a little bit of that to be honest with you—that
mentality, you know? Unless it’s higher than a Cat-3. (Informant 15)
The two preceding quotes show that frequent experiences with hurricanes and a
familiarity with weather outcomes have normalized such events in the minds of the
informants and decreased perceptions of risk.
b. High Perception of Risk
Conversely, some informants had a clearly defined high perception of risk. Although I
did not ask any questions about Hurricane Katrina specifically, each of the following informants
mentioned their own experiences with Katrina at some point during their interviews. These three
informants were all New Orleans residents at the time that Katrina hit, although their stories
regarding how the storm affected them vary considerably.
A: What aspects of a hurricane do you feel are most dangerous?
Informant 6: (Laughing) All of them. There’s no particular one. All of
them…Wind. Rain. Water. All that. People hollering and screaming, trying to get
the hell out of here.
A: So living here, in Louisiana, would you consider hurricanes to be a threat to
you or to your household?
Informant 14: Yes. Absolutely, yes.
A: Ok. And what aspects specifically do you consider to be most dangerous or
threatening?
Informant 14: Well, the water.
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A: Ok. So, living here in Louisiana, and specifically growing up here, do you
consider hurricanes to be a threat to you or to your household?
Informant 16: Absolutely. Absolutely. I would consider, I think in terms of
threat…the flooding is the most salient portion of that. I wouldn’t be as concerned
about wind force, or objects being thrown around by the wind. If I was here for
one, I think flooding is really the major threat.
Each of the preceding informants specifically mentioned water or flooding as a relevant risk
factor for thinking about the danger that hurricanes pose in New Orleans.
c. Risk Perception Influences
There were several common themes that seemed to impact people’s perceptions of risk.
These themes were Katrina, flooding, trust in the City of New Orleans, and the general feelings
of those around them or social influence. In many instances these influences intermingled to
show the multiple elements that individuals consider when deciding about whether or not there is
a legitimate threat. Although not all of the informants below were 100 percent on-board with
evacuation as the best possible solution, each weighed one or several of the above factors.
In regard to Katrina, both first-hand and second-hand knowledge or experience clearly
impacted people’s perceptions of risk:
Informant 13: You know, a lot of people I know since I’ve been here, were with
Katrina and stuff, so you know a lot of my team members went through that. So,
you know, I take what they say in to consideration, and heed as well, you know as
far as you know the news. That’s where I’d go with it.
Informant 13 is a New Orleans transplant, and although he previously stated that he personally
felt that hurricanes were not a threat to him because he had not experienced them, he also seems
to value the past lived experience of his peers and co-workers. Similarly, Informant 11, is also
new to New Orleans, but he factors in the events that occurred during Katrina to his risk
weighing process. In this case, Informant 11’s Katrina knowledge is from media portrayals of
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the event, although he also mentioned that his daughter-in-law had lived in New Orleans at the
time, had evacuated, and came home to moldy (and therefore ruined) belongings.
Informant 11: You know the other thing that I would worry about is a breakdown
of civil structure. We’ve all read about the people that were shot on the bridge or
the overpass, during Katrina, and from what I can tell, from listening to the news
and reading the news, people are essentially no better than they were in those
days. And the police forces, the government forces, are no more dependable than
they were in those days, and with the election of Trump and his people…I feel
much less secure then I did a few years ago. So, I sort of worry about how robust
a response to a natural disaster might be. How robust help would be, in terms of
response.
The preceding quote illustrates not only how Katrina impacts this individual’s risk perception
process, but also how current government climate and events factor in. At the time that I
interviewed Informant 11, news was just starting to roll in regarding the ambiguous death toll
numbers in Puerto Rico following Hurricane Maria, as well as the delays in providing necessary
aid and in restoring essential services to the island. This informant mentions the questionable
“dependability of government forces,” and “Trump and his people,” and he is considering these
elements in light of the administration’s response to Puerto Rico following Hurricane Maria.
The themes of flooding, and trust in the city, as they inform perceptions of risk, are
closely related. The theme of flooding as the primary risk was mentioned by over half of my
informants.
A: What about hurricanes do you consider to be most dangerous?
Informant 10: Floods. Flood damage. Wind and flood damage.
Informant 5: Uh. Inundation. Water.
Informant 15: Yeah. Flooding. Of course the winds are severe, but hell, these
houses are how old?
Informant 17: Flooding, and like trees, mostly falling, stuff like that.
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While everyone who lives in New Orleans is likely aware that the city was inundated with water
during Hurricane Katrina (there are water lines commemorated all over the city), a much more
recent flood event (the August 5th, 2017 flood event) refreshed the threat of flooding in people’s
minds, and also led them to re-scrutinize the city’s capabilities to respond to emergencies.
Informant 15: And it’s not so much I’m worried about the wind, it’s the levees
and everything else. We’re in an X zone here, so it doesn’t flood here, but
everywhere else. When I was running for [a city position], stuff like that, you
worry about it. What are we going to do? Are the pumps going to work?
A: Ok. What aspects specifically of hurricanes do you consider to be most
threatening or dangerous?
Informant 19: Um, flooding I think is the biggest thing. Both from poor storm
water management, and also obviously, levee failure. Water levels…what’s the
phrase I’m looking for? You know what I’m talking about…I can’t think of the
phrase….yeah, so flooding from both ends of that spectrum. (We later figured out
that the phrase this informant was searching for was storm surge.)
S: Do you consider hurricanes to be a threat to you, and to your immediate
household?
Informant 10: I mean, growing up on the Gulf Coast, my whole life, yeah.
Absolutely. Especially living in New Orleans, yes. Absolutely. Especially with
the floods from hardly any rain last summer, and the Sewerage and Water Board
bullshit…am I allowed to be profane?
All of the preceding quotes demonstrate a concern with the dependability of vital city resources
such as the city pump system, general storm-water management, and the city levee system. It is
obvious that the August 5, 2017 flood event has influenced perceptions of the city’s overall
competency. However, to complicate issues surrounding flooding and its ties to city trust
further, there was another still more recent event that has also become part of the ongoing saga
that is the shaky relationship between New Orleanians and their city. In the following quote, the
informant is expressing his displeasure with the City of New Orleans’s response to the potential
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Hurricane Nate, which city officials anticipated to be a flood event, and which incidentally
turned out to be a non-event for the city when the storm turned sharply just before landfall.
Informant 4: Curfew. Motherfuckers did a curfew. And, and I was, stuck, you
know? And it’s like I can’t get groceries, I can’t do anything. For barely a fucking
rain. Oh my god I was so mad. Even though it’s perfectly fine outside. And so I
was pissed – it can’t be willy-nilly. You can’t. If it’s mandatory, it needs to be, it
has to be a little bit more proven. The curfew was not cool.
There were five total separate mentions of Nate from different informants, though most
informants merely mentioned the event in terms of haven taken a few extra precautions (such as
buying water or batteries) that turned out not to be necessary. The precarious relationship
between city planners, the New Orleans Sewerage and Water Board, and New Orleans residents,
as well as how that relationship effects emergency planning, will be discussed in greater detail in
the following chapter.
In addition to considering past events and how they were handled, several informants
mentioned looking toward the general sentiments of those around them when trying to assess
risk.
Informant 2: That’s another thing, I didn’t say that, but that’s another thing—what
people are feeling about it. Which shouldn’t be a factor. That really shouldn’t
matter if everyone’s afraid or not. You don’t know what it’s going to do. No one
was worried about Katrina, but it wasn’t the storm that was the problem. I’ve
heard they’ve built the levees better now.
A: What factors do you consider when deciding whether or not to evacuate?
Informant 13: People telling me to.
The quantitative data in Chapter IV pertaining to the role of neighbor, family, and religious
influences in shaping risk perception helps build a more complete picture of how residents look
to those around them during their decision-making processes.
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6. HBM Element: Perceived Severity/Weather Beliefs
“Weather Beliefs” served as a primary code for this data-set because when referring to the
element that is “perceived severity” in the HBM, severity is often tied to storm or weatherrelated outcomes when talking about hurricane dangers. Several residents mentioned multiple
elements or aspects of weather that they are looking for as benchmarks of potential severity
when attempting to gauge the potential risks associated with an impending storm and decide
whether or not to evacuate.
A: What factors do you consider when you decide whether or not to evacuate?
Informant 16: I would say the primary ones…I would say really direction and
intensity of the storm, would be probably what I’d look at.
A: Ok. Um, what factors do you consider when you decide whether or not to
evacuate?
Informant 17: What they’re saying about the storm, how strong it is, how much
water they’re saying it’s going to dump. And is it even going to hit us. Because if
we’re getting like bands, from the outside, it’s just some rain. Is it actually
coming here? Those are the main things that I think about.
The preceding two informants mention direction, projected intensity, strength, and projected
rainfall. While these factors are not all of the necessary elements needed to fully determine the
possible danger of a storm, they are all factors that directly impact potential risk. Other factors
worth considering that were not mentioned will be discussed in the next chapter.
The most common theme prevalent throughout codes for “weather beliefs” is the mention
of the Saffir-Simpson Scale (which is a designation for wind speed). Although no informants
referred to the scale by name, many spoke about how “category strength,” “categories,” or “cats”
factored in to their considerations. Some informants seemed to have a reasonable understanding
of what category strengths designate. Unfortunately, however, it is evident that many of my
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informants did not possess an accurate understanding of the scale or what its numerical
designations mean.
A: Ok. Are you generally more inclined to evacuate or to stay if you can?
Informant 19: It depends on the severity of the storm—if it’s a tropical storm, or
maybe even a Category 1, I would be fine, I mean, I would probably stay, but I
think anything over a 1, and I’m going to go.
In the case shown above, informant 19 has a more conservative understanding of category
strengths than is used as the benchmark in New Orleans for issuing a mandatory evacuation.
Informant 18 has similarly conservative personal benchmarks.
A: What factors do you consider when deciding whether or not to evacuate?
Informant 18: I guess the strength of the storm, I mean if it’s a hurricane we’ll
leave but we’re not leaving for a tropical storm. So, um, and even with a Category
1 hurricane we will leave but even then, you know, you don’t know until the last
minute sometimes what it’s going to be, but as long as it’s going to be a tropical
storm we don’t leave, we stay.
During this research period, and as of this writing, the benchmark for declaring a mandatory
evacuation in New Orleans is a Category 3 or higher, although there have been talks of revising
the benchmarks to account for dangerous elements of weather that the Saffir-Simpson Scale does
not address, which will be discussed in the next chapter.
Informant 2, shown next, is from a state that does not have hurricanes. She is not very
familiar with category strengths, or what the numbers associated with those strengths designate.
Informant 2: Well, I would assume, well—I haven’t been through a hurricane, so I
would assume if they issued a mandatory evacuation, I would assume that it’s
pretty sure to hit, and I would bet—they don’t know till the last minute, right? I
would also assume it’s a high category. They wouldn’t try to evacuate for a low
category, like a 3 or something, right?
When asked to clarify her understanding of storm categories, Informant 2 assumed that the rating
system was more broadly scaled (like perhaps a scale of 1 to 10) and that the number indicated
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more than just wind speed (like the likelihood that a storm will hit a given area). Informant 3
seemed to have similar misunderstandings.
Informant 3: Most of the time no (I won’t evacuate). In certain situations, yes, like
a Cat 4 or a Cat 5 I feel could potentially threaten this place, but lower than that I
don’t really worry too much about it.
Informant 15, who has a great deal of hurricane and typhoon experience, understands the SaffirSimpson Scale system well, but his perception of risk is still low.
Informant 15: Um, sometimes you’ve got a captain with a ship, with the mentality
of “I’m going to go down with this ship!” You know, it’s like, “oh, it’s only a Cat
3”—I know it sounds strange, but it’s like I’m not leaving unless it’s a Cat 3.
Informant 15 understands that there is much more to gauging the potential danger of a storm than
just category strength, and yet he admits being swayed by the magic tipping point of “3 or over.”
Informant 10 is more conservative but seems to have an internal magic number as well, stating,
“But yeah, I mean, I plan to evacuate if it’s threatening enough. If it’s more than a Category 2,
I’d probably evacuate.”
Occasionally, when residents mentioned category strength, they did so with the
understanding that it was only one of several elements to consider when making decisions about
potential storm danger. Although Informant 15 mentioned that “Cat 3” is his tipping point, he
elaborated that he understands there is more to consider.
Informant 15: Category strength. Yeah. But rains now too. If it’s going to be a fast
mover or a slow mover. Because if it’s a fast mover then it won’t really rain on us
that much. But if it’s just sort of creeping along…and sit, and sit. I just got done
doing a forum on the Ninth Ward. We were up on the bridge, coming in from the
Ninth Ward, and you could just see that cloud, that day in August, and my
campaign manager was like, “Look man, that don’t look good.” And I even
remember taking a picture of the clouds, saying, “That doesn’t look right.” I had
to work that night, so I got home, went to sleep, and when we got up, we drove,
towards the CBD, and I’m like, “What’s all this water?” Because I didn’t listen to
the news or anything. I just woke up, and I was like, what the hell is going on? I
found out about the pumps. So. Slow mover, category. Those are the two most
important items.
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In the instance above, Informant 15 has revised his tipping point of “Cat 3” to include what he
considers to be a New Orleans-specific danger, which in this case is the possibility that if a storm
is slow moving and projected rainfall is high, the city’s pumps may not function, as was the case
on August 5, 2017.
A somewhat less common but still highly relevant theme was what I will call “other
storm knowledge.” In each of the examples that follow, informants are basing their
understandings of hurricane danger upon other dangerous weather patterns that might be more
familiar based upon their own lived experiences.
Informant 2: Well, I lived in California, so my prior experience was with
earthquakes, not hurricanes. That was our thing out there. Every place has to have
its hazards. So, I have absolutely no experience with hurricanes, except watching
the Wizard of Oz.
Informant 14: I think if it’s over a hurricane Cat 3, like an F-3 or something, but
also if it’s producing like certain, like some of them do like tornadoes and stuff,
you know, so just looking and seeing what type of storm it is, that’s going to be a
factor and how bad they are anticipating. I mean, if they think it is something that
the homes can’t hold, then yeah, I’m definitely leaving.
Informant 11: Well, I think that damage to the structure that I’m in is probably
potentially the most hazardous. Suppose the roof blows off and the house caves in
for example. Or a tree branch hits the window and causes a great pressure change
and the house in one sense or another explodes.
In each of the preceding examples, the informants are confusing hurricanes with tornadoes.
Watching the fictional movie Wizard of Oz (which begins in Kansas during a tornado event) will
not provide any relevant information about hurricanes. If an informant is waiting for a storm to
be designated on an “F-Scale” (the Fujita-Pearson Scale of tornado intensity) they may either
miss important relevant warnings for an impending hurricane or evacuate at precisely the wrong
moment, when there is an immediate threat of a regionally local tornado rather than a timed
threat of a hurricane rolling in from the Gulf. And in the case of Informant 11, it is obvious that
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his childhood upbringing with tornado experience in Iowa reflects what he imagines a hurricane
is likely to be like. This informant also mentioned that he knows to close the doors in each room
if he decides to shelter-in-place. I spent a good deal of time explaining to him what to expect
from a hurricane, and assuring him that although there is potential danger, his house is not likely
to explode. When I remarked that his storm-related knowledge was colored by his past
experience with tornadoes, he remarked thusly,
Well, you know, I may be unrealistic, but, um, another issue of course is water.
Water damage. And it’s interesting that you should mention tornado experience
because I’ve been thinking about the violence of weather lately and trying to
imagine whether or not the immediate violence of a tornado which I’m most
accustomed to thinking about is the sort of violence that one would experience in
a hurricane. I don’t really know. But I’ve read Their Eyes Were Watching God…
The examples of weather beliefs coded above demonstrate that education, local knowledge,
shared knowledge and past experiences all influence perceptions of risk. When paired with
other elements of the Health Belief Model, weather beliefs are an important component that
individuals factor in to their evacuation plan decision making process.
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CHAPTER VI
DISCUSSION
Significance of Results to Emergency Planning Literature
Using Health Belief Model constructs as a guideline for both the creation of a
quantitative survey tool and a semi-structured qualitative interview tool allowed me to
investigate hurricane evacuation behavior in a new way. Previous literature has not taken a
model-based approach to analyzing a public health risk mitigation program in order to predict
possible outcomes from both a quantitative and qualitative perspective. Typically, researchers
have restricted themselves to one or the other. While “some researchers have adopted
quantitative approaches that often encompass structured questionnaire surveys… other have
undertaken qualitative studies to document perceptions of the hazard and subsequent behavior”
(Montz, Tobin & Hagelman 2017:155). The advantage of using a model-based approach to
explore evacuation behaviors from both perspectives (no matter the model) is that it can paint a
broader picture of overlapping factors that relate to evacuation behavior outcomes than either
perspective alone.
In addition, early research on evacuation behavior traditionally focused on specific
singular vulnerabilities and sought to identify and obtain insights from individuals with that
vulnerability that might reveal how it affects behavioral outcomes. As Laska and Morrow
caution, this approach has limitations (2006:19). Because some factors associated with
vulnerability (such as race, gender, and tenancy) tend to converge, mitigation, preparation, and
evacuation studies geared toward a specific unique population group can have only limited
effectiveness (Id.). This limitation affects work such as Bateman and Edwards’ 2002 research on
gender and evacuation and Willigen et al.’s 2002 study of behavioral tendencies of households
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with a physically disabled family member, both of which focus on the impacts of a specific and
limited variable.
A slight improvement has been to focus on a particular vulnerability but then use a
model-based approach to study the perceptions of that vulnerable population set as those
perceptions relate to behavior outcomes. This approach allows some room for vulnerable
population groups to self-assess and report their own perceptions in an organized and replicable
fashion, and thereby can shed some light on a confluence of factors that contribute to root causes
of vulnerability. Elder et al.’s 2007 study on African American’s decisions not to evacuate
before Hurricane Katrina used this general approach. There, researchers conducted focus groups
with 53 African Americans who needed to be emergency evacuated to Columbia, South
Carolina, and used some elements of the HBM as the framework for developing group
discussion guides. They then identified themes based on several elements of the Health Belief
Model, coding for perceived susceptibility, perceived severity, barriers, and perceived racism
and inequities. However, this research still begins with the core assumption that a certain
population group is more vulnerable than others, precluding researchers from identifying similar
themes in other population groups that share similar thoughts, vulnerabilities, and biases, but
were not the subject of inquiry. This becomes a concern at the programmatic level, when
allocating resources and planning protocols to meet the needs of a particular demographic group
may come at the expense of another. As diversity increases, so too will the need to encourage
study across multiple (and perhaps new) demographic groups. Mileti explains, “the need for
mitigation efforts to acknowledge differences among the nation’s citizens will become even
more critical as the U.S. population becomes more diverse” and, accordingly, “research is also
needed to shed further light on how mitigation programs…can be rendered equitably” (1999:7).
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I would argue that the first step to equitable mitigation research is to erase assumptions of
demographic-based vulnerability and allow communities to self-identify their own needs,
expectations, and barriers. This is not to say that there will not be statistically significant
outcome differences among distinct population subsets (whether along race, gender, age, or other
lines), or that we should resist looking for such demographic patterns to emerge. It is only to say
that mitigation research needs to begin from a broader perspective and to work toward inclusivity
rather than exclusivity.
Yet another approach to evacuation behavior research is combining multiple known risk
factors or vulnerabilities to perform multivariate logistical regression analysis that examines
where those risk factors rank in terms of behavioral influences. Heath et al.’s 2001 study of
human and pet-related risk factors for evacuation failure takes this approach and compares the
behavior of households with children to households with pets. Although these types of studies
provide a means to scale risk factors, they can sometimes overlook certain “low” risk factors that
could be easily ameliorated and thereby lower overall composite risk. They can often fail to
identify overlap with other risk factors outside their limited scope of inquiry and may also miss
protective factors that might override certain vulnerabilities.
The biggest limitation of each of these three approaches to behavioral study is that they
are vulnerability-driven, and vulnerability-driven studies are unlikely to detect the influence of
any groups that may affect program outcomes but that are not already categorized as vulnerable,
as well as unlikely to identify factors of resilience that categorically vulnerable population
groups may possess. Vulnerability-based studies are especially problematic when assessing
open-access support services because they by definition must make baseline assumptions about
who those services are for and who will use them prior to beginning the assessment. Population
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groups whose use is not anticipated might overwhelm programming because they were not
accurately identified as part of the population served or were misidentified as outliers.
This gap in the literature was acknowledged in a 2015 article entitled “Stay or Go?
Examining Decision Making and Behavior in Hurricane Evacuations,” where Bowser and Cutter
review “the empirical research on evacuation behavior” and provide a wide overview of
evacuation behavior literature to date. While they describe multiple well-known predictors of
evacuation intent such as risk perception, sheltering options, and housing types, the authors
conclude that “none of these intersections are adequately captured in current hurricane behavior
studies, which tend to focus on single factors such as age or race as explanatory variables, but
also caution that “the evacuation response process is multidimensional, encompassing several
personal, social, and experiential factors” (2015:30).
My multidimensional research addresses this gap and provides broad insight into the
overall populations in New Orleans’ attitudes and behaviors related to hurricane evacuation. I
used the HBM to evaluate an entire potential population within accessible range of City-Assisted
Evacuation support, without selecting for key vulnerabilities. In doing so, I bypassed any
baseline assumptions of who users of the plan might be and cast a wide net of inquiry. This
approach allows me to look for population trends that might fall outside of the range of wellknown behaviors exhibited by categorically vulnerable groups. This is consistent with Mileti’s
recommendation that mitigation researchers seek out wide participation when researching
programming and making planning decisions, and attempt to
Adopt a consensus building approach, starting at the local level. Building
consensus is a process of seeking wide participation among all of the people who
have a stake in the outcome of the decision being pondered, identifying all
possible concerns and issues, generating ideas for dealing with them, and reaching
agreement about how they will be resolved and what steps will be taken…What is
important is that the participatory process be engaged in, for the information it
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generates and distributes, for the sense of community it can foster, for the ideas
that grow out of it, and for the sense of ownership it creates.” (1999:34)
This research, then, is best viewed as an honest attempt to engage with local New Orleanians
about a program in their city that everyone, vulnerable or not, ultimately has a stake in the
success of. As a community, New Orleanians possess a common desire to see City-Assisted
Evacuation and Evacuteer be successful in their evacuation goals so as to never repeat the
atrocity of lives lost unnecessarily during Katrina. Seeking to identify all possible concerns and
issues across all population groups, from community members from all walks of life, is a
community-building exercise that increases programmatic buy-in and enhances program
visibility.
The data-set that I produced using the constructs of the HBM to build my quantitative
and qualitative research tools is extremely large and somewhat unwieldly; however, it provides a
very broad portrayal of potential complications with the City-Assisted Evacuation plan being
piloted in New Orleans. Because I collected demographic information for each participant, the
data also allow me more granular insight into populations typically considered vulnerable. I am
now able to use the quantitative data-set specifically to view results by race, income, education
level, pet ownership, or many of the other 19 demographics assessed in my survey. This means
that I can compare my results to the existing literature written about certain subsets of the
population. Many of those data-set inquiries, such as how age might affect evacuation
preference, are included in my quantitative results chapter. In addition, however, because I did
not choose an initial focus on a particular subset of the population or limit my research to
categorically vulnerable populations, I can see other trends that are not necessarily groupspecific. For example, by studying across all education levels rather than seeking only the
opinions of New Orleanians with low levels of education (the categorically “vulnerable” group),
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I was able to discover that there is a distinct link between education levels and levels of trust in
the City of New Orleans to provide effective emergency evacuation services (see Chapter IV,
Inquiry 8). With this in mind, I believe that my research is not best utilized to simply validate or
refute existing literature results on a case-by-case or population-by-population basis. Instead, in
the next chapter, I will focus primarily on two aspects of my results: first, those that that pertain
to population groups that have been neglected in the existing literature, and second, those that
seem to be specific to New Orleans and City-Assisted Evacuation and are therefore directly
relevant for the programmatic improvements discussed in the concluding chapter.
Accordingly, while I do engage with the existing literature where it is can lend analytical
depth on a particular topic (such as effective evacuation messaging strategies), I do not intend
this research to validate or refute previous behavioral literature. There are three reasons I do not
believe it is beneficial to go back to each article that influenced this research and make a resultby-result comparison, however tempting and easy it would be to do so. First, much of the
existing hurricane evacuation behavior literature is purely qualitative and based upon interview
and focus group outcomes. It would be a disservice to that body of literature and to qualitative
research in general to hold it up to my quantitative analysis tool and tell readers that I did not
find similar statistically significant results.
Second, each disaster response experience represents a unique set of circumstances and a
confluence of singular geographic, temporal, and social factors. While we may review historical
events for possible contributing factors to future event outcomes, we should be wary of making
direct comparisons in an effort to “confirm” or “deny” the results of previous literature. For
example, Bateman and Edward’s 2002 study involved “a cross-sectional survey of 1,050 coastal
North Carolina households affected by Hurricane Bonnie” (2002:107). More women than men
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in that survey group evacuated, and the authors concluded that women were more likely to
evacuate than men because in that particular population, “women live at greater exposure to risk
and have a heightened perception of risk” (2002:107). My own research outcomes yielded
different results: Chapter IV, Inquiry 2 shows that in New Orleans neither gender was more
likely to have a higher perception of risk or more likely to make an advance evacuation plan.
My data also shows that among my survey participants men were actually more likely to have a
higher evacuation preference than women (the difference in means between male and female
respondents (-1.858) is statistically significant at a .10 level of significance (p-value = 0.0647)).
When I controlled for other possible well-documented variables that affect preferences, like
children or pets (as Heath’s 2001 study did), men’s preferences to evacuate were still greater,
and those results were significant at a .05 level of significance. The difference in results should
not be understood to indicate that either I or Bateman and Edwards must have been wrong, but
that gender likely affects preference to evacuate differently in unique population groups
(residents of North Carolina versus residents of New Orleans) at unique moments in time (about
five years after a 1998 hurricane versus about 13 years after 2005’s Hurricane Katrina). The
myriad of outside contributing factors that could possibly contribute to these differing results
would be impossible to control for. I could hypothesize, for instance, that shifting social
constructs of masculinity make men in 2018 more inclined to share their true emotions than they
were 20 years earlier. I might also theorize that the extremely poor outcomes for males
following Hurricane Katrina (particularly for African-American males) have significantly
contributed to a regionally, racially, and locationally specific set of factors that influenced the
risk perceptions of New Orleans men and altered statistical outcomes. In short, there is little
benefit and great potential harm to pitting one body of research against the other when doing so
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could affect mitigation plans that should be tailored to each unique community. I believe that it
is beneficial both to appreciate that results of a particular program may be unique to a particular
city and to look to each other’s research as informing how we may better study evacuation
behaviors generally. This dissertation, for example, may serve as a blueprint for other
communities interested in developing City Assisted Evacuation programs, and they might use the
same or similar methodologies to assess their own regions, predict their own unique outcomes,
and draw conclusions that will best suit their own communities.
The third reason that I feel it is not beneficial (and perhaps even detrimental) to compare
my research outcomes directly to those in the existing body of evacuation behavior literature is
that as a pre-assessment of New Orleans’ City-Assisted Evacuation program, my research is
proactive rather than reactive. Montz, Tobin, and Hagelman refer to this type of pre-assessment
approach to studying perceptions as an “expressed preference approach” to conducting research
(2017:157). Here I have sought out people’s “expressed preferences” for interacting with CityAssisted Evacuation. In contrast, the existing literature explores reasons why people did not
evacuate or could not evacuate after the fact. This can be a crucial difference. Montz, Tobin and
Hagelman caution that “one problem with this expressed preference approach is that individuals
do not always do what they say they would—that is, words do not always translate in to
subsequent actions” (2017:157). While this is obviously true for a variety of reasons (for
example, individuals may practice cognitive dissonance surrounding risk, be uncomfortable
sharing their true thoughts, or later find that circumstances prevent them performing the actions
they expressed a desire to take), expressed preference research remains an important tool. The
United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction cautions against emergency planning that is
always reactive rather than proactive (UNISDR, 2015). Reactive research is costlier and does
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not save lives. Just as the City-Assisted Evacuation program and Evacuteer in New Orleans are
proactive programs meant to reduce risk rather than controlling for damage after a catastrophic
event, this study was intentionally designed to help these programs be the most effective possible
versions of themselves prior to suffering through negative program outcomes. Steps taken now
to maximize potential efficacy not only maximize the likelihood of a successful first partnered
deployment but also makes it more likely that these programs will survive to grow and improve
through multiple catastrophic events. Programs with poor initial outcomes are often cut as
distance between catastrophic events increases and need for such programs fades from recent
memory. This simply throws planners back in to the post-disaster recovery reaction phase where
after a catastrophic event, new (and likewise untested) programs are implemented.
My research is therefore significant to the current body of evacuation behavior literature
primarily in terms of broader research methodology; I have attempted to answer the calls made
by Mileti, Bowser, Cutter, Tobin, Montz, Hagelman, and others to push toward research that is
inclusive, multidimensional, community-driven, and proactive. While this methodology may
have been far from perfect, Mileti remarks,
No one would argue that a transition toward sustainable hazards mitigation
is easy or that any one person has all the answers. True sustainability is
both a process and a goal, and many of the most important changes that
need to be made are not immediately fathomable. The process of
transforming the future requires open-minded debate; full public
participation; a willingness to experiment, learn, fine-tune, and alter; and a
consensus among stakeholders to stand behind their commitment to the
goal. (1999: 63-64)
This research project was but one small pilot study conducted by a single researcher attempting
to fulfill the role of statistician, public health professional, geographer and anthropologist. My
hope is nonetheless that scholars of hurricane evacuation behavior can see the value such a study
has when thinking about the challenges we face in evaluating proactive emergency plans in a
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broad and inclusive fashion, and that they will welcome this dissertation as an early contribution
to literature in the field that seeks to address evacuation concerns preemptively.
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CHAPTER VII
ANALYSIS
Introduction
This chapter discusses the research results in terms of their relevance to New Orleans’
City-Assisted Evacuation program and to Evacuteer. My two primary goals were to find out
how New Orleanians perceive the evacuation programming currently available in their city and
to contribute to crisis mitigation efforts in New Orleans by finding and highlighting areas that
may benefit future program outcomes by improving those perceptions. Each section represents
my analysis of one aspect of the CAE and/or Evacuteer programs that can be improved to
strengthen positive perceptions and ultimately increase prospective efficacy.
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The Invisible Man

Figure 7.1. The Evacuteer (photo courtesy of Evacuteer)
I’ve seen the thing that looks like a person with their arm up? I think that’s
supposed to be an evacuation—I think there’s one right around the corner on
Carrollton too? Umm, I don’t remember how many of them there are though, and
I don’t really know how it works. They don’t do enough to let us know what to do.
- Informant 10
For some reason, the 14-ft-tall, 800 lb. Evacuspot statues dotting the city simply go
unnoticed. And when people do notice one, all too often they are not sure what it stands for.
This presents a serious marketing and branding problem for Evacuteer. In 2016, Evacuteer
rolled out a survey designed to quantify the problems of visibility, knowledge, and
understanding. Volunteers surveyed riders at bus stops during the beginning of the 2016
hurricane season and conducted a 3-day “NOLA Readiness Ride” where over 30 volunteers rode
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buses and surveyed riders. They ultimately obtained responses from 884 passengers. Their
results can be summed up as follows:
60.5% of respondents who answered volunteers’ questions had no way to selfevacuate during a mandatory evacuation, but 56.4% of respondents did not know
about CAE. While 54.4% of respondents had seen Evacuspot statues, 46.3% of
those who had did not know their significance. (Internal document, Evacuteer)
When I became an Evacuteer intern in 2017 to fulfill my own scholarship service commitments,
everyone at Evacuteer was still talking about the Readiness Ride and its outcomes. Quantifying
the issues had shown that while just over half of Regional Transit Authority (RTA) riders had
noticed the Evacuspot statues, less than half of those could say what they were for. Evacuteer
held a number of troubleshooting sessions, which suggested a branding and marketing crisis.
The Evacuteer “image” was really more of a logo than a mascot. If it was supposed to be a
mascot (and was it?), then it had no name. Did it need a name? Was it a man? Was it a woman?
No, it was supposed to be genderless, an “everyman” if you will. The “Evacuteer.”
Unfortunately, it turns out that a nameless, genderless, featureless, straight-lined mascot made of
grey steel just is not eye-catching.
When conducting the research presented here, I roughly incorporated the six questions
Evacuteer had used in its Readiness Rides into my larger quantitative survey tool. This both
maintained research continuity for Evacuteer and directly worked with my own interests in
identifying possible barriers and looking for cues-to-action as directed by Health Belief Model
constructs. I was also personally curious if my own broader demographic survey, which spanned
each of the 17 neighborhoods within 1-km of an Evacuspot, would give better or worse results
than those Evacuteer had obtained from a narrower set of RTA riders. As it turned out, raw data
from my 2017 quantitative survey showed results similar to those obtained by Evacuteer: 44%
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of my respondents did not know about CAE, and 60.7% of my respondents could not identify the
purpose of the Evacuteer statue when shown a picture.
However, because my survey tool was a good deal more robust, I was able to search by
various demographics for additional exposure trends in an effort to discern whether there was
any particular group of people who seemed to have more or less knowledge about City-Assisted
Evacuation and Evacuteer. First, I found that, when divided by education levels, my dataset did
not suggest that individuals with a college education had any more knowledge than anyone else.
There was no statistical difference (see Tables 4.13, 4.14). This indicated that the city had not
been pooling all of its marketing efforts toward New Orleans college campuses. This possibility
had concerned me because I was aware of several outreach campaigns at different universities
geared toward registering people to become Evacuteers, and I wondered if those campaigns
might be the only way people were hearing about the program. This does not seem to be the
case. Unfortunately, my data did give different results when analyzed by race. White
respondents were more likely to know about CAE than non-White respondents, and this was
significant at the 5% level (see Table 4.15). When I controlled for possible contributing factors
to knowledge (like gender, having children, or having pets), White respondents were still more
likely to have knowledge of evacuation support services than other races (see Table 4.17). I
controlled for the aforementioned factors with the thought that perhaps parents with school-age
children would hear about the program through school messaging, or that people with pets might
hear about the program through veterinary clinics or pet adoption services. I also considered that
women might have more exposure to this sort of messaging than men, if they were the ones
taking care of children or pets. These hypotheses were not supported by the data.
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While it is impossible to say precisely why, it is safe to say that CAE and Evacuteer
program visibility among New Orleans residents is poor overall. Several of my informants
expressed these same or similar concerns during my qualitative follow-up interviews in 2018.
Not one recalled seeing any information from the city of New Orleans or Evacuteer – with the
exception of what I had given them when they took my survey the year before. Many
individuals were unaware of the giant statues in their neighborhoods, often only a block or two
away from their homes and were surprised when I showed them their neighborhood Evacuspots
on a map. One informant remarked that she drove by there every day but had not noticed.
Another informant explained that they thought they had read the statues were an art project. All
of this points to a serious problem: where is New Orleans’ messaging regarding evacuation?
How does the message get out? In what ways is someone supposed to learn about programming?
During my quantitative surveys, I attempted to answer these questions. Whenever
someone marked that they knew what the Evacuspot was for, I asked them how they knew. This
was not a set survey question but was a genuine curiosity. In most cases, people who knew what
the statues were for had been curious enough to walk directly up to them and read the signs.
These signs are a decent source of information for locations where statues that are easily visible,
in safe neighborhoods, and not surrounded by bustling traffic – for instance, the statue in front of
Louis Armstrong park. If someone actually goes up to investigate this statue, this is the signage
they will see (Figure 7.2 below).
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Figure 7.2. City-Assisted Evacuation Sign on Evacuteer Arm (Photo credit: Infrogmation/
Commons.wikimedia.org)
The sign reads,
City Assisted Evacuation Pick-Up Point. Remember, only 1 small carry-on bag
per person (45” total size- 22”x15”x8”). Bring all medications and prescriptions.
Bring all important papers and contact information. Bring official identification if
you have it. ABSOLUTELY NO: Guns, Knives, or other weapons, Illegal drugs
or prohibited substances.
IF TRAVELING WITH PETS: Pets must be in a carrier or restrained on a leash.
Must have a collar and ID tag. Must have current vaccinations and needed
medications. If you need assistance call 3-1-1.
If you have never encountered the CAE program before, reading this sign might leave you with
more questions than answers. When do I show up at the sign? Under what circumstances? Who
is coming to get me and in what fashion? How long can I expect to wait? Who is this program
for? If my pets are not vaccinated but a storm is coming, should I come anyway, or should I stay
home, knowing they will not be evacuated with me? If I bring my family, are we all kept
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together? Where do we go? If I want these questions answered, am I actually supposed to call
3-1-1 for “assistance”? There’s no website listed or any other indication as to where to find
more information. A further problem with this sign is the absence of branding. The word
“Evacuteer” is not printed anywhere on this sign or on the Evacuteer statue itself, nor is there any
mention of the Evacuteer organization.
Evacuteer quickly realized that the small and vague signage was a problem, but they
found themselves limited in the ways they could fix it. The artist who had created the statues in
collaboration with the New Orleans Arts Council stipulated that they cannot be permanently
changed in any way, shape, or form. Evacuteer improvised by making the signing temporarily a
little more visible, a little friendlier, and a little more informative. During the hurricane season,
the signage below is now zip-tied to each statue:

Figure 7.3. Evacuspot Signage Added by Evacuteer (photo credit:
Infrogmation/commons.wikimedia.org)

160

These temporary new signs read,
Hello, I am an Evacuspot. I am part of New Orleans’ City-Assisted Evacuation.
If you’re unable to leave the city during a mandatory evacuation, come visit me at
one of my 17 locations and our Evacuteers will load you, your family, and your
pets on to a free bus to a shelter! When the city reopens, you will receive a ride
back. Check my arm for more information about what to bring!
The signage also includes the Evacuteer logo, information for volunteering as an Evacuteer, and
a Twitter handle and hashtag. To the side of the messaging is a rough map of the locations of
each of the 17 spots, with accompanying addresses.
While this signage is a marked improvement and answers some of the questions that
potential users might have, the solution is limited: the sign is still only visible to those who are
curious enough to walk up and read it, and furthermore, only those who visit the Evacuteer
website will find the answers to the questions above.
Evacuteer has therefore continued to look for ways to improve Evacuspot visibility and
information. Over the fall of 2018, Evacuteer staff and volunteers won a grant to secure the help
of a local design firm through that firm’s annual “day of service” competition. Evacuteer
worked with this design firm over several months to develop creative solutions to increasing
visibility while still adhering to the artist’s stipulation that the statues not be permanently
changed or altered. The team suggested a wide variety of innovative temporary solutions, and
mock-ups of some of those are shown in the figures below (See Figures 7.4, 7.5, 7.6, 7.7, & 7.8).
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Figure 7.4. Sign Panel Evacuteer Improvement Mock-Up (photo credit: Evacuteer)
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Figure 7.5. Vinyl Wrap Evacuteer Improvement Mock-up (photo credit: Evacuteer)
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Figure 7.6. Swag Evacuteer Improvement Mock-up (photo credit: Evacuteer)
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Figure 7.7. Background Panel Evacuteer Improvement Mock-up (photo credit: Evacuteer)
While each of the designs would increase visibility, not one would make the Evacuspot
statues more informative. All of them would require people to approach and read the signage
and then go online to learn more information. This presents significant barriers to certain
populations in New Orleans, such as the elderly or homeless, who may not have cell phones or
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internet access. Furthermore, none of the solutions are financially practical for Evacuteer itself,
which operates on a shoe-string budget with a paid staff of one. If visibility and understanding
of the Evacuspots and their role in the CAE program are going to improve, the City of New
Orleans must increase its investment in this partnership and work with Evacuteer to build an
effective mitigation program that is well-known by the public it seeks to serve.
At present, the City of New Orleans itself does very little to advertise or promote CityAssisted Evacuation. None of the avenues of city-led messaging regarding CAE are deployed in
a uniform, organized, or widespread manner. A citizen who goes to Ready.Nola.gov to
proactively seek out evacuation assistance information must scroll all the way to the bottom of
the opening page to click on a link to “Learn About City-Assisted Evacuation.” A visitor to the
site can also click to “Sign Up for Emergency Alerts,” and – assuming alert messaging is
activated for an evacuation event and that the individual who signed up has a cell phone and it
accepts text messages – this should push out an emergency message about City-Assisted
Evacuation if a mandatory evacuation is issued. This alert system will not, however, tell anyone
in advance that the CAE program exists or help plan to use it. Someone who needs to register to
be picked up during an evacuation event must click yet another link on the Ready.Nola.gov
homepage to “Sign Up for the Special Needs Registry.” Note that there is nothing to indicate to
visitors that the special needs registry relates to City-Assisted Evacuation and in fact, the bottom
of the registry warns,
The first line of defense against the effects of a disaster is personal preparedness.
During an emergency, the government and other agencies may not be able to meet
your needs. It is important for you to make your own emergency plans and to be
prepared for your own safety in an emergency. Registering on this website is not a
guarantee that emergency officials will be able to assist you in an emergency.
(Nola Special Needs Registry website, n.d.).
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Rather than reassuring residents that CAE is available to help them, this warning suggests that
they may not be able to use CAE at all.
The warning to residents with special needs is not only scary, but also contradicts the
message that a resident should “[c]all 3-1-1 to sign up for the Special Needs Registry if you are
elderly or have medical or mobility needs” that the city promotes in the trifold CAE information
pamphlets it distributes every hurricane season at community messaging events (New Orleans
CAE Pamphlet, 2018.). These events are planned by the community outreach coordinator
working for The New Orleans Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness
(NOHSEP) and take place either as separate tabling events in public spaces such as libraries or
NORDC facilities, or, in coordination with other city events like festivals. The city also gives
pamphlets to Evacuteer so that they can run additional public awareness tabling events. The
community outreach coordinator at NOHSEP also manages its social media pages, such as
Facebook and Twitter, and posts information on those pages throughout hurricane season.
However, no one is likely to seek out information about the CAE Program unless they know it
exists, and since awareness of the program is so low, residents are unlikely to encounter
NOHSEP’s social media messaging or to know when and where its community events are held.
When I first started my internship with Evacuteer, I asked why messaging was not
widespread and public. Why did I never hear about it on the radio? Why did I never see it on
local news station broadcasts? Why was there no big signage at my local grocery store?
Evacuteer’s answer was simple: funding. Paid advertising costs money they do not have. They
promote CAE as much as they can using the city-provided materials and volunteer labor, but
beyond that, their resources are scarce.

167

One of my informants shared my concern about the lack of widespread messaging, and
had a suggestion:
What would be cool is if everyone gets something mailed to them once a year.
Listen, if something happens, they have this, just a simple little flyer that
everyone has. You have it, you’re aware, you know? If you have a problem, this
is where you need to go. Just black and white, simple you know? That would just
make, you could probably touch people even more. (Informant 14)
I had a similar conversation with Evacuteer, asking why they did not partner with someone who
could help distribute messaging. Phone books, utility bills, and grocery store coupons are
regularly distributed to most mailing addresses in New Orleans. Surely, we could arrange to
include information about the CAE program with any one of those communications once per
year. I discovered that they had already tried and failed to make this happen. They had
contacted RTA to see if they could get bus or bus-stop advertising space. They had contacted the
electric company to see if messaging could be included with a bill. They had asked to put
Evacuteer cardboard cut-out structures in public places like grocery stores and libraries to catch
attention. At each turn, they were shut down.
When I asked the city, I was told that this distributing CAE program information to all
residents this way would be cost-prohibitive. Printing information for every resident in New
Orleans, many of whom probably did not need CAE, was not in the budget. However, it turns
out that in 2014, door hangers went out throughout the city in neighborhoods near Evacuspots.
A sample is shown below (Figures 7.8 and 7.9).
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Figure 7.8. City of New Orleans Issued CAE Door Tag- Front (2014)
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Figure 7.9. City of New Orleans Issued CAE Door Tag (Back) (2014)
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No one could tell me why these door tags were distributed for only one year and never reissued,
but their absence reflects a larger problem. The more distant memories of Hurricane Katrina and
the federal mandate for CAE becomes, the more city interest in and funding for the program
dwindles. Budgets for marketing and outreach are cut a little more each year. After all, the city
remains in compliance with the federal requirement that it maintain a program to evacuate
residents during a mandatory evacuation even if the programming is not marketed or advertised.
Today, it is unsurprising that people fail to notice Evacuspots or that when they do are not sure
what the statues are for. People do not usually go looking for someone they do not know exists.
Without a robust and enthusiastic partnership and funding from the city, Evacuteer’s mascot is
unfortunately destined to remain The Invisible Man.
Cementing a Plan for the Future
Before the statues were installed in 2013 (see Fig. 7.10), the City of New Orleans
selected the 17 Evacuspot sites in order to bring visibility and awareness to existing evacuation
pickup points that it had designated based upon RTA ridership statistics. Those pickup points
were chosen and designated by the city without the assistance of Evacuteer. After the statues
were installed, Evacuteer realized that despite their size, many were difficult to see, especially at
night. Evacuteer therefore undertook a 2015 campaign to light the Evacuspots. This campaign,
called “Love, Write, Light,” not only improved the statues’ visibility, but also further established
the permanence of these structures and their placement in New Orleans. In Evacuteer’s own
words:
In 2015, for the tenth anniversary of Hurricane Katrina, you helped us to embark
on an incredible mission to light our Evacuspot statues. We did this in hopes to
bring them more visibility and promote City-Assisted Evacuation awareness to
our residents because we believe that everyone deserves access to an option to
evacuate safely during a mandatory evacuation. (Evacuteer, n.d.)
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The Evacuspots have been illuminated for several years now. However, their enhanced visibility
has not resulted in significant resident awareness of their purpose or of the City Assisted
Evacuation program. Many residents remain unaware that New Orleans has an evacuation
assistance program, and even those who have noticed the statues often do not know what they
are for.

Figure 7.10. 2013 Evacuspot Installation Shipment (photo credit: Evacuteer)
I realized when I began my research in the summer of 2017 that one of the most
significant barriers to public awareness of the Evacuspots is their location. When I set out to find
each spot using the CAE trifold brochure and get a feel for the neighborhoods that they served, I
had a great deal of difficulty. Some were easy to locate because they are prominently placed in
front of schools, libraries, or other public-use buildings, such as YMCAs (See Figure 7.11
below). Others, however, are extremely difficult to find or dangerous to approach. For example,
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there is a marker placed behind a large building on a street where there are no residences (Spot 2,
Figure 7.12), there is one behind a dumpster in a Chicken Mart parking lot (Spot 3, Figure 7.13),
and one in the middle of a very busy intersection where no one could safely walk up and read the
information on them (Spot 15, Figure 7.14).

Figure 7.11. Evacuspot 5, Located in Lakeview (photo credit: Evacuteer)
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Figure 7.12. Evacuspot 2, Located behind the Kingsley Center (photo credit: Evacuteer)

Figure 7.13. Evacuspot 3, Central City Senior Center (photo credit: Evacuteer)
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Figure 7.14. Evacuspot 15, Gentilly Walmart Neutral Zone (photo credit: Evacuteer)
I started to consider how the Evacuspot locations might hinder evacuation work. If there
is a mandatory evacuation, Evacuteers are supposed to come to each Evacuspot as a team, set up
a tent with a registration table (and a few chairs in a shaded area for people who may need to sit),
and line people up in an orderly fashion to enter arriving buses. This seemed to require more
space than, for example, the 3-foot-wide neutral zone at Evacuspot 15 (Fig. 7.14). Evacuteer
explained to me that they had attempted to address this problem by securing an understanding
with Walmart management that they would use the parking lot near the spot, rather than the spot
itself. However necessary, these workarounds create logistical difficulties and burdens of their
own. The year that I interned with Evacuteer, they had not yet managed to re-establish their
agreement with the newest rotation of Walmart management for that hurricane season.
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My qualitative research the next year revealed an additional concern when my most
elderly informant noted that the Evacuspot closest to her home, Spot 3, is in an area that can be
dangerous, particularly at night. I know that the City of New Orleans has planned to have police
presence at each spot, but my informant, like most city residents, does not. Furthermore, given
the overall lack of trust in the city, that knowledge might not be reassuring. I began to wonder
how the locations of the Evacuspots might affect people’s perception of the reliability of CityAssisted Evacuation. For example, Figure 7.15 below shows a spot with no real place to
congregate. The overall effect, next to a barbed-wire topped fence, is not inviting.

Figure 7.15. Evacuspot 13, Stallings Recreation Center (photo credit: Evacuteer)
Perhaps more significant than the present location of the spots themselves is their
permanence. The statues were installed with the intention that they would stand through 200
years of wear and tear. However, the City of New Orleans was very different when the statues
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were installed in 2013 than it was in 1813, and it is unlikely that the city will not undergo
similarly dramatic changes between now and 2213. That presents serious problems. For
example, the four buildings meant to serve as “Senior Evacuspots” allowing elderly citizens
access to air conditioning and restroom facilities in nearby buildings may be functional now, but
those buildings are unlikely to be there in 200 years. The statues will almost certainly need to be
moved at some point to retain any functionality.
I am not the first researcher to question the location and assumed permanence of CityAssisted Evacuation pick up points. In 2017, Louisiana State University researchers Bian and
Wilmot questioned the efficacy of the current Evacuspot positioning as it relates to Cutter’s
Social Vulnerability Index in a paper entitled, “An Analysis on Transit Pickup Points for
Vulnerable People During Hurricane Evacuation: A Case Study of New Orleans.” After
studying the location of the 17 Evacuspots, Bian and Wilmot concluded that they were not
ideally situated to reach the greatest number of vulnerable New Orleans residents. They then
suggested a hypothetical relocation of the spots to locations that would better serve categorically
vulnerable residents. Although I do not advocate for a placement based upon vulnerability alone,
my own two summers of research have led me to agree with Bian and Wilmot on several of their
conclusions, namely, that pickup points should be located in places that are easily recognizable
to locals; that pickup points must be located in places that provide sufficient space for gathering
people and transit vehicles serving the site; and that pickup points must be close to major roads
for easy access (Bian and Wilmot, 2017).
I disagree with Bian and Wilmot’s plan to relocate the Evacuspots to “new” but still
“permanent” locations because that would not fully address the problem presented by the current
placement. My own qualitative research and my conversations with informants have led me to
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believe that evacuation pickup sites must be: (1) readily visible, so that they are noticed, (2)
accessible, so that those who need to use them are safe and comfortable, meaning that they must
provide basic amenities such as handicapped access and seating and shade for the elderly during
summers, (3) reasonably walkable, so that they can be safely reached using sidewalks and
without crossing major roads or highways, and (4) relatively safe and crime-free, so that
residents are not afraid to use them. Unfortunately, as a city grows and changes, its landscapes
shift. Populations rise and decline in certain areas. Vulnerabilities increase and decrease in
specific neighborhoods as residents age or relocate. These considerations call for some solution
beyond or in addition to static point positioning.
LSU Transportation Engineer Brian Wolshon notes that “using a flexible or adaptive
response to carrying out evacuations has been suggested as a way to further increase the ability
to better respond to catastrophic threats” (2010:np). However, Montz et al. caution that,
Flexible evacuation has many benefits, [but] it may be difficult to implement in
practice, particularly for large-scale threats such as hurricanes. Communication is
difficult during emergencies. Even during hurricane threats, when several days are
available to convey clear, simple and effective guidance to evacuees,
communication is a challenge. (2013: np)
Although 200-year static point positioning using pre-Katrina transit numbers is clearly not the
answer, flexible positioning, as mentioned by Montz et al., raises a legitimate risk of
communication gaps and reduction in locational awareness. My thought is that an improved
CAE Program would likely land somewhere in the middle. I would advocate for well-marked
spots that change infrequently, but that can be re-located when necessary as populations grow
and decline, vulnerability patterns change, site safety ebbs and flows, and transit services are
altered.
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Testing the Waters: Local Perceptions of the August 5th, 2017 Flood Event
And also, we think about, how’s the water management been in our neighborhood
recently? Like have the streets been flooding a lot? Do you think there’s a greater
chance of that happening? –Informant 5, on weighing factors that contribute to
evacuation decisions
On August 5, 2017, the New Orleans Sewerage and Water Board failed to warn New
Orleans residents of reduced pumping capacity in their neighborhoods prior to heavy rainstorms.
Numerous equipment outages (outages known to the Sewerage and Water Board but kept secret
from the public and city officials) limited the pump system’s capacity to drain water, and in a
matter of hours, heavy rains caused severe localized flooding over large swaths of the city.
Many residents were unable to secure their homes or relocate their vehicles before the flooding
took hold, resulting in widespread property damage. Residents of neighborhoods impacted by
the August 5, 2017 flood called 9-1-1 in large numbers (Figure 7.16):

Figure 7.16. 911 Calls in New Orleans reporting flooding on August 5, 2017 (Swenson &
Adelson, 2017)
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I was approximately half-way through my quantitative research period when this flooding
hit the city, and I quickly shifted my focus to surveying the Evacuspot neighborhoods I had not
yet reached that were now in flooded areas. I surveyed the neighborhood surrounding Evacuspot
10 in Mid City and Evacuspot 5 in Lakeview. I found that overall categorical social
vulnerability indicators such as race, age, income, educational levels, and disability status were
not high for these neighborhoods. However, residents’ negative perceptions of the city’s
competency, mistrust in local reporting services, and experience seeing their homes and vehicles
flood during peak hurricane season had left them feeling particularly vulnerable.
During the weeks after this flooding, Hurricane Harvey roared to life in the Gulf of
Mexico and New Orleans was placed in the “cone of uncertainty.” Residents I surveyed in
Lakeview, many of whose cars had flooded, expressed their concern over how they would leave
the city without a working car when every car rental facility in a 100-mile radius was completely
out of vehicles. I found that because the well-to-do residents of Lakeview had never anticipated
needing city services to evacuate, their knowledge of City-Assisted Evacuation and Evacuteer
was extremely low. When isolating data for Lakeview alone, I found that 100% of my survey
participants for that neighborhood had household incomes in excess of $60,000, that 86% of
residents were homeowners, and that 83% had a college degree. However, 0% of these
individuals used public transit, only 47% knew that there is some sort of evacuation assistance
program in New Orleans, and an overwhelming 76% did not trust the city to keep them safe
during an evacuation. One survey participant bemoaned that no one had received a flood
emergency warning from the city, remarking, “the worst part was the cowardice on the part of
city officials. They knew, and they didn’t tell us.”
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Media portrayals of the August 5, 2017 flooding were quick to capitalize on images of
streets underwater, comparing them to images after Hurricane Katrina. A Nola.com reporter
went to recapture an iconic post-Katrina image of the Circle Food Store in the Treme
neighborhood, flooded once again, and added the caption, “History Repeats Itself Yet Again in
New Orleans” (Figure 7.17).

Figure 7.17. Circle Food Store Flooding: Katrina and August 5, 2017 (Brett Duke, 2017).
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After the August 5th, 2017 flood, many of my survey participants were eager to tell me
that if the city had failed to keep them safe during a rainstorm, they could never trust the city to
keep them safe during a hurricane evacuation. Even when I included the surveys taken prior to
the flooding, only 31.92% of overall participants answered that they trusted the city to keep them
safe during an evacuation. This lack of trust remained a summer later, when I began my in-depth
qualitative research. The same sentiments were echoed across all neighborhoods so frequently
that when I analyzed the resulting data, “flooding” needed its own unique code. The vignettes
below are representative of many residents’ recollections of August 5th, 2017:
Yeah, my step-daughter was over here in the afternoon, or maybe in the morning,
and there was like this much water at the curb (holding hand up to ankles) and she
got her feet wet getting to the car. And then it just kind of kept raining and I was
going to go over there for dinner. And then I got dressed and I went out to my car,
and I thought, ‘Oh my God,”—the water was up to the bumper on my car in the
driveway and the trashcans were floating away and I said, “This is not supposed
to be happening.” You know? (Informant 11)
I was living in Mid-City for that flood. And that was even, they weren’t even, I
mean, it just rained really hard for like an hour. That was bullshit. My
roommate—fortunately our apartment was upstairs. I was living like on Jeff
Davis, like right in the middle of it. Like, right there in the middle of Mid-City,
and my roommate, water came up to his steering wheel, so his car was totaled,
and I had a couch that I loved, and it was out in storage out back and it got
flooded, so no more couch. Yeah, and just, a bunch of my friends lived in MidCity, and it came up in to their apartments. I had to wade through water up past
my waist for like blocks just to get to work and back home from work. It was
disgusting. And actually, I got cut pretty bad too. I mean, you couldn’t see the
bottom… (Informant 10)
As I contemplated the August 5th, 2017 flooding, I began to wonder how trust in the city of New
Orleans might differ across groups, hypothesizing that minorities and those of low socioeconomic status might have overall lower levels of trust. My reasoning was these groups were
generally more insecure and more heavily reliant upon the city services that they might have had
negative encounters with during the flooding. Statistical Inquiry 8 shows my results for
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measuring trust in the city by race (see Table 4.19) and education (see Table 4.20). Only 19.3%
of White respondents reported trusting the city compared to 41.1% of non-White respondents,
for a difference of means that is significant at the 1% level. Contrary to my expectations, while
trust in the city is low overall, it is particularly low for White respondents. When looking at the
effects of education, I found that 41.7% of those with no college experience trusted the city to
keep them safe, whereas only 24.3% of those with an Associate’s degree or higher did. Again,
the difference in means between these two groups was significant at a 1% level. When I went
back and stratified education levels by each level of education that could be indicated on my
survey, increased levels of education were inversely proportional to trust (See Graph 4.2). This
was again the opposite of the result I expected.
I can only hypothesize why this might be. Perhaps non-minority (more privileged)
respondents with higher levels of education also have more exposure to negative media
portrayals of the efficacy of city planning, such as the Nola.com photo (Figure 7.9). They might
also have more awareness of city politics, more discretionary time to engage in them, and, if they
are homeowners, may have also had to deal with the city in an official capacity more frequently
(perhaps to get building permits, or to have property taxes reassessed). The question is ripe for
further inquiry. Whatever the reasons, however, New Orleans residents across the board have
trust issues concerning the city.
New Orleanians are incredibly good at making their opinions publicly known, including
and perhaps especially their opinions about their city. During the 2018 Mardi Gras season, the
city’s lack of response to the August 2017 floods was the subject of widespread commentary and
ridicule. As I stood watching Krewe Du Vieux (a satirical walking parade), the severity of the
public mistrust in the city following the August 5th, 2017 floods was unmistakable. Below is a
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small collection of items that were handed to me during the 2018 parade (Figures 7.18, 7.19,
7.20, 7.21).

Figure 7.18. Krewe of K.A.O.S “Submarine Pass”
The “Submarine Pass” issued to me above (Fig. 7.18) was handed out as New Orleans celebrated
its 300-year anniversary. The pass imagines what New Orleans Regional Transit might look like
in 400 years, when presumably the city will be under water.
The next two “pump function” passes (Figs. 7.19 & 7.20) are satirical representations of
the city notices that kept appearing following the August 5th floods. At first the Sewerage and
Water Board reported that only a certain number of pumps were compromised, and the rest were
fine. Then that number was revised to include more pumps. Later that number was revised
again to include still more. This led many residents to feel that the reporting of functional pump
capacity by the Sewerage and Water Board was blatantly dishonest.
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Figure 7.19. Satirical Pump Function Notice provided by the Alkreweists

Figure 7.20. Satirical Pump Function Notice provided by the Alkreweists
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Figure 7.21. Satirical Reimagining of the New Orleans Hop-On Hop-Off Tourism Buses provided by Krewe du C.R.A.P.S.
186

The images above and my own quantitative and qualitative survey data all serve to represent how
residents feel about the city of New Orleans’ honesty, competency, and capabilities following the
floods. Considering this lack of trust, I believe it would be prudent for Evacuteer to serve as the
primary face of evacuation assistance, with the city serving as a named partner in that goal. This
would emphasize that an organization other than the city itself is committed to a cause that New
Orleanians may otherwise be reluctant to trust despite the danger to their lives.
Back to the Books: Existing Evacuation Literature and How it Applies to City-Assisted
Evacuation
My research is not intended to add to vulnerable population evacuation literature, and I
do not make direct behavioral outcome comparisons. However, I will discuss that literature here
to provide a better understanding of the concerns addressed or partially addressed by the CityAssisted Evacuation Program and Evacuteer. This in turn will allow me to discuss my
conclusions regarding which concerns remain most significant for vulnerable populations and
should be kept in mind as New Orleans works toward proactive assistance.
Gender and Evacuation
Bateman and Edwards’ research presupposes that women are more likely to evacuate
than men, based upon previous studies that treat gender as a control variable rather than an
explanatory factor (2002:107). With that assumption, the researchers undertook multivariate
analysis to examine gendered differences in socio-economic status, care-giving roles in the
household, evacuation incentives, exposure to risk, and perception of risk that might explain why
women were more likely to evacuate (2002:107).
My own quantitative analysis found that contrary to Bateman and Edwards’ assumption,
men – not women – in New Orleans have a statistically significant higher preference to evacuate,
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and perceptions of risk and plan preparedness were similar by gender (See Chapter IV: Statistical
Inquiry 2). I suspect that the differences might be partially explained by the gendered
differences that Bateman and Edwards explored and that differences in socio-economic status,
exposure to risk, and risk perception may be higher for men (particularly minority men) in postKatrina New Orleans. New Orleans’ unique culture may also explain another difference between
my research and Bateman and Edwards’. They mention that women are statistically more likely
to communicate with and be influenced by neighbors and to be swayed by those neighbor’s
evacuation decisions (2002:109). New Orleans has an outdoor culture largely enjoyed by
minority men, who frequently sit on their porches, play card, dice, or domino games, or grill and
listen to music, particularly during cooler times of year, or in the evenings as the temperatures
cool. Here, the precise opposite might be true, with men more likely to communicate with and
be influenced by their neighbors. Gender as a risk factor may be locationally and situationally
specific.
While the underlying assumption regarding gender and evacuation does not hold for New
Orleans, I would like to explore the actual variables that Bateman and Edwards cite as
contributions to increased risk and to talk about those variables as they relate to the City-Assisted
Evacuation program in New Orleans. Bateman and Edwards use a variation of Perry’s concept
of “incentives to evacuate,” which explains that certain factors are likely to increase the
probability that a threatened person will evacuate (2002:109). One such incentive is owning a
car (2002:109). CAE accounts for this “incentive” or protective factor of owning a vehicle by
assuming that car-less populations will comprise a large portion of their usership and that the city
must provide vehicles for evacuation. A second incentive Bateman and Edwards name is having
an advance evacuation plan, which potentially reduces opportunity costs associated with
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evacuation (2002:109). Again, CAE attempts to match this incentive by providing a pre-set plan
for evacuation. If residents know in advance that they will use CAE and feel confident and
capable in their ability to do so, they have a simple advance evacuation plan. Another third
incentive named by the authors is residential location (2002:109). Residential location
incentivizes evacuation when residents do not feel safe remaining where they are during a
potential hurricane. While Bateman and Edwards think of location risk in terms of proximity to
the coast, I would think of location risk for New Orleans in terms of likelihood of flooding,
which is a highly localized situation. CAE’s localized Evacuspot system attempts to address
this, but a number of improvements could make the City-Assisted Evacuation program more
accessible geographically. Those considerations appear in the section on static point positioning
above.
Other evacuation incentives mentioned by Bateman and Edwards are the incentives of
“housing type” (2002:109) and “household composition” (2002:111). Housing type refers to the
type of physical structure where someone lives and that structure’s anticipated likelihood of
withstanding a storm. For instance, mobile homes might serve as an incentive to evacuate over
more permanent housing. Household composition refers to having a household with children
under 18 or having a disabled member in the household, both of which are also considered
evacuation incentives. In regard to household composition, the City-Assisted Evacuation
Program has made concerted efforts to be family- and disability- friendly. For instance, riders
who board with car seats, diaper bags, baby carriers, or strollers will not have those items
counted as their one allowed piece of luggage. Families receive a single evacuation ticket as a
unit and matching wristbands to help ensure that they remain together throughout the evacuation,
sheltering, and return process. The City-Assisted Evacuation Program has also made efforts
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toward being disability-friendly. Residents who cannot get to an Evacuspot due to a physical
disability are encouraged to call 3-1-1 and arrange for pickup. If they know they will need this
service, they are also encouraged to register for it in advance (though the registration website
mentions that the city does not guarantee services). The needs of disabled residents whose
medications need refrigeration are addressed with small refrigeration units on buses.
While many “incentives” have been accounted for by CAE, that is meaningless for
residents unless they know those services exist, regardless of their gender. My concern, backed
by my own research, is that few residents know or understand the CAE Program or the specific
ways it has been designed to help them. In each of the twenty instances where I asked my
qualitative interview participants to describe the process of using the system, not a single person
could do so. If integral parts of the program are not transparent to potential users, people may
not perceive the program as something they could use despite steps taken to address their needs.
Disability and Evacuation
Willigen et al. conducted research examining the experiences of physically disabled
individuals and their families following Hurricanes Bonnie, Dennis, and Floyd (2002). The
authors found that households with disabled family members were less likely to evacuate than
others due to their lack of access to evacuation support services and assistance or to their
perceived lack of such access (2002:98). Because Willigen’s study took place following the
three aforementioned hurricanes, participants were able to talk about their actual experiences.
My own quantitative research, in contrast, related to hypothetical future evacuation experiences.
However, I found no statistically significant difference in preference to evacuate or shelter in
place between residents who were physically disabled or had a disabled member in the
household and those who reported no disabilities (See Chapter IV: Statistical Inquiry 5).

190

In highlighting the needs of the physically disabled as they differ from the majority
population, Willigen et al. mention difficulty with physical access to services, difficulty
performing toileting activities independently, difficulty concerning shelters without handicapaccessible lavatories and dining areas, and the need for extra assistance from shelter staff and
volunteers (2002: 99). They also mention that adults with disabilities are statistically more likely
to live alone than in family units (2002:99) and more likely to live at lower socio-economic
levels that those without disabilities (2002:100).
Willigen and colleagues bring up several concerns significant to the City-Assisted
Evacuation program. As discussed previously, I am concerned about the physical accessibility of
many of the Evacuspots themselves, which sometimes do not afford any kind of handicap access.
In addition, there are concerns associated with the city’s reliance upon residents registering for
special transportation assistance by dialing 3-1-1 or visiting a website. As Willigen et al.
mention (2002:100), those with disabilities are more likely to be socio-economically
disadvantaged than majority populations. Disabled individuals may not have access to a
telephone or to internet services that would allow them to register. However, even assuming
they can and do register, the program assumes that these residents will maintain that phone
number (so that registration can be updated each year), and that they will not change their
physical address (so that the city knows where pick them up). My own research experiences
while attempting to set up interviews with residents who had voluntarily shared their contact
information with me only one year earlier tells me that these are not reasonable expectations.
Many of my survey participant’s phone numbers had changed or been disconnected, many email
addresses bounced back as undeliverable, and in several cases where I returned to knock on the
doors of residents who had told me I could contact them again, I was told by new inhabitants that
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the former inhabitants were gone. Even among the 20 qualitative informants that I was able to
contact via email or telephone, six had relocated to a new address.
When I handed out and explained CAE information to each participant following my
initial survey, many participants shared precisely the same concerns regarding shelter that
Willigen and colleagues expressed. Survey participants wanted to know why there was no
information printed about where people are going or where they would be sheltered. Many
asked me what showers and food would be like at shelters. Several disabled individuals asked
me if they would have access to power outlets (in one case for a CPAP machine) or refrigeration
(for insulin). I always gave the most truthful answer I could give – shelter locations will
necessarily change depending on the direction of a storm, and that accordingly, the New Orleans
Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness (NOHSEP) has operating agreements
with multiple locations in multiple states. Answering the question this way cleared up a great
deal of uncertainty for people, particularly those who guessed that they might be evacuated to the
Super Dome or Convention Center (both of which operated as shelters of last resort during
Katrina). However, I was unable to tell people exactly what shelters would be like or what
resources they would have. Shelters are not operated by local city staff, and many aspects of
how they are run or what resources they provide are simply beyond the scope of the CityAssisted Evacuation program. I can acknowledge that this is understandable as a researcher.
However, I can also see that lack of security regarding these issues is a significant barrier for
population groups with special needs that have to plan outings and overnight stays with extreme
care and caution.
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Pets and Evacuation
Heath et al. examined risk factors, including pet-related risk factors, for failure to
evacuate during a flood in Yuba County, California (2001). While exploring reasons for nonevacuation with 397 households after the flooding, the researchers found that more households
with pets than households without pets failed to evacuate (2001:659). They further determined
that the more pets in a household, the more likely that household was to disregard evacuation
notices (2001:659). The authors also found a correlation between responsible pet ownership
(which they designated as keeping pets indoors, taking them to the vet, and maintaining up-todate vaccinations) and increased likelihood to evacuate as a pet owner (2001:664). Heath et al.
named the following pet-related impediments to evacuation: owning multiple pets, owning
“outdoor” dogs, and not having a cat carrier (2001:659). They call for pre-disaster planning that
educates pet-owners on how to safely evacuate with their pets, and suggest that evacuation
management services maintain leashes, cages, leather gloves, and vehicles on hand to transport
pets (2001:663). The authors further found that most public shelters do not allow pets, and that
most pet owners who evacuated stayed with friends, family, or relatives (2001:664). They call
for more research on the effects of “pet-friendly” public shelters during disasters (2001:664).
My own prospective research on evacuation behaviors (see Chapter IV, Statistical Inquiry
3) shows even before an event, pet owners in New Orleans were less likely to state a preference
to evacuate than non-pet owners. This was significant at the 5% level. This is not explained by
any significant difference in how likely pet owners and non-pet owners are to have a preemptive
evacuation plan; this had a combined mean of 51.2%. Some households I encountered expressed
impediments to evacuating with their pets beyond those discussed by Heath et al. For example,
several survey participants owned exotic pets (e.g., a snake and a large tortoise) and were not
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sure whether those animals would be welcomed by the CAE program. Other pet owners
expressed concern that their dogs could not be taken on CAE transport because they were “not
good with people” or had been “trained to be guard dogs” (several of such dogs were removed
from the room or yard so that I could safely conduct my survey). Several survey participants
told me sad stories of leaving their pets behind with food during the Katrina evacuation, thinking
they would be home in a few days. Perhaps as a result of these stories and their outcomes, most
residents are now unwilling to evacuate without their pets.
My qualitative research interviews revealed an additional impediment to evacuating with
pets: reluctance to impose their pets on other people. This was a particular concern of two
informants: the first, a man with a very energetic dog, and the second, a woman with three cats
and no car. Although the woman did have carriers for each of her three cats, she was concerned
that she would be unable to navigate evacuation assistance while carrying all three carriers in
addition to her own luggage, even assuming they were welcome.
The CAE program has made significant provisions for pet owners and their pets.
Working in partnership with the Louisiana SPCA and with input from Evacuteer, they have
formulated a relatively pet-friendly plan. Pets small enough to fit in to carriers will ride in buses
on the laps of their owners or by their feet. Larger pets will be transported in air-conditioned
transit vans behind the buses where their owners are on board. The plan for sheltering pets is
similar: small pets will reside with their owners, and larger pets will be housed in a separate
facility in walking distance of their owner’s shelter. In both cases, pet owners are expected to
feed their own pets.
This plan improves vastly on the limited pet evacuation support services typical in other
cities, but my research suggests several remaining concerns. One smaller concern is that pet
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owners are expected to bring their own pet food and are not told how many days’ worth of food
to pack. This poses a problem for those with multiple pets and for all pet owners who find
themselves unable to return home after a few days, because the volume of pet food they are
required to carry may become unmanageable. A bigger concern relates to the actual evacuation
process. At present, it is not clear whether those who show up carrying pets by hand or with pets
in unapproved carriers (such as cardboard boxes or pillowcases) will be allowed to use the CAE
program. It is also unclear what will happen when people show up with unvaccinated pets or
even vaccinated pets but no records. No guidelines are in place to address these situations or to
clarify who is responsible for making these calls or policing these protocols, and it seems unfair
to place the burden of turning away needy people who may not meet rider requirements upon the
unpaid volunteers who work for Evacuteer. While the carrier and vaccination policies are
matters of public safety, the CAE is presumably intended as a low-barrier program geared
toward serving the needs of vulnerable populations, many of whom may have unvaccinated pets
with unapproved carriers that they are simply unwilling to leave behind. Accordingly, these
questions have been hotly debated by program partners at CAE planning meetings.
Elderly Populations and Evacuation
Rosenkoetter and colleagues examined older adults’ perceptions of evacuation through a
descriptive survey focused upon lower socioeconomic participants at meal assistance sites in
New Orleans following Hurricane Katrina (2007). The authors found that Hurricane Katrina
significantly impacted participants’ prospective decisions to evacuate for future events. Over
70% of their survey participants reported that they would definitely evacuate for a future event
(2007:160). Those who did not anticipate evacuating often reported that they did not trust the
news on television or the information about disasters disseminated by local officials (2007:160).
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The authors also found that health concerns such as decreased mobility, hypertension, and
arthritis tended to complicate the evacuation process for the elderly (2007:160). Furthermore,
they determined that 46% of those surveyed had no personal means of transportation and would
need some form of assistance with evacuation (2007:160).
Rosenkoetter’s et al.’s work is of particular interest to my research because it relates to
the elderly population of New Orleans during the year prior to the initial roll-out of its CAE
Program, before Evacuteer’s involvement. CAE has since directly taken up many of the
concerns raised by Rosenkoetter and colleagues, such as the need to provide transportation
assistance and the need for a pre-emptive planning strategy that allows elders to travel with pets
(2007:161). Other problems they identify remain unaddressed. For example, Rosenkoetter et al.
found that 57.5% of individuals had no cell-phone and that only 29 of 139 interviewees had
access to a computer with internet access. While these numbers have likely improved somewhat
as the city has had more time to recover from Katrina, my research shows that lack of
information sources and the inability to register for evacuation assistance via telephone or
internet is still a concern for elderly populations in New Orleans today.
The elderly’s lack of trust in information provided by news and public officials is another
persistent concern. Rosenkoetter and colleagues believe that city officials could increase trust in
the information they provide and “promote public acceptance by explaining how decisions are
made, what emergency measures need to be taken, and where older adults can access
information” (2007:166). Although this suggestion was made before the advent of CAE, the
advice remains directly relevant to the city of New Orleans today.
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The Saffir-Simpson Scale: Killer Misconceptions
Throughout both my survey and qualitative interview periods, many participants
remarked that they would look to specific weather markers when deciding whether to shelter in
place or evacuate. Some would evacuate “when something turns from a tropical storm in to a
hurricane”; others would leave for “anything higher than a Cat 1 storm.” Participants frequently
mentioned storm categories (referring to the Saffir-Simpson scale) when explaining when they
would evacuate (Chapter V, Weather Beliefs), and whenever someone did so, I asked them why.
I quickly came to realize that people’s perceptions of how these categories related to danger and
risk did not reflect an accurate understanding of what the Saffir-Simpson scale represents. The
National Hurricane Center (NHC) defines the “Saffir-Simpson Hurricane Wind Scale” as “a 1 to
5 rating based on a hurricane's sustained wind speed. This scale estimates potential property
damage” (Saffir Simpson Wind Scale, n.d.). The NHC defines the category ratings as follows:
Category 1: 74-95 mph. Very dangerous winds will produce some damage.
Category 2: 96-110mph. Extremely dangerous winds will cause extensive damage.
Category 3: 111-129mph. Devastating damage will occur.
Category 4: 130-156 mph. Catastrophic damage will occur.
Category 5: 157mph or higher. Catastrophic damage will occur. (Saffir Simpson Wind
Scale, n.d.).
Significantly, these ratings reflect only the potential damage to property and buildings related to
wind speed, and do not estimate other factors that represent potential risk to human life, such as
the potential for storm surge, rainfall, or hurricane movement speed.
In a Time article entitled, “Hurricane Florence is Exposing Major Problems with How We
Categorize Storms” (2018), reporter Alejandro De La Garza recounts the misunderstandings
many residents along the North Carolina coast had when deciding how to respond to Hurricane
Florence, a storm ranked as a Category 4 storm while off the coast but degraded to a Category 1
storm shortly before making landfall. Weather officials expressed concerns that reporting the
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degraded category strength led residents to have underestimate the risk presented by the
incoming storm. Just before the storm, FEMA director Brock Long warned residents,
Just because the wind speeds came down…please do not let your guard down.
This is a very dangerous storm. Storm surge is why many of you have been placed
under evacuation and we are asking citizens to please heed a warning. Your time
is running out. (De La Garza, 2018)
As De la Garza reports, the difference between the sustained wind speeds measured by the
Saffir-Simpson scale and the speed the hurricane itself is moving can be significant (2018).
Furthermore, “slower storms can dump biblical amounts of rain and create other hazards in a
more limited area over longer periods of time” (2018). As Dr. Tricia Wachtendorf, Director of
the Disaster Research Center at the University of Delaware, remarks in the article, “[w]e really
have to think about the different types of ways of explaining the risks. Having a classification
system or a cone of uncertainty is one approach, but that has to be balanced with other
information as well” (De La Garza, 2018).
The question suggested by Wachtendorf’s remark is how to provide the general public
with enough information to accurately convey risk without confusing or overwhelming them.
New Orleans’ CAE program and Evacuteer currently operate only in advance of storms rated
Category 3 or higher, the historical benchmark for NOHSEP’s mandatory evacuation warnings
for Orleans Parish (though Louisiana Parishes outside the levee protection system do have
different benchmarks). However, following the August 5th, 2017 flooding, New Orleans planners
met with representatives of the U.S. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)
to discuss whether revising these benchmarks would better reflect the true risks presented by
storms, particularly risks related to flooding. I attended this meeting. As of this writing, I am
not aware of any final revision to modify the CAE plan, Evacuteer, or mandatory evacuations for
New Orleans at any time other than the approach of a Category 3 or higher storm.
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Thirteen Years Later, We’re Still Talking about Katrina: The Real, The Imagined, The
Mythologized
When writing my research proposal, I was very careful not to view, talk about, or refer to
this project as “Hurricane Katrina-Related Research.” I did not want to conduct a “post-Katrina
assessment” or examine “how Katrina affected risk perceptions.” Nor did I intend to look at
New Orleans in light of how CAE and Evacuteer are “post-Katrina projects.” My Internal
Review Board research request specifically mentioned that I would not ask any questions
directly related to Katrina so as to avoid triggering Katrina-related post-traumatic stress in any of
my survey or interview participants. And yet, despite my caution and the 13 years since the
storm hit, I somehow wound up spending a lot of my time listening to people talk about Katrina.
In many ways, the story of Katrina is ingrained in the city of New Orleans itself, and
references to the storm are unavoidable. The Starbucks in Lakeview has a bronze waterline
painted near its ceiling as a reminder of how high the waters rose when the levees broke. When I
went to survey the 9th Ward, I waded through areas of tall grass and missing sidewalks where
houses once stood, were flooded, and were eventually demolished. I walked up to the doors of
“Brad Pitt Houses,” the Make-it-Right Foundation’s efforts at rebuilding in the Lower 9th Ward.
When I spoke to residents throughout the city, many would hold up their hands, or in some cases
raise them above their heads, to show me how high the flood waters from Katrina had risen in
their homes.
I carefully avoided saying Katrina myself so that no one would feel obligated to talk
about the storm. However, I anticipated that some of my questions (such as whether a
participant had prior experience with hurricanes) might prompt Katrina-related responses and
was unsurprised when many participants volunteered their Katrina stories. What did surprise

199

me, however, were the ways in and extent to which Katrina had affected New Orleanians’
perceptions of risk, even when they had no personal lived knowledge or connection to the event.
One way Katrina affected risk perception is illustrated by the responses I frequently
received to the following survey questions: (1) “My house has flooded during a previous
hurricane (Yes/No/Unsure),” and (2) “My house is at risk from flooding during a hurricane
(Yes/No/Unsure).” I had included these questions with the intention of locating these responses
over city flood maps to see if perception of flood risk was higher for those living in low-lying
areas. However, participants often told me that “yes,” their home had flooded before, but “no,”
their house was not at risk of flooding again. Sometimes, where a home had been raised above
projected flood levels, this response made sense. But in other cases, people who had just told me
they had 14 feet of water in their single-story, unraised, ranch-style houses during Katrina
explained that they were not worried about their home flooding again because “they fixed the
levees.” It is true that flooding during Katrina was chiefly due to levee failures due to storm
surge, and not due to wind or rain, but I am very concerned about how this risk perception might
play out in the future. Rainfall amounts for the next storm might be significantly higher than
they were for Katrina, and New Orleans is still dependent upon a debatably functional pump
system that is over 100 years old. I am also concerned that many non-locals marked “no” when
asked whether their house had flooded in a previous hurricane, although they lived in
neighborhoods I knew had flooded during Katrina and several of their neighbors had talked with
me about how their homes had flooded. These new residents, looking at the carefully rebuilt
historic homes and old-growth trees, were unaware that they were living in neighborhoods that
had previously flooded. In each case this happened, the individuals were renters. I discovered
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that these questions, intended as a marker of geographical location, strongly reflected personal
risk perceptions.
My survey also revealed a Katrina-related misconception regarding CAE. When they
learned what I was studying, a few participants told me that they thought the CAE program was a
new and organized way to take people to the Super Dome, the Convention Center, or other
shelters of last resort. They believed that Evacuspots were intended as a pre-determined place to
meet up for help with evacuation if your home became flooded during a hurricane. I only
received those insights because participants offered their thoughts without prompting; these
aspects of CAE were not in any way an organized set of questions on my survey. They serve to
illustrate the many unexpected ways that Katrina affected my research.
Katrina took on additional relevance to my research during qualitative interviews with
non-locals who had no direct personal experience of the storm. These residents often shared
acquired knowledge of what they expected a hurricane might be like, drawing upon stories they
had heard from friends and neighbors, or images they had seen in print or on film. The strict
truth of these stories is irrelevant; what is interesting to my research is that many stories took on
an almost mythologized aspect. In these retellings, people were forced to wait on bridges “for 12
hours” to evacuate. When the teller’s neighbors tried to return home, “the National Guard met
them at gun-point.” A man who thought his neighbors might have stolen his boat instead “found
it in a tree blocks away.” Stories like these were never first-hand accounts: they were always
related by way of a friend-of-a-friend or neighbor. All of these stories could be honest and
unexaggerated accounts of events that followed Hurricane Katrina, but I have heard similar
versions from various people in other contexts over the years, and they all have aspects of major
headline news stories. Their “truth” is in what they convey about the city’s collective trauma
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related to Katrina and New Orleanians’ perceptions of the potential devastation of a hurricane
and related evacuation.
These aspects of my research suggest opportunities to improve CAE by improving
people’s knowledge and understanding of the program. City planners might raise people’s
estimation of CAE by explaining that it is a new program born out of lessons learned following
Katrina and that is intended to take proactive measures that might prevent history from repeating
itself. Emphasizing that CAE did not exist before “the storm” and that it in no way is associated
with the unfortunate events that occurred at the Super Dome or the Convention Center might
increase trust. Trust may also be improved by messaging focused on dispelling myths of
separation or displacement. In many ways, telling people what CAE and Evacuteer will not do
might be as important or more important than telling them what it will do. New Orleanians need
to believe that CAE will not displace individuals across the country with no planned or organized
passage back for their return, will not separate families, will not house them with sex offenders
or other dangerous individuals (who must ride and shelter separately), and will not make them
leave their pets behind on doorsteps or force them to set them loose. These should be promises
that we as planners can make to the citizens of New Orleans because of the planned aspects of
the proactive CAE program set in place. If we do not feel comfortable making these promises,
we may need to revisit planning protocols.
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CHAPTER VIII
CONCLUSIONS
What We Can Learn from an Untested System
The introduction to this research mentioned that the only test of New Orleans’ CityAssisted Evacuation program (CAE) was Hurricane Gustav in 2008, one year after the program’s
inception. Officials estimated that between 15,000 and 20,000 individuals used the CAE
program to evacuate (Fogarty, 2011; Kiefer et al., 2009). Robert Fogarty, who served as
volunteer coordinator for Mayor C. Ray Nagin’s office during the inaugural run of the CAE
program helped mobilize several hundred one-time AmeriCorps volunteers who tagged luggage,
answered phones, and offered translation services (Fogarty, 2011). Fogarty realized that surgecapacity staffing provided by these volunteers had been crucial to efficiently and effectively
evacuating the city during Hurricane Gustav, and further believed that CAE would be more
successful in the future if volunteers could be preemptively and formally mobilized (2011).
Born from this vision, Evacuteer was officially recognized as a 501.3c organization in August of
2009 (Fogarty, 2011).
The CAE program that New Orleans offers its citizens today is a collaborative
partnership between Evacuteer and the New Orleans Office of Homeland Security and
Emergency Preparedness’s CAE program. An official public/private NGO partnership such as
this is still relatively rare in preparedness planning initiatives and is in fact the only such
preemptive evacuation partnership of its kind in the United States today. The partnership directly
addresses the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s “Public Health Emergency
Preparedness Capability One: Community Preparedness,” which recommends public and private
organizations work together in an organized and structured way when undertaking risk reduction
actions (CDC, 2016).
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The idea of volunteer evacuation management assistance is a novel approach to
preparedness that is virtually unheard of in emergency management circles, and I set out to
gauge New Orleanians’ perceptions of the CAE/Evacuteer partnership in hopes that those
perceptions could shed light on the program’s potential efficacy during a future event.
Accurately understanding the program’s effectiveness is particularly important because other
cities are looking to New Orleans when developing their own emergency preparedness
programming. Following a very active 2018 Gulf hurricane season, Evacuteer experienced an
increase in inquiries from neighboring coastal cities who are considering adopting similar models
for their cities. My hope is that the research findings presented here might show both the
benefits and initial hurdles the partnership in New Orleans is experiencing, and that areas
identified for improvement can be addressed preemptively here in New Orleans in an effort to
improve future outcomes.
Model-based Approaches to Emergency Planning
I chose to use the Health Believe Model constructs to evaluate systems within the
Evacuteer/CAE partnership that Evacuteer staff had long suspected were problematic because it
allowed me to organize, separate, rationalize, quantify, and categorize problems in such a way
that they can be readily assessed and understood by outsiders. However, one limitation of the
HBM is that there is no way to prioritize one construct over any others, and it provides no clear
evidence that any particular construct may be more relevant to outcomes than others. It is
therefore difficult to say if the magic formula for improving health outcomes during evacuation
events is to remove barriers, increase self-efficacy, or better convey information that contributes
to understandings of perceived severity or susceptibility. That magic formula may be a little bit
different for each individual. However, there are also benefits to an unbiased and unweighted
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approach such as the HBM when looking at preconceptions rather than examining outcomes.
Starting from a set-problem perspective is problematic when, as here, there is no strong evidence
establishing that the problem identified is the primary problem. Instead of fixating on a problem
I assumed was significant and pushing to allocate resources toward it, I was able to conduct a
broad evaluation that showed a fuller range of possible contributing factors.
The HBM was also particularly valuable to my research because I was able to use the
constructs themselves as a way to organize and code the qualitative data set. Not only did this
allow me to talk about my data in a way that is familiar to anyone else who has encountered the
model, it also allows for continuity of evaluation from a qualitative research perspective. Even if
I am not the researcher, the code set used here is not unique to me in the way that most
qualitative coding sets are. Future researchers who work with Evacuteer or the CAE program
can also code their data set based upon the set constructs of the HBM and expect to see some
measurable changes in trends in perceptions. I am not necessarily suggesting that future
researchers use this particular model, but I am advocating that organizations choose a modelbased evaluation approach and stick with it to periodically assess their programs in order to build
comparable datasets. This is particularly important in situations such as the CAE/Evacuteer
partnership which require multi-agency cooperation across organizations with members from
significantly different backgrounds.
Suggestions for the Improvement of Evacuteer and the CAE Program
One conclusion evident from my research is that both Evacuteer and the CAE program
could improve their marketing and branding strategies. This underscores Evacuteer’s own
earlier Readiness Ride results, which indicate that the Evacuspot statue is not yet a wellestablished symbol of evacuation support in New Orleans. These statues’ intent was to highlight
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existing evacuation locations throughout the City of New Orleans, but they also inadvertently
cemented those sites in place by affixing permanent markers to the site locations. While it would
be ideal to easily relocate evacuation sites as city landscapes change, the suggestions below do
not address site relocation. Such an endeavor would not only be cost-prohibitive, but would
require assessment from a team of individuals far more knowledgeable than myself in matters of
transportation and urban planning. However, they do address the other elements of my research
outcomes where changes are within the reasonably attainable scope of the City of New Orleans
CAE program and Evacuteer as a non-profit organization.
Evacuteer and the CAE program need to work together to increase program visibility as a
unit. The first step to doing so should be for both partner organizations to conduct an audit of
their currently operational information sources, including websites and physical marketing and
branding materials, to ensure that all messaging available to the public uniformly reflects what
both organizations agree to be the most current plan for operating evacuation support. This
process should include an audit of information displayed by other community partners and city
organizations who generate and perpetuate evacuation support materials of their own, such as
(but not limited to) the Louisiana Department of Health, the Louisiana SPCA, and the New
Orleans Regional Transit Authority. As it currently stands, not all information disseminated
throughout the city related to CAE is uniform. I also found that in many cases, online
information pathways are broken, and “click to learn more” links often circle back to pages the
viewer has already seen rather than conveying additional necessary information.
The second step, once all information sources have been located and audited, is for
planners to work together to assess gaps and discrepancies in information and decide jointly
where to add additional information and how to make improvements to information sources.
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When doing so, the goal should be to ensure that the information available to citizens of New
Orleans directly addresses citizen questions and concerns with programming. My research
serves as a starting point in identifying many of these questions and concerns (see Ch. V), but I
urge planners to consider holding community engagement meetings to allow citizens to voice
their questions and concerns directly to the organizations. These meetings would not only
provide additional insights, but also improve community/planner/partner engagement and
interest.
I would also urge planners to consider increasing program transparency when working
together to develop an informative and unified messaging approach. Explaining the aspects of
the evacuation program that most confuse and concern prospective participants will go a long
way toward increasing trust in the organizations. For example, planners should consider
explaining that safe evacuation locations outside of the city will necessarily change depending on
individual weather events, and that this is the reason that the city is unable to provide advance
information on precisely where individuals will be evacuated to. A reasonable and transparent
answer (even if the answer is “here is why we don’t know”) is better than no answer at all.
People are more reassured when planners share what is known (“we will take you to an airconditioned facility that is handicap accessible, in a location that is safe for this particular
storm”) than when they share no information at all.
Based on my research, I believe that trust will be increased if Evacuteer and the CAE
program use their non-profit NGO/city government partnership to their advantage and allow
Evacuteer to be the “face” of evacuation in New Orleans. Although Evacuteer assists the CAE
program, and not the other way around, allowing Evacuteer to serve as the outward distributor of
information makes sense for several reasons. First, the Evacuteer statues themselves are already
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in place as a branded image of the evacuation program. Once residents begin to better
understand what they are, the Evacuteer statues will provide free advertising for the program
throughout the city. Second, rather than dividing resources and conducting limited community
outreach independently, pushing resources toward Evacuteer will enable them to do more
outreach at a greater capacity. This has two potential positive results: not only does it increase
awareness of the program to vulnerable populations that may need support, but it also opens the
door for wider involvement from those who do not need the evacuation service but want to help
by volunteering with Evacuteer to help others who do. Finally, allowing Evacuteer to serve as
the official representative of evacuation in New Orleans may provide a buffer against the general
public’s low level of trust in the city. In an article entitled, “The Public’s Trust in Non-Profit
Organizations: The Role of Relationship Marketing and Management,” Herrington Bryce
explains Kenneth Arrow’s concept of trust in non-profits, which, “is grounded in a concept of
congruence of interest— A can trust B because A and B have a similar interest, purpose or
orientation. Thus, individuals create organizations and become clients to assure that their
preferences are attended to and not subordinated” (Bryce, 2016). In the case of New Orleans
residents and Evacuteer, the congruence of interest can be considered high. Both Evacuteer and
New Orleans residents have an interest in saving lives by evacuating people who cannot help
themselves in advance of a hurricane. This interest is Evacuteer’s only goal. Conversely, in the
case of the relationship between the City of New Orleans and New Orleanians, congruence is
necessarily lower because the scope of roles that the City of New Orleans plays is far wider, and
many of the roles it plays, such as the role of conducting tax assessments and acting as law
enforcement, are not beneficial to building a solid relationship of trust. Knowing that Evacuteers
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will be on-site at evacuation pickup points to help the process go smoothly and treat evacuees
with dignity and respect may make all the difference in participation outcomes.
Once planners have developed relevant unified messaging and decided who will
distribute it, they will need to find ways to better disseminate that information. Both Evacuteer’s
and the CAE program’s historic approach to marketing has been tabling events and occasional
neighborhood canvassing. Both of these approaches reach a single individual or family with
each point of contact. My statistical inquiry on outside influence (see Chapter IV) established
that family, friends, and religious organizations often influence and impact evacuation decisions.
While the degree of perceived impact from these entities varies by demographic, this awareness
of outside influences could strengthen outreach and promotion tactics. This may be particularly
true for religious influence. Previous research has shown that faith-based-organization (FBO)
involvement has increased recovery outcomes (Pant et. al, 2007; Philips & Jenkins, 2010;
Putman et. al, 2012; Gajewski et. al, 2011), and while recovery is different from preparedness,
there is no reason to believe that FBO involvement would not have a positive impact. Many of
the reasons FBOs have been shown to improve recovery outcomes – such as increased
community involvement (Mileti,1999:33) – would also apply to preparedness. Establishing a
culture of proactive evacuation culture within New Orleans faith-based communities would both
improve program visibility at the community level and also establish continuity of educational
messaging as existing members will be able to educate newcomers on the cultures established
within their organizations. Working at this level also shifts the outreach impact from a scale of
individual-to-individual to a scale of individual-to-many, allowing outreach coordinators at both
partner organizations to maximize their potential. Furthermore, this practice applies to other
organizations beyond the scope of FBOs. For example, veterinary clinics offering reduced or no-
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cost vaccinations could provide evacuation information to pet owners. Doctor’s offices and
pharmacies offering low and reduced cost services could hand out information about evacuation
services during hurricane season. Partner websites should invite other community-involved
businesses to request an outreach event at their facilities. By looking for educational
opportunities where the knowledge they convey for the day will travel further down a
community chain, outreach coordinators can maximize their potential impact.
Public information regarding prospective storms should also be improved. City planners
and Evacuteer monitor weather reports and evaluate evacuation possibilities during the period
leading up to any prospective evacuation events, and it would be beneficial to provide updates to
the general public as part of that process. These updates should provide relevant information
beyond the Saffir-Simpson scale such as projected rainfall, projected storm surge, projected
storm speed, and what these projections mean in layman’s terms for a likely mandatory
evacuation and CAE activation. Educating the public on elements of risk beyond wind speed
will help them to more accurately assess their own susceptibility based on their own
transportation and sheltering options, and it is better to provide that information proactively.
Providing these kinds of updates to Evacuteer volunteers “internally” before releasing them to
the public at large undermines credibility when information inevitably leaks onto neighborhood
messaging boards and is taken up by the news. This was the case with Hurricane Harvey during
the days preceding the storm when projected landfall was not yet clear and Evacuteers were “oncall.” The public’s suspicion that they were not being fully informed while city planners
considered evacuation led citizens to question the integrity and intent of the programs.
Each of the suggestions for improvement offered above are directly informed by the
constructs of the Health Belief Model. Giving residents all information they need to make
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informed evacuation decisions for themselves and their families increases self-efficacy, as
residents will have the confidence to know where to go, what to bring, and how to use the
program. Providing that information in a way that is transparent and detailed removes barriers
associated with lack of trust and misunderstandings. Making uniform information widely
available and frequently encountered throughout New Orleans increases cues-to-action to use the
program, should the need arise. Offering detailed information beyond the category strengths
associated with the Saffir-Simpson scale during an impending storm allows citizens to more
accurately gauge perceptions of severity and susceptibility. And, although it is difficult to look
at the bright side during an evacuation, reminding residents that they are trading power outages
and stifling humidity for a cool and air-conditioned place for themselves and their families to rest
during a hurricane if they choose to evacuate helps reframe the perceived benefits of evacuation.
“Studying Up”
Throughout my research, from the moment I formulated my thesis proposal, I was asked
by fellow scholars, instructors, and, later, those interested in presentations of my research why I
did not structure my research around the vulnerable population groups that Evacuteer and the
CAE program see as their primary service demographic. During my internship period with
Evacuteer, even staff wanted to know what value there was in interviewing and surveying
individuals who were not likely to use the program. There are two answers to this question. The
first is that because the Evacuteer/CAE partnership is new and singularly unique as an
evacuation preparedness measure within the United States, I wanted to be certain that I did not
leave anyone out. Although preparedness planners generally think of vulnerability in terms of
race, age, gender, socioeconomic status, and the overlapping effects of belonging to categorically
vulnerable groups, I was concerned that there might be other groups who may need to use CAE
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services that were not as easily identifiable as categorically vulnerable. For example, one such
group that I feel has not received due attention in current academic literature on emergency
preparedness is international students. While universities typically make provisions to evacuate
students residing in campus housing during emergency events, this may not extend to students
who live off campus. These students tend to live with roommates close enough to campus that
they can walk or commute by bicycle, and thus rarely own vehicles. Many are older students,
such as those at the masters and doctoral levels, who are surviving on limited stipend or grant
funding, with little to no expendable income at the end of each month that they could use to
evacuate independently. They may have recently moved to the area or to the country and be
unaware of the local culture of risk and hazard perceptions. Despite these vulnerabilities, most
of these students would be overlooked if I focused on categorically vulnerability populations.
When I first started interning with Evacuteer, I wondered why so many Evacuspots were
clustered in the Uptown/Carrollton area, one of the most affluent neighborhoods in New Orleans.
I have since come to realize that these spots are the most accessible to Tulane and Loyola
University students, many of whom are foreign and cannot easily return home during an
evacuation. However, if I had focused on mapping out vulnerable populations, my research
would have never taken me in to Uptown, and I would have missed this group entirely.
The second, and more impactful reason for my whole-population approach stems from
my thinking about what it will really take to ensure that Evacuteer and the CAE program are
well-established and well-regarded as successful programs: whole community buy-in. In
discussing the basic principles of sustainable hazards mitigation, Mileti recommends the
adoption of “a consensus-building approach, starting at the local level” and further explains that
[b]uilding consensus is a process of seeking wide participation among all of the
people who have a stake in the outcome of the decision being pondered,
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identifying all possible concerns and issues, generating ideas for dealing with
them, and reaching agreement about how they will be resolved and what steps
will be taken. (1999:34)
Everyone in New Orleans has a vested interest in seeing all citizens evacuated safely during a
hurricane and avoiding the pain and suffering felt city-wide because of the significant loss of life
following Hurricane Katrina. Bearing this in mind, we must realize that there are two distinctly
unique but equal sides to the coin of successful evacuation preparedness in our city. The CAE
depends upon Evacuteer for surge-capacity staffing during an emergency evacuation event. Just
as Evacuteer and the CAE program need buy-in from potential users of the services they offer,
they also need buy-in from those offering their time as volunteers. Going back to Mileti’s quote,
it is not only our vulnerable populations but also our volunteers who contribute to broad
participation, who have a stake in the outcomes of decision-making, who are able to generate
ideas for program improvement, and who provide the manpower to actually take the steps to
move programming forward and to ultimately sustain it through service and donations to the
organization.
Considering that this was a study of how perceptions of Evacuteer and the CAE program
in New Orleans may affect evacuation outcomes, it is valuable to know what potential
volunteers, donors, benefactors, and directors of partner organizations that help build strength in
advocacy think of these organizations and their programming. In a presentation entitled Five
Years Later: Emergency Preparedness in New Orleans, LA Since Hurricane Katrina, Evacuteer
founder Robert Fogarty writes,
Evacuteer.org has long-term financial sustainability questions that must be
answered for it to remain relevant in emergency preparedness in New Orleans, as
well as to expand its reach to other Gulf cities. Since its creation in 2009, the
organization has struggled to attract public and private financial support, despite
receiving high marks from its volunteers, the City of New Orleans, and many
major media outlets. Currently, the organization is still run on a day-to-day,
volunteer basis by Robert X. Fogarty and a committee of committed volunteers.
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The organization believes that this is a natural step for young organizations to go
through, but it in turn becomes a potential threat to the long-term sustainability of
the organization. Like [name of organization redacted], volunteer or citizen
engagement burnout threatens the organization. This can be addressed by
consistently involving new individuals in the organization, as well as developing
long term financial support. (2010)
Fogarty wrote this statement five years after Hurricane Katrina, when Evacuteer was just two
years old. Although improvements have been made, many of Fogarty’s concerns remain in
2019. The organization has an official funding agreement with the city that affords a paid staff
of one and some limited outreach events, but it still struggles to attract widespread attention and
to find and sustain private financial support that could help it grow. In some small way, I hope
that my own research can contribute to solving this problem by allowing a more specific
understanding of how city perceptions of the organization and its partner may be contributing to
these outcomes.
Anthropologist Laura Nader described the process of studying the middle and upper ends
of social power structures as “studying up” in a 1972 essay entitled Up the Anthropologist:
Perspectives Gained from Studying Up. Nader explains:
Anthropologists have a great deal to contribute to our understanding of the
processes whereby power and responsibility are exercised in the United States.
Moreover, there is a certain urgency to this kind of anthropology concerned with
power, for the quality of life and our lives themselves may depend upon the extent
to which citizens understand those who shape attitudes and actually control
institutional structures. (1972:1)
I would argue that understanding those who shape the attitudes and control the institutional
structures of our emergency management systems has never been more important than it is now,
during a new age of public/private partnership and engagement in proactive emergency planning.
I would urge future planners of multi-sector partnerships to also consider both sides of the
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spectrum of need and support as they relate to program efficacy and outcomes, and I am grateful
for the insight that adopting a whole-community approach to my research process has given me.
Concluding Remarks
In some ways, this research took place over a period of about three years, from my initial
internship period with Evacuteer and through two hurricane seasons of field work and two years
of attending outreach events and continued service as a volunteer with the organization. But in
other ways, this work is the culmination of thirteen years of personal care and concern for the
City of New Orleans.
I moved to New Orleans in 2006, six months following Hurricane Katrina. My husband
and I had already made plans to move to the city prior to the storm and we had put our Texas
home on the market. After Katrina devastated the city, we debated changing our plans but
decided to move anyway. We were young, my husband had a new job in New Orleans, and the
suburbs of Texas were too slow for us. So, we picked up and moved to a post-disaster city.
When we arrived in the 7th Ward, we had power and water, but both went out for long
periods intermittently. Garbage collection and mail services had not yet resumed. Refrigerators
still sat out on corners, and many houses had yet to be gutted. Although I had no previous
service experience to speak of, I quickly found a job at a local restaurant. They were so shortstaffed they would have taken anyone willing to work.
As I settled in to my new city I witnessed many recovery hang-ups first hand. The police
force was understaffed, much of the city infrastructure was still unrepaired, people were waiting
on disaster relief funding to come through so that they could start the rebuilding process, and
many homes sat decaying because their owners were either unable to make it back to the city or
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simply could not be found. There was also a pervasive overriding sentiment from many locals
that the outside world did not care much about the recovery of New Orleans.
I knew that I wanted to do something to improve not only the situation in New Orleans,
but recovery processes in general. I did not see how I could do that as a waitress, so I enrolled as
a student at the University of New Orleans. I had no real college experience and a great deal of
naivete, but when they asked me what I wanted to major in, I told them I wanted whatever kind
of degree would help me get people’s stories out, get them heard, and get them help. The
educational trail I followed, though long and circuitous, has always been driven by this
overriding purpose. As an undergraduate studying English and anthropology, I concentrated on
conveying stories of recovery and cultural preservation. I then chose to pursue a dual degree in
medical anthropology and public health specifically because it offered an optional certification in
emergency planning and preparedness. It was here that I was introduced to the extremely
complex world of emergency management and began to understand the intricacies of
preparedness, mitigation, response, and recovery networks. By the time I got to Louisiana State
University to pursue my Ph.D. in geography, I realized that the best way I could help New
Orleans recover from its past was to better prepare it for a more resilient future. This goal
shaped this research project, and, though it is but one very small part of the larger picture of
increasing a culture of preparedness in New Orleans, it is a very heartfelt effort.
I honestly had the best time conducting my research. I got to walk through 17
neighborhoods throughout New Orleans knocking on people’s doors to ask for their opinions
about our city programming. New Orleanians were generally very willing to speak with me
about their opinions on how we can do better as a community. Of houses where someone
answered a door, I had a virtually unheard-of survey response rate of just over 85%. People

216

were eager to participate because they care about this city. Many of my initial surveys, designed
to take no more than 8 to 10 minutes, took over an hour because people wanted to learn more
about programming that they were unfamiliar with and hear how I thought my research might
help it. I spent a lot of time listening to stories that were never recorded, simply because some
people had been waiting years for someone to come along and listen, and they deserved to be
heard. This process slowed down my research considerably and would have frustrated someone
unfamiliar with the local culture to no end. It also reaffirmed for me that if a public/private
partnership that counts on the service of interested and committed volunteers who love their city
can work anywhere, it is here in New Orleans.
There is much more work to be done in helping Evacuteer and the CAE program to be
successful in their goal of safely evacuating New Orleanians who cannot evacuate themselves.
While much of my analysis looks for problems, it only does so in an effort to help us all better
understand the issues we face so that we can make concrete improvements to our programming.
I urge other planners to take a similar approach in their own research in their own cities: work
critically, but with kindness, and with a spirit of community engagement in mind. It is my hope
that this work may serve not only as an early example of the enormous strides we have made in
recent years in terms of innovative whole-community approaches to emergency planning, but
also as a guidepost for how much we can still do to grow stronger and improve our future
outcomes. In the words of Evacuteer, let’s never underestimate “the power of us.”
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APPENDIX A
USING THE COIN FLIP AND DIE ROLL SAMPLING TECHNIQUE
The dwelling physically closest to the starting point will be approached first.
Household Selection Process
The first dwelling should be approached:
a) If that dwelling fulfills the definition of a household then assign it a household
ID and assess the eligibility of the household adults according to the enrollment
protocol.
b) If that dwelling does NOT fulfill the definition of a household then move on to
the next dwelling.
c) Unless the dwelling is clearly marked as a business, shop, or restaurant then
the field surveyors should assume that it could be a household. They should then
approach to confirm. (Remember that sometimes people who own shops also live
in the back – if any doubt then they should always approach to confirm).
To identify the next dwelling to approach for sampling, the following methods should be
used:
a) The field surveyor will stand with his/her back to the main entrance of the first
dwelling.
b) Flip a coin.
c) If the coin lands on TAILS then proceed to your LEFT. If the coin lands on
HEADS then proceed to on your RIGHT.
Next, roll the die to determine which house to approach. The numbers on the die
represent which house number (in sequential order according to physical distance to the
front door) will be chosen.
a) If the surveyor comes to an intersection or dead-end before reaching the house
number on the die, then flip the coin again to determine the continuing direction.
Again, TAILS will be LEFT and HEADS will be RIGHT.
b) In instances where there is only one physical direction to go, then proceed in
that direction.
c) If a dwelling repeats, then repeat the coin-flip and die process.
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APPENDIX B
IRB APPROVAL FORM AND CONSENT FORM
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Consent Form
1. Study Title: Use of a Behavioral Health Framework to Assess Perceptions of Evacuation Support
Services in New Orleans, Louisiana
2. Performance Site: Louisiana State University and Agricultural and Mechanical College (LSU)
3. Investigators: For questions about this study, please contact researcher, Aubry Kyle, via email at
akyle5@lsu.edu or supervising professor, Dr. Craig Colten, at ccolten@lsu.edu
4. Purpose of the Study: The purpose of this research project is to add to the body of knowledge
about factors that contribute to individual decisions to evacuate or shelter in place when a mandatory
hurricane evacuation is declared in the City of New Orleans.
5. Subject Inclusion: Individuals 18 or older, who live within a 1-km radius of a designated
evacuation spot (“Evacuspot”), in Orleans Parish are eligible to participate.
6. Number of subjects: 257
7. Study Procedures: The study will be conducted in two parts. In the first part, subjects will spend
approximately 15 minutes completing a questionnaire about their knowledge regarding evacuation
services available in New Orleans, and their feelings about evacuation in general. In the second
part, a select group of subjects who indicated a desire to share contact information and be
interviewed will spend approximately one hour being interviewed by the researcher. During the
interview, subjects will be asked their opinions regarding potential risks associated with hurricanes,
as well as their plans for evacuating themselves and their families and pets, or their plans to shelter
in place.
8. Benefits: There is no monetary compensation provided to participate in this study. However, the
study may yield valuable information that can be used to improve evacuation support services for
communities in need of assistance in advance of a hurricane.
9. Risks: There are no known foreseen risks to participating in this study. Every effort will be made to
maintain the confidentiality of your study records. Files will be kept in secure cabinets to which only
the investigator has access.
10. Right to Refuse: Subjects may choose not to participate or to withdraw from the study at any
time without penalty or loss of any benefit to which they might otherwise be entitled.
11. Privacy: Results of the study may be published, but no names or identifying information will be
included in the publication. Furthermore, subjects may participate without providing any personal
contact information. Subject identity will remain confidential unless disclosure is required by law.
12. Signatures: The study has been discussed with me and all my questions have been answered. I
may direct additional questions regarding study specifics to the investigator. If I have questions
about subjects' rights or other concerns, I can contact Dennis Landin, Institutional Review Board
(225) 578-8692, irb@lsu.edu, www.lsu.edu/irb. I agree to participate in the study described above
and acknowledge the investigator's obligation to provide me with a signed copy of this consent form.
Subject Signature:________________________________ Date:____________________
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QUANTITATIVE SURVEY TOOL
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